I'm having trouble making sense of what epistemological objectivity means. My inclination from the way it's used is that it can be reduced to ontological objectivity. Harris says it's about being "free from bias", which itself doesn't sound very objective to me (bias from whose perspective?).
I'm not familiar with the academic discourse on this though. Is there a sense of epistemological objectivity used in academic philosophy?
1. Science is objective: it aims at an underlying reality 'beneath' subjective appearances.
2. Consciousness is essentially subjective.
Therefore
3. There can be no natural science of consciousness.
Searle's contention is that there is nothing to prevent a science that is epistemically objective from studying consciousness which is ontologically subjective. Here is the crucial passage:
The pain in my toe is ontologically subjective, but the statement
"JRS now has a pain in his toe" is not epistemically subjective. It
is a simple matter of (epistemically) objective fact, not a matter
of (epistemically) subjective opinion. So the fact that
consciousness has a subjective mode of existence does not prevent
us from having an objective science of consciousness.
Searle's argument goes like this:
4. The pain in JRS's toe is ontologically subjective.
5. That JRS has a pain in his toe is a matter of epistemically
objective fact.
Therefore
6. That consciousness has a subjective mode of existence is consistent
with there being an epistemically objective science of it.
Lance has mangled the argument, construing it as saying that science is *not* concerned with ontological objectivity. This is backward: Harris's aim is to convince people that, while retaining its epistemic objectivity, science can and should broaden from a exclusive focus on ontologically objective facts (e.g., molecules, planets) to encompass ontologically subjective facts (e.g., moral facts about what optimizes well-being).
The opening salvo here seems to rest on a misunderstanding. Someone on Reddit explained it clearly:
"The author is understandably confused, because Sam made an ambiguous claim. Sam said:
Science is fully committed to epistemological objectivity. That is, to analyzing evidence and argument without subjective bias. But it is in no sense committed to ontological objectivity. It isn’t limited to studying objects, that is, purely physical things and processes. We can study human subjectivity, the mind as experienced from the first person point of view objectively, that is, without bias and other sources of cognitive error.
On its own, the bolded bit is ambiguous. Saying "science isn't committed to x" can mean (a) science doesn't concern itself with x at all, or (b) science does not only concern itself with x.
The author seems to think Sam means (a), but Sam actually means (b). So, everything else in the essay that follows from this (a) interpretation is confused. We see this confusion in this paragraph opening:
Harris claims that science is only committed to epistemological objectivity, but not ontological objectivity.
That's not what Sam is saying, and it wouldn't really make any sense if he was. Of course science is concerned with the ontologically objective (i.e., clearly existent physical objects and their physical processes). That's a banal claim about bread & butter science. Sam absolutely does not intend to challenge that.
What he's trying to say is that science isn't limited to concerning itself with clearly existent physical objects and their processes. Science can be about much more. Science can also concern itself with things that are ontologically subjective, such as pain. Pain only exists (i.e., its ontology) subjectively, but it can still be studied and discussed in epistemologically objective terms. And that's precisely what science does when it describes the neurological pathways that bring pain into existence, and effective treatments that snuff it out."
Well said. The metaethics course I took started off with Mackie, to set the stage, and his argument is pretty clearly set out. Was Harris so bored that he just slept through that class?
I never read TML, but I've thought Harris a shallow thinker ever since I read _The End of Faith_, back in the day. Like you, I was initially excited by New Atheism, but I now feel quite disenchanted with the entire atheist-skeptical movement, and one big reason is the fact that poseurs like Harris (and a few others) are still held in high regard. Skeptics frequently seem no better than many Christians in uncritically latching onto "thought leaders" and never letting go. And that's a damning indictment for a movement that's ostensibly about critical thinking and opposed to epistemic authority.
I'm having trouble making sense of what epistemological objectivity means. My inclination from the way it's used is that it can be reduced to ontological objectivity. Harris says it's about being "free from bias", which itself doesn't sound very objective to me (bias from whose perspective?).
