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Jessie Ewesmont's avatar

Lance, thanks a lot for writing this. I'm a moral realist myself, and don't always see eye to eye with you on metaethics - but as I read through this post, I found myself nodding my head a lot in agreement.

In particular, I think your account of how people go from being laypeople with mixed intuitions to being trained to prune them because they're philosophically inconsistent is quite right (although I think the process itself is/can be epistemically legitimate). And I haven't seen many other people talking about this, and sometimes even seen people talk as if it wasn't true (eg. when they poll laypeople about their ethical intuitions and then are surprised that those intuitions conflict).

I think the most charitable reading of Shevlin and Hoyeck is that they think it's in some way *arrogant* to be a relativist who insists that others follow their moral standards. For instance, if someone thought that morality was stance-dependent because it can be reduced to eg. cultural standards, then to insist that everyone else follow your ethical convictions (and refuse to brook disagreement) might seem a little brash because it seems to imply that your culture is better than everyone else's. This, I think, is why Hoyeck makes the remark about taste in movies - he's internally comparing the arrogance of thinking your culture is better than everyone else's to the arrogance of thinking your taste in movies is better than everyone else's. (Although I don't even know if that analogy is good at face value; how many serious movie connoisseurs will have an unshakeable conviction that I'm wrong if I insist that Boss Baby is the best movie ever made?)

Anyway, I think that's the least objectionable construction of their tweets. But even that formulation still leaves much to be criticized. What's bizarre about undergraduates being a bit brash in their ethical beliefs? Heck, even if they *are* philosophically inconsistent, what's bizarre about that? They're going to your class *in order* to learn philosophical skills like maintaining a consistent position, reflecting on your ethical intuitions, learning to rigorously formulate your arguments so you don't assert more than you can prove, and so forth. Of course undergraduates aren't intellectually perfect; it's your job, as an ethics professor, to teach them how to better themselves, rather than publicly making fun of them for not being already perfect. I wouldn't want to be one of Shevlin or Hoyeck's students, if that's the disposition they have towards undergrads.

Also, the "in 2025" references are just weird. University freshmen thinking that all morality is relative and "just your opinion, man" is a phenomenon that's been around for a very long time. r/askphilosophy, an online forum for laypeople to ask questions to philosophers, has an FAQ section on it because it's such a common question. Moral relativity is an incredibly common ethical intuition amongst laypeople! It's straight up conspiratorial thinking to lay that at the feet of a "cult of feeling" caused by therapy and over-affirmation. And of course, serious moral relativists have much more to say about morality than "it's just a feeling", and it's intellectually dishonest to lump them in with the unprepared remarks of philosophical undergrads.

So, from the POV of a moral realist: these guys are being really unserious. I disavow them, I was annoyed to read their tweets, and I want to reassure you that we aren't all like this. There are way better arguments for moral realism than picking on first year undergraduates for having ethical stances that, everything considered, aren't even that odd or far-out.

PS: Some of the responders seem motivated by culture war stuff (eg. the random references to "postmodern philosophy", therapy, "overly affirmed" kids, "moral relativism is the root problem with the world today", etc.) more than genuine philosophical disagreement. Normally I wouldn't bring this up, but if they're going to talk about "cults of feeling"...

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Sam's avatar

Thanks for the post. It was an interesting read. I did, however, think that perhaps you were slightly missing the point of Henry’s tweet (full disclosure I am an old friend of his). My immediate thought was that his point was more pedagogical than metaethical. I also teach philosophy, though at secondary school rather than university, and his tweet chimed with me. What I find interesting (perhaps even ‘bizarre’) is the way that many students are ready and willing to engage in pretty subtle reasoning at the metaethical level, following the line via Moore, Ayer, Hare, Gibbard, Mackie etc… to arrive at a considered anti-realism; but those same students on normative questions seem to be not only absolutely certain of their views but often unwilling to debate them and can even be hostile to intellectual challenges. While I appreciate anecdotes are not data, this certainly has been a pretty common experience for me over the last 15 years of teaching moral philosophy to adolescents. Perhaps the issue being highlighted by Henry isn’t revealing some analytic contradiction, but a tension in how students reason in the different domains of metaethics and normative ethics?

Wading into metaethical waters (a risky endeavour, I am hardly a strong swimmer), I would say that, as a moral realist, I do struggle to comprehend how anti-realists justify specific normative claims. This is particularly so on what you highlight as the question of scope. I certainly don’t doubt that the conative aspect of a moral judgement allows for a subject to hold views that are stance-dependent and to varying degrees of importance. Where I struggle is in justification of the universal scope (or prescriptive element) characteristic of moral claims. I (and I think most non-philosophers) have an intuition that there is an important difference between me saying “I strongly desire that you abstain from acting in this way” and “for you to act in this way is morally wrong”. I also have a strong intuition (again I think shared by most non-philosophers) that a claim for some normative prescription of universal scope should be justifiable. As the moral anti-realist lacks any stance independent element they have nothing but the conative element (whether personal, or culturally augmented) underpinning their expression of a claim’s universal scope. However this conative element lacks the ability to justify the universal scope being asserted, as the desire of a subject (no matter how strongly felt) cannot bridge the gap between ‘I strongly desire all do x’ and ‘x is morally mandated’. While I agree with you that there is no analytic contradiction here, and no necessary cognitive dissonance, I do think this is a problem. Perhaps the best way to describe it would be, following Philippa Foot’s terminology, a mistake of practical reasoning. To justify a universal scope prescription is not a task that can be performed without some recourse to something stance-independent; on the other hand to claim that we do not need to justify a claim of universal scope is to fall short of the normativity moral claims require.

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