Incorrigibility and the futility of defeaters
1.0 Phenomenal gridlock
Suppose two philosophers endorse phenomenal conservatism. If it seems to them that something is true, then they are justified in believing it is true in the absence of defeaters.
To one philosopher, it seems that P. To the other, it seems that not-P. They consider themselves justified in believing P and not-P, respectively, in the absence of defeaters.
Each attempts to present defeaters to the other. Neither is convinced that the defeaters are sufficient to override the strength of their seemings that P and not-P, respectively. Are there any steps that can be taken to resolve these disagreements? If so, what are those steps?
Many philosophical views may play out like an evidential game, where one’s goal is to tally up the points for and against competing views, and reach a conclusion based on which view has the most points in its favor.
Yet philosophers often seem to reserve a kind of “epistemic fudge factor” for the end of the game. Once the points are tallied, the…
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