I'm not familiar with the academic discourse on this though. Is there a sense of epistemological objectivity used in academic philosophy?
Here's a good summary (found online)...
Searle and Harris are replying to this argument:
1. Science is objective: it aims at an underlying reality 'beneath' subjective appearances.
2. Consciousness is essentially subjective.
Therefore
3. There can be no natural science of consciousness.
Searle's contention is that there is nothing to prevent a science that is epistemically objective from studying consciousness which is ontologically subjective. Here is the crucial passage:
The pain in my toe is ontologically subjective, but the statement
"JRS now has a pain in his toe" is not epistemically subjective. It
is a simple matter of (epistemically) objective fact, not a matter
of (epistemically) subjective opinion. So the fact that
consciousness has a subjective mode of existence does not prevent
us from having an objective science of consciousness.
Searle's argument goes like this:
4. The pain in JRS's toe is ontologically subjective.
5. That JRS has a pain in his toe is a matter of epistemically
objective fact.
Therefore
6. That consciousness has a subjective mode of existence is consistent
with there being an epistemically objective science of it.
Lance has mangled the argument, construing it as saying that science is *not* concerned with ontological objectivity. This is backward: Harris's aim is to convince people that, while retaining its epistemic objectivity, science can and should broaden from a exclusive focus on ontologically objective facts (e.g., molecules, planets) to encompass ontologically subjective facts (e.g., moral facts about what optimizes well-being).
Thanks. I just watched a Searle lecture that helped explain it too.
The way I hash it out is:
Epistemic facts are true propositions
Ontological facts are true propositions of the form "X exists"
I take a skeptical view of truth so I guess I learned where i sit, which is rejection of objective epistemic facts.
The opening salvo here seems to rest on a misunderstanding. Someone on Reddit explained it clearly:
"The author is understandably confused, because Sam made an ambiguous claim. Sam said:
Science is fully committed to epistemological objectivity. That is, to analyzing evidence and argument without subjective bias. But it is in no sense committed to ontological objectivity. It isn’t limited to studying objects, that is, purely physical things and processes. We can study human subjectivity, the mind as experienced from the first person point of view objectively, that is, without bias and other sources of cognitive error.
On its own, the bolded bit is ambiguous. Saying "science isn't committed to x" can mean (a) science doesn't concern itself with x at all, or (b) science does not only concern itself with x.
The author seems to think Sam means (a), but Sam actually means (b). So, everything else in the essay that follows from this (a) interpretation is confused. We see this confusion in this paragraph opening:
Harris claims that science is only committed to epistemological objectivity, but not ontological objectivity.
That's not what Sam is saying, and it wouldn't really make any sense if he was. Of course science is concerned with the ontologically objective (i.e., clearly existent physical objects and their physical processes). That's a banal claim about bread & butter science. Sam absolutely does not intend to challenge that.
What he's trying to say is that science isn't limited to concerning itself with clearly existent physical objects and their processes. Science can be about much more. Science can also concern itself with things that are ontologically subjective, such as pain. Pain only exists (i.e., its ontology) subjectively, but it can still be studied and discussed in epistemologically objective terms. And that's precisely what science does when it describes the neurological pathways that bring pain into existence, and effective treatments that snuff it out."
I've responded here https://open.substack.com/pub/lanceindependent/p/a-response-to-reddit-comments-on
Well said. The metaethics course I took started off with Mackie, to set the stage, and his argument is pretty clearly set out. Was Harris so bored that he just slept through that class?
I never read TML, but I've thought Harris a shallow thinker ever since I read _The End of Faith_, back in the day. Like you, I was initially excited by New Atheism, but I now feel quite disenchanted with the entire atheist-skeptical movement, and one big reason is the fact that poseurs like Harris (and a few others) are still held in high regard. Skeptics frequently seem no better than many Christians in uncritically latching onto "thought leaders" and never letting go. And that's a damning indictment for a movement that's ostensibly about critical thinking and opposed to epistemic authority.
I have pretty much the same attitude. Thanks for sharing that.