Betting on moral realism & other bad takes
Twitter Tuesday #43
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1.0 Mattering to vs. Mattering Simpliciter
JPA is at it again with the disappointingly underdeveloped takes on moral realism.
Moral realism is the position that there are stance-independent moral facts. If moral realism was not true, it would mean that…there were no stance-independent moral facts. And that’s about it. Does moral realism being false entail that “nothing matters” or that “life is meaningless”?
Well, that depends. What does it mean to say that “nothing matters”? If by this you mean that nothing stance-independently matters in a moral sense, then this is true. And if by “life is meaningless” you mean that life has no stance-independent meaning (again, in a moral sense), then sure, moral realism being false suggests that life is meaningless in this respect.
But note what JPA is helping himself to: the view that for something to matter, it must matter in a realist sense, and for life to have meaning, it must have meaning in a realist sense. JPA’s views on moral realism seem to involve a conjunction of claims:
Moral realism is true
Something can only matter, and life can only have meaning, in a distinctively realist sense
JPA then suggests that if (1) is false, that (2) would still be true, and so it would follow that if moral realism is not true, that nothing would matter and life would have no meaning.
The problem with JPA’s claim is that a critic can simply reject both of these claims. Both claims are a matter of contention. An antirealist who rejects moral realism is not obliged to just grant that moral realism is necessary for things to matter or for life to have meaning. Rather, they will frequently argue that moral realism is false and that there are conceptions of mattering and meaning that are consistent with rejecting moral realism.
This is a paradigm case of the halfway fallacy.
The halfway fallacy occurs when one argues that a particular position contrary to their own has one or more flaws or undesirable characteristics, but those flaws or undesirable characteristics are only applicable to the position if some set of claims you believe are true are in fact true, but you haven’t argued for and those the objections are directed at are free to (and in many cases probably would) reject. In other words, the problem occurs when one holds certain presuppositions that those who hold the view are free to reject (it might also be the case that they aren’t merely free to reject these presuppositions but do, and it may even be that rejecting the presuppositions is a natural and synergistic feature of the contrary view).
One might also call this the fallacy of unshared presumption. The central problem with this form of reasoning is that an argument for or against some position is based on considering the implications of someone holding one or more views contrary to one’s own, but, critically, not considering that they reject certain other presuppositions you hold.
JPA offers no good reason to think that things would only matter or that life would only have meaning if moral realism were true. He just…makes assertions. This does not make for interesting or compelling philosophy. It is mere dogma masquerading as a serious intellectual stance. If JPA disagrees, he’s welcome to engage in a blog exchange with me, or join me on my channel to discuss his views. I’d also encourage him to post a video response on his own channel. I don’t think he will. JPA has a penchant for ignoring and blocking critics and to my knowledge is not interested in engaging with me on the topic. If not me, then I’d encourage JPA to reach out to other moral antirealists. There are likely plenty who’d be happy to talk to him.
More generally, note that JPA goes into exactly no detail at all to explain what he means by mattering or meaning. If he did, it’d likely become increasingly clear that his realist presuppositions are baked into the very concept of what it means for something to matter or to have meaning, exposing his claims as completely vacuous. JPA’s view amounts to something like that according to the view that things stance-independently matter, if it’s the case that this view is not true, then nothing stance-independently matters. It is an utterly trivial position. Is this a bad objection? Maybe. But JPA doesn’t even bother to address concerns like this. Everything about JPA’s remarks are superficial, remaining perpetually at the surface level, but are presented with such apparent confidence and self-assurance they may have a persuasive effect over readers.
If critics object that there’s little or no space to develop on these ideas on Twitter, well, suppose you are correct. In that case, is it responsible for JPA to be making these sorts of claims? Yet there’s little reason to think this is a plausible take. You can always write multiple remarks over several tweets. I’ve done something similar on Bluesky. There are probably means of automating the character limit splits to make this easier. Second, he could easily link to his blog to posts that unpack his claims in more detail. I don’t know JPA’s intentions, but his approach on twitter seems to be to make provocative, rage-bait style claims, reap the praise of those who agree, engage softball criticisms, and block or ignore anyone able and willing to provide serious pushback. The whole exercise seems utterly pointless, at least from the point of view of engaging in worthwhile philosophical exchanges or producing quality content for one’s audience. Again, I don’t know JPA’s motives, but from all outward appearances, it looks more like what I’d expect from a Christian apologist than a philosopher seriously interested in the truth. JPA is still welcome to disabuse me of this assessment, but for whatever reason he appears dismissive towards me.
