A short comment on realists claiming that only they think things "really" matter
A short comment I made in a reply to someone that captures part of a common problem I encounter when discussing moral realism:
In rejecting moral realism, it's not that I think that the realist conception of things mattering reflects the correct view of what it would mean for something to really matter, but it happens to be the case that I don't think anything matters in that respect. I both reject that things matter in the respect they think they do and I reject their conception of what it would mean for something to "really" matter. Realists seem to think we can only reject the former, and not the latter. They are mistaken.
Part of the issue I encounter with realists is that they will insist that only they think things "really" matter, and if you're an antirealist, then you can't think things really matter. But this use of "really" is suspicious. What do they mean, exactly?
If they mean that things only they think that things matter in a stance-independent way, that's true. But then it's a bit misleading to say that only they think things "really" matter. Why use this term instead of just repeating "stance-independent"? That would be far more clear and remove any ambiguity. I suspect this is because if they were clear in this way it would be clear that their remarks were trivial. It would amount to saying something like "Only moral realists endorse a realist conception of mattering." Well, sure, but so what?
If, on the other hand, they think that for something to matter in a stance-independent way entails that in "really" matters in a way that goes beyond merely mattering stance-independently, then what else is there to their notion of things "really" mattering? I'd like to hear an account of how the realist conception of mattering reflects what "really," matters, and why antirealist conceptions don't count as "really" mattering.
I suspect, however, that what we're really dealing with is little more than a rhetorical move: to say that things "really" matter only on the realist view, and that antirealist conceptions of mattering aren't "real" mattering gives the impression antirealists have some kind of phony, artificial form of mattering. It reminds me of ads for products that say things like:
"Made with real sugar!"
Such efforts, when exposed as empty rhetoric, should make us more suspicious of moral realism, rather than less. If there are good arguments for moral realism, there's little need to lean so heavily on this sort of rhetoric. And yet much of the discourse on moral realism involves this kind of posturing and the use of language to frame antirealism in a negative light, rather than explain in a clear way, using precise language, why realism is false.
Of course, this doesn't mean there aren't good arguments for moral realism (though who am I kidding? I don't think there are), but I do think it (a) detracts from the case for moral realism and (b) I think it suggests in some cases a kind of animus towards moral antirealism that isn't reducible to an intellectual disagreement alone.