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Nash B's avatar

what do you mean by 'public'? do you define morality as contingent on the existence of external approval, of society, of cultures to support a particular moral framework? would you consider someone who rejects the moral norms of everyone around them as definitionally immoral (because morality must be publicly endorsed or it's not real morality), even if they're against slavery and the culture around them isn't?

the comparison with grammar doesn't feel adequate. shared grammar is required for communication, and communication is inherently public. occasionally people might invent personal languages and codes to hide their written thoughts from the public, but by and large, people's grammar comes from the outside because it's inherently shared. values don't have to be shared in the same way. they often are, but it's not in my view a necessary condition to either uphold them or feel that they're binding.

I also think it's important to distinguish causal provenance from ontological dependency. it's likely most people's values are derived from sets of values that they've encountered somewhere outside in the public world (i.e. people rarely invent new kinds of morality from scratch, though they may adapt them, refine them, and customize them). but the fact your values make come from a particular external culture or group of people doesn't necessarily means that those values are still tied to the approval and opinion of that group. if you're in a society that taught you to respect foreigners, and then by some unfortunate cultural change, xenophobia spreads like a plague and you're left the only one still respecting foreigners, it doesn't necessarily entail you'll lose that value, or that you'll feel there's no longer any need to feel guilty if you mistreat foreigners just because the public consensus around you has decided to no longer think that it's bad.

once values are inside you they're only dependent on external approve IF external approval itself is one of your (highest) values. if it's not, then your moral values aren't a public matter at all, regardless of their causal provenance. it's only if you believe in morality only because others do (e.g. "I believe X is wrong because most people think it's wrong (eg because they think god thinks it's wrong), but if everyone changes their mind, I'll follow the flock wherever they go next") that your morality becomes tied to the public consensus, approval, and susceptible to feeling external pressure to perform, etc. but then I'd question the validity of such moral values: if whether you think something's wrong depends on whether you might get publicly shunned or condemned for it, I'm not sure that constitutes actually believing that that thing is wrong, as opposed to merely thinking that that thing is bad for your personal interests as a member of a particular culture or society. morality starts to look more like an informal type of legal system: one that someone may respect out of self-interest without believing in.

Paul McNamara's avatar

"More generally, the “demands of morality” can feel “imposed from the outside.” But they aren’t. They are imposed on us by our own psychology"

I do not understand this at all. Morality to me is analogous to the rules of grammar. The rules of grammar are public not private (subjective). Feeling guilt may well be a subjective experience (true) but the rule against masturbation is not subjective. The rule is public (the public rules of the Catholic Church). Feeling guilt may be subjective, but what and why we feel guilt for some things rather than others is not explained by our subjective psychology.

Please note, I am not appealing to some objective basis. Morality is in my view public, not objective or subjective. But it is independent of my own subjective desires in the same way as the rules of grammar are independent of my desires or goals.

Lance S. Bush's avatar

I’m talking about the phenomenology of morality.

Paul McNamara's avatar

"They are imposed on us by our own psychology".

Ok, but that doesn't explain why different people from different cultures over vast expanses of time have different psychological reactions to the same thing: infanticide for instance. Our psychological reactions are shaped by the cultural norms and conventions in which we were raised.

"the demands of morality” can feel “imposed from the outside."

They may not be 'imposed from the outside', but they are certainly influenced/shaped by the outside.

Lance S. Bush's avatar

Sure it does. Enculturation influences which norms will end up internalizing.

Micah Sadoy's avatar

I would suggest that the question of guilt – usually regarded as an emotional state – is not the key point to focus on. Rather, the idea of possessing a “rational basis” for condemning our previous desires, or even our current desires, is likely what Watkins takes as central to his critique.

The pivot to another desire – a deeper desire or a higher desire that is somehow more central to our conception of ourselves – is an open dialectical move, but how plausible that move is is another matter.

If I am asked (or if I ask myself), “Is it rational for me to believe things on a basis of mere wishful thinking and to simply dogmatically reject all evidence against the proposition?” I may have an urge to believe something because it is comforting or otherwise desirable. But it does not appear to me that some further desire grounds the fact that wishful thinking is epistemically vicious or bad policy when it comes to my belief formation practices. The normativity of whether I should use reason and evidence or go with some set of nonsense principles does not appear to rest on whether I desire something further, even on whether or not I desire knowledge. Rather, it seems (upon rational reflection) that the fact I should not believe things using nonsense principles is because it runs contrary to the very nature what it is to have a (rational) belief and what it is to have beliefs which I can make sense of why (in a justificatory sense) I believe certain things rather than others.

Explaining things in terms of desires – and stronger or higher-order desires – does not strike me as plausible because the epistemic error of wishful thinking and the normative fact that I ought not to use various kinds of fallacious reasoning does not dissolve when I consider the counterfactual under which I do not possess this or that desire.

Similarly, whether or not something is moral or immoral does appear, on counterfactual analysis, to flip depending on whether or not I have some relevant desire or stance.

I critique my prior epistemic sloppiness on some issue not because I have some different desire than my previous self but because I understand something about what was dysfunctional concerning some prior epistemic belief or policy I erroneously held to.

Similarly, I critique my prior moral beliefs not because I have some different set of desires but because I understand something about what was dysfunctional about some prior moral belief or policy.

It is difficult to sustain the “rational basis” of critique on a desire-dependent or stance-dependent basis as – on the stance-dependent theory – the stance is the ultimate arbiter. Whether morality on that account is whimsical or a matter of deeply engrained psychological tendencies, neither whims nor neuroses would appear to be able to meet the demands we place upon ourselves in the context of serious reflective scrutiny.