Also: in other papers, Street uses the term "normative reasons" a lot. What, if anything, is the difference between that and common-or-garden "reasons"?
I feel just a little bit proud of myself that I used an argument similar to Street's in an essay for the metaethics & normativity seminar I took, a couple of years before I ran across that paper. (My target in that case was Cuneo's Fragile Ella, who desires to believe only happy, comforting things. I pointed out that Ella needs to be a truth-seeker at least some of the time, or the real world will at some point intrude in unpleasant and unignorable ways, thus Cuneo's example doesn't really prove what he wants).
For any given desire, there will be actions that are and are not consistent with achieving the desire. Insofar as you are motivated to perform actions that would achieve your desires, what more of a connection do you need?
Also: in other papers, Street uses the term "normative reasons" a lot. What, if anything, is the difference between that and common-or-garden "reasons"?
I feel just a little bit proud of myself that I used an argument similar to Street's in an essay for the metaethics & normativity seminar I took, a couple of years before I ran across that paper. (My target in that case was Cuneo's Fragile Ella, who desires to believe only happy, comforting things. I pointed out that Ella needs to be a truth-seeker at least some of the time, or the real world will at some point intrude in unpleasant and unignorable ways, thus Cuneo's example doesn't really prove what he wants).
For any given desire, there will be actions that are and are not consistent with achieving the desire. Insofar as you are motivated to perform actions that would achieve your desires, what more of a connection do you need?