JPA goes on to reveal a profound misunderstanding of moral antirealism and makes a variety of dubious remarks about metaethics. Have a look at this exchange:
Pledgendary’s response reveals a common problem I have with other antirealists: they concede ground to moral realists that they don’t have to and shouldn’t concede. It does not follow that if moral realism is false that “life is meaningless.” Why let realists have ownership over the concept of meaningfulness? I don’t grant that it’s built into the very notion of meaning that things can only be meaningful if they’re meaningful independent of our goals, hopes, values, and desires. The only sense of meaning I care about is one that is entirely dependent on our goals, hopes, values, and desires. Realists don’t own the concept of meaning. Antirealists should not hand it over to them.
By conceding a realist notion of meaning Pledgendary sets themselves up for a host of problems they wouldn’t have if they simply rejected JPA’s notion that realism is required for meaning. This leads Pledgendary to make further concessive remarks, like that he’d “bite the bullet.” This concedes further unnecessary rhetorical ground to JPA. See here for a discussion of why antirealists should avoid doing this.
Nevertheless, JPA’s remarks still don’t make that much sense. Note this remark:
And Putin has his preferences. You don’t think some of his are bad (not just ones you’d prefer he didn’t have)? No doubt you’ll bite the bullet here, but I’d bet that you don’t act as if your moral convictions are mere matters of taste/preference.
What on earth does JPA mean when he says that you don’t act as if your moral convictions are mere matters of taste/preference? What, specifically, would someone do that would indicate that they don’t consider their moral convictions a matter of preference? As far as I can tell: nothing at all. Imposing one’s standards on others, getting upset with others for not acting in accord with one’s moral tastes/preferences, feeling guilt, and so on are all consistent with regarding one’s moral standards entirely as a matter of taste/preference.
What surprises me about all this is that JPA was willing to engage with this person. It’s good to see someone actually have an exchange with JPA, but I wonder how he’d react to someone who presented criticisms similar to mine, i.e., critiques that do not accepting his framing of what’s philosophically and practically at stake.
JPA makes assertions elsewhere that continue to reinforce a rigid conception of things “mattering”:
What does JPA mean by mattering? He doesn’t say. But what if something matters to you? Is this notion utterly incomprehensible if moral realism is false? If so, why? Consider, e.g., that my family matters to me, and your family probably matters to you. What does such mattering consist in? I think it consists in the attitudes, dispositions, beliefs, and other features of our psychology that we have towards our family. I want them to be happy. I want them to be safe. I want them to pursue their goals and achieve their dreams. And so on.
In other words, the notion of mattering-to is reducible to various psychological phenomena: emotions, beliefs, attitudes, and so on. But for something to matter-simpliciter, to matter in the sense JPA appears to think things matter, is not for it to matter to anyone in particular or according to some standard or frame of reference. No, it is for things to matter in-and-of-themselves, to simply matter, full stop. This ghostly notion of mattering is utterly divorced from and in no way depends on our actual goals, desires, interests, life projects, attitudes, feelings, or anything else about us. Something would still “matter” even if you found it repugnant and vile and even if it stood for everything you’re against. The notion of mattering JPA alludes to, the realist notion, is an utterly inhuman, alien thing, something I find it strange for JPA or anyone else to care about.
This notion of mattering-to is not unfamiliar to others. See these remarks:
Notably, JPA did not respond to these remarks. Indeed, I’m not the only one who noticed the ambiguity in JPA’s phrasing and the failure to engage with the distinction of mattering to vs. mattering simpliciter:
2.0 What do you mean?
JPA has other bad takes as well:
These remarks are entirely consistent. Is JPA unable to appreciate that some people can employ a move like asking what a term means in sophistic and indefensible ways, but that other people can do so in entirely serious, defensible, and justifiable ways? Sure, some philosophers filibuster and ask what people mean in pointless and distracting ways, but I think JPA does not appreciate that the latter questions, coming from a philosopher, often have a legitimate function in conversations.
