Parfit and the case of missing reasons

Parfit claimed many of his colleagues lacked his concept of reasons.

I find this plausible for the simple reason that I don't think anyone has the concepts in question. It may be that these philosophers didn't have the concepts in question because there are no concepts to have.

One of the most common reactions I've received to suggesting that the concept of reasons Parfit and some non-naturalist moral realists have in mind is unintelligible is incredulity, or even the belief that I must be pretending not to have the concept.

Yet one of the most prominent metaethicists seems to have believed the best explanation for the persistent disagreement between himself and prominent colleagues in the field was that they lacked the relevant concept.

I think Parfit is probably correct. And I think I do lack the concept in question. So why is it so implausible that I may lack Parfit's conception of reasons? Apparently Parfit thought several well-established philosophers lacked the concept.

If they do, then the question is: why? And I don't think the only possible explanation is that there is a concept, and they and I for whatever reason don't have it.

Relatedly, I find it strange that the suggestion that one is mistaken due to a conceptual or linguistic confusion is seen as an extremely uncharitable suggestion.

Yet the alternative does not strike me as any more flattering. If anything, it seems even less charitable. Consider the situation I am in: I suspect some philosophers are mistaken about metaethics as a result of mistaken inferences about their phenomenology, or more fundamental mistakes in their conception of language, meaning, and concepts. As a result, I endorse quietism about reasons and much of non-naturalist realist vocabulary.

Yet if you endorse a conventional antirealist account (error theory, relativism, noncognitivism), what kind of mistake are realists making? Apparently, in spite of endorsing the same philosophical presuppositions, and sharing the same methods, they persist in making the same grievous philosophical error over and over. 

For instance, a proponent of relativism or noncognitivism may think that a moral realist is simply failing to understand the semantics of ordinary moral language. An error theorist may think that a realist is making serious and implausible errors in their appraisal of the most plausible ontology. Somewhere in the realist’s line of reasoning there is going to be some philosophically fatal error.

Why is attributing the mistake in the realist’s views to a more proximal cause, such as a misguided intuition, failure to recognize the quality of an antirealist’s argument, failure at conceptual analysis, misunderstanding of the semantics of moral discourse, and so on, not so uncharitable, and is a, if not respected, at least tolerated and treated cordially (one is, as it were, still invited to dinner parties), but suggesting that if there is a mistake, it may (in some cases) be attributable to a more fundamental methodological or conceptual error extremely uncharitable, to the point that such a suggestion is seen as so outrageous incredulity, dismissiveness, and contempt are appropriate reactions?

For comparison, imagine two scientists are having a dispute about whether a given theory is true. Suppose one scientist believes the other scientist is mistaken. The question is: what mistake is the other scientist making?

Mistake #1: Both scientists are using the same methods and paradigms to investigate the theory in question. They both understand the theory in the same way. Yet the other scientist still rejects the theory. It could be that the other scientist is interpreting their data wrong, or they may have a bug in their statistical software. There are all kinds of possible mistakes they are making, ranging from understandable to negligent to nefarious.

Mitsake #2: The other scientist conceives of the theory differently than you. Perhaps the reason they reject the theory is attributable to their misconceptions about the theory itself. If they understood the theory in the way you do (and suppose you understand it correctly) then they would endorse the theory. Their results don’t appreciably differ from your own, and they aren’t making any mundane, negligent, or nefarious errors. They just are mistaken about the concept of the theory itself.

Are instances of Mistake #2 necessarily less charitable and more ridiculous than instances of Mistake #1?

I don’t think so. It is going to depend on the specifics of the situation. In many cases, attributing other people’s errors to the kind of mistakes that fall within #1 could be far less charitable. One may end up thinking their colleague is incompetent at routine procedural tasks, or is violating basic scientific protocols, is bad at analyzing data, or may even be fabricating their results.

By analogy, an antirealist who does not think moral realists are making any fundamental conceptual mistakes could still think they’re making a mistake somewhere in their line of reasoning (I say “could” because it’s possible that the antirealist thinks the realist is mistaken but isn’t making any errors in reasoning. They’d be making a mistake in the sense of being incorrect, but not making any mistakes given what information is available to them).

And the kind of mistake an error theorist, relativist, or noncognitivist thinks that a moral realist is making could be very severe. It could even be a really mundane mistake. A subjectivist might think:

“Moral discourse is obviously used in a way that fits better with subjectivism.”

If you think this, you might also think that anyone who thinks moral discourse obviously doesn’t fit with subjectivism is making a big mistake. Perhaps they’re so bad at analyzing moral discourse that they’re not even competent at basic tasks that fall within the scope of their discipline. Or perhaps, in spite of agreeing with the subjectivist about the proper methods for assessing different metaethical positions (intuitions, etc.), they are failing to appreciate the force of the antirealist’s arguments. Why? How can they just not understand why a particular premise is true? Apparently, in spite of sharing all of the presuppositions, methods, and background assumptions as the subjectivist, they still get it wrong.

That seems pretty uncharitable to me. Yet for some reason, suggesting that if they’re making a mistake, it is something more fundamental and, I believe, much less obvious, and isn’t introspectively accessible, and doesn’t require that they misunderstand how arguments work or fail at freshman logic is supposedly an outrageous suggestion?

“Are you seriously saying most professional philosophers are confused about this topic?”

Yes. Why is that so much more implausible than suggesting they’re not confused at all, but persist in being completely wrong anyway? That seems far more uncharitable to me. 

I’m not suggesting those who endorse positions that involve unintelligible concepts are outright morons who just can’t think correctly. If anything, the alternative is far closer to suggesting something like this. I believe my position is far more charitable in where I locate the mistake in non-naturalistic conceptions of moral realism, since it doesn’t require laying the mistake at the feet of each individual philosopher’s ability to competently employ an effective method.

I suspect their mistakes are downstream, and can be located in the methods and presuppositions they were inducted into as a result of pursuing formal training in analytic philosophy (or at least by second-hand exposure to those who did receive this training). 

If your tools are poorly calibrated, then you could be an excellent reasoner, and an amazing scientist, but your data will still be wrong. And if you and your colleagues all get their tools from the same company, and that company screwed up the calibration on their equipment, then you’ll all get the wrong data.

That is what I am suggesting is going on in contemporary metaethics: people in the field are using methods that are not sufficient for the task, so no matter how capable they are under these constraints, they’re simply not using the tools suitable to converging on the correct answer.

Now imagine a group of scientists do have extremely well-calibrated tools, and they still manage to get it wrong. Over and over and over. Now they don’t have the excuse of a bad method. They’re using a good method. The problem isn’t the method. It’s them.

This is one of primary alternatives (if not the primary alternative) if you endorse traditional antirealist accounts, don’t think the relevant forms of (mostly non-naturalist) moral realism are unintelligible, but their proponents are still mistaken. The problem isn’t their method. It’s them.

In short: I attribute the mistake some non-naturalist moral realists are making to them using the wrong tools for the job. Standard alternatives grant that they're using the right tools for the job, but failing anyway. It is entirely unclear to me why the former is some kind of deep affront and ludicrous suggestion, while the latter is completely copacetic.

Given these considerations, I find the notion that this is somehow much more charitable and far less outrageous than my view to be implausible. I’m not sure why this reaction persists but I’d like to hear from realists (or anyone, really) who has a sense of why the unintelligibility thesis is met with so much incredulity and even contempt.