Another great post. I once wrote something very similar regarding subjective probabilities. If person A’s credence that X is true is .7, while person B’s credence that X is true is .4, A and B do not disagree with one another.
I don’t think the distinction between propositional and dispositional disputes is all that helpful. Propositional disputes can also concern plans, goals, or desires.
The source of conflict that motivates disputes over moral claims for subjectivists is the social aspect of morality. When people have different moral standards, there may be no conflict about beliefs, but there clearly is conflict about what actions can/can't/should /shouldn't be taken as a result of those commitments. When I say “X is wrong” that describes what I believe, but that belief is about the norms, obligations, and rights of other people. These are what is at stake in the dispute.
The stakes are never resolved as the result of a single dispute, but that is not a reason for demotivating them. Only agreement would demotivate dispute. Yes, we can agree that my opinion is my opinion and your is yours, but can we agree on how people should be treated? We would not necessarily need to agree on why people should be treated this way, but we would have to agree on how we should treat each other. So long as there is disagreement there, dispute will continue. And it can be framed as either a propositional dispute or a dispositional dispute.
As you might imagine, I don't agree, and I think this post illustrates the importance of the distinction between a propositional and dispositional disagreement.
Framing things in terms of language about what people should or shouldn't do reintroduces the appearance of a conflict of beliefs. It should be very clear when a conflict is a clash of goals rather than a clash of beliefs, and a lot of the language philosophers use obscures or overlooks this.
Another great post. I once wrote something very similar regarding subjective probabilities. If person A’s credence that X is true is .7, while person B’s credence that X is true is .4, A and B do not disagree with one another.
I don’t think the distinction between propositional and dispositional disputes is all that helpful. Propositional disputes can also concern plans, goals, or desires.
The source of conflict that motivates disputes over moral claims for subjectivists is the social aspect of morality. When people have different moral standards, there may be no conflict about beliefs, but there clearly is conflict about what actions can/can't/should /shouldn't be taken as a result of those commitments. When I say “X is wrong” that describes what I believe, but that belief is about the norms, obligations, and rights of other people. These are what is at stake in the dispute.
The stakes are never resolved as the result of a single dispute, but that is not a reason for demotivating them. Only agreement would demotivate dispute. Yes, we can agree that my opinion is my opinion and your is yours, but can we agree on how people should be treated? We would not necessarily need to agree on why people should be treated this way, but we would have to agree on how we should treat each other. So long as there is disagreement there, dispute will continue. And it can be framed as either a propositional dispute or a dispositional dispute.
As you might imagine, I don't agree, and I think this post illustrates the importance of the distinction between a propositional and dispositional disagreement.
Framing things in terms of language about what people should or shouldn't do reintroduces the appearance of a conflict of beliefs. It should be very clear when a conflict is a clash of goals rather than a clash of beliefs, and a lot of the language philosophers use obscures or overlooks this.