It seems to me your claiming (i) the claim 'Murder is wrong' is true iff someone believes that 'Murder is wrong' and (ii) that someone believes that 'Murder is wrong' makes it 'Murder is wrong' true. This seems strange to me because the truth-maker for the sentence does not correspond exactly to the content of the sentence. There is a difference between 'Murder is wrong' and someone believing that 'Murder is wrong'. It seems odd that a state of affairs where someone believes that P would be the truth-maker for P. In most cases it would seem that 'S believes that P' is not a function of 'P' is true.
I think there might be something to this idea. Something about the semantics of these claims on a subjectivist view strikes me as very odd. I am not saying 'strikes me as odd' as an objection, whatever some things are odd. I am just saying there seems to me something fishy about the semantics of this that gives me a reason to pause.
Sharp dismantling of the ‘relativism = infallibility’ trope. The nonmoral-fact entanglement lands; curious how you’d model deep value change over time.
It seems to me your claiming (i) the claim 'Murder is wrong' is true iff someone believes that 'Murder is wrong' and (ii) that someone believes that 'Murder is wrong' makes it 'Murder is wrong' true. This seems strange to me because the truth-maker for the sentence does not correspond exactly to the content of the sentence. There is a difference between 'Murder is wrong' and someone believing that 'Murder is wrong'. It seems odd that a state of affairs where someone believes that P would be the truth-maker for P. In most cases it would seem that 'S believes that P' is not a function of 'P' is true.
I think there might be something to this idea. Something about the semantics of these claims on a subjectivist view strikes me as very odd. I am not saying 'strikes me as odd' as an objection, whatever some things are odd. I am just saying there seems to me something fishy about the semantics of this that gives me a reason to pause.
Sharp dismantling of the ‘relativism = infallibility’ trope. The nonmoral-fact entanglement lands; curious how you’d model deep value change over time.
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