There is nothing wrong with philosophers asking what people mean by “meaning” or “conscious,” or “free”. Clarity on the meaning of central philosophical concepts is absolutely fundamental to doing good philosophy. JPA’s implied impatience and opposition to such clarification is a hallmark of his own myopic view of philosophy, which he’s attempting to contort into an implied inconsistency. It’s not very effective.
3.0 Practical consequences of realism
JPA also thinks it’s obvious that there would be a huge practical difference if moral realism were true:
If it makes a huge practical difference, why doesn’t JPA explain what that difference is? I don’t think it makes any practical difference at all if moral realism is true. Many of the responses to this remark are unfortunate:
The initial remark does not make sense.
Even the mere belief that moral realism is true, absent any particular knowledge of morality, is impactful.
…implies that if even the belief could make a practical difference, that the truth of moral realism itself would make even more of a difference. But this does not follow. The truth of moral realism itself could make no difference even if belief in moral realism did make a difference.
Consider abortion. If moral realism is true, then there is an answer - it is moral or immoral. If not, then we can as individuals or societies, make up the answer.
…And what is the practical difference here? Even if there was an answer as to whether abortion was stance-independently moral or immoral, so what? It’s still up to us whether we have any interest in complying with stance-independent moral rules. All moral truth would invariably be filtered through human values and preferences, anyway. All antirealism does is remove the middleman.
Other comments are worse:
Not only does this not help, it does not make any sense. What do Hitler and Mother Theresa have to do with the practical consequences of moral realism?
4.0 No downside to realism
JPA also offers a kind of Pascalian wager in favor of moral realism:
I’ve addressed why these arguments are bad already. See here. An implicit assumption concealed in JPA’s wager is that, if moral realism is false, that there’d be no benefit to believing this, that no good would come of it, because if moral realism is false then there can be no benefits, no goods, nothing of value, and so on. Of course, this is a contestable position, and so a moral antirealist is free to hold the following:
Moral realism is not true
Moral realism does not offer the correct (or at least only) account of what’s good/valuable/beneficial, etc.
As such, we are free to reject JPA’s claim that there’d be no benefit to being a moral antirealist. The only sense in which an antirealist is committed to holding that nothing matters is in the sense that nothing stance-independently matters. While they might think that this is the only sense in which anything could matter, and that if moral realism is not true, that nothing matters, they’re not obligated to think this.
Let’s go through some of the replies:
Many moral antirealists, myself included, deny that “nothing matters.” We can and do care about things and think things matter.
Apparently, JPA even included a Pascal’s Wager argument for moral realism in his dissertation:
Great. That will give me plenty of material to respond to.
4.0 Dismiss without argument
JPA also believes that we can dismiss moral antirealism without argument on the grounds that “there can be no reason to believe that nothing matters.” This is another instance of the halfway fallacy. An antirealist can dispute both moral realism and JPA’s conception of what it means for something to “matter,” maintaining both that moral realism is false (and that nothing matters in the realist sense), and that things can and do matter in a non-realist sense.
Ditto for illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. It is incredible that intellectuals would pride themselves on identifying positions they are willing to dismiss without argument. Here is how I responded to the same prompt:
Engaging with those who hold contrary views is one of the best ways to grow as a philosopher. JPA is doing himself no favors by adopting such an attitude.
5.0 Pragmatism
This last one isn’t about moral realism:
JPA does not explain why it’s ludicrous or insane. I am curious if he’s ever spoken to a pragmatist. I’m a pragmatist. I don’t find the pragmatist’s view of truth to be ludicrous or insane; on the contrary, I think it is a more sober view of truth than any other and that it more closely matches ordinary practice than any other conception of truth.
Fortunately, for this one, JPA received quite a bit of pushback. I’m sympathetic to these remarks:
I think people do often operate in practice as pragmatists, but I don’t think most people are aware of this so I don’t think there’s anything to “admit.” Others responded in defense of pragmatism:
That’s quite a decent showing. As you can see, JPA doesn’t do much to engage with these responses. That’s unfortunate. I think if JPA engaged with the more critical responses and had a back and forth he could better refine his objections and have more substantive and engaging remarks to make about metaethics and other topics. Generally speaking I think philosophers should engage with their best critics, and not necessarily their friendliest critics.