Phenomenal conservatism and the Great Zorf

There's a growing tendency for people to appeal to phenomenal conservatism in arguments in a way I find extremely unproductive. It is beginning to serve as a kind of conversation stopper, or illegitimate attempt to foist the argumentative burden entirely onto whoever you're talking to. Here's how it works.

Someone will ask someone else, "Why do you endorse philosophical position X?"

That person will then say:

"I endorse phenomenal conservatism. We have defeasible justification for believing X if it seems to us that X. It seems to me that X. Therefore, I am justified in believing X in the absence of defeaters. So, if you'd like to refute X, you'd have to present defeaters."

I had thought that the whole point of a typical philosophical discussion is to provide *publicly evaluable* arguments, evidence, and reasons for a view, for the consideration of others. But appealing to phenomenal conservatism as I’ve outlined above doesn’t even attempt to do this.

Let’s grant for the sake of argument that if it seems to you that X then you have defeasible justification for believing X.

That may technically be a literal response to the question “Why do you think X?” and perhaps the fault is, in part, with the original question. The purpose of philosophical dialectic isn’t merely for us to announce to one another how things seem, then demand that if anyone disagrees they prove us wrong. Imagine how absurd this would be if a moral realist and antirealist were having a dispute:

Realist: “It seems to me realism is true. I am justified unless you present defeaters.”

Antirealist: It seems to me that moral realism isn’t true. I am justified unless you present defeaters.”

They would be at an impasse. How are they to resolve this disagreement, other than to do the things philosophers normally do, which go beyond simply appealing to how things seem to them, personally?

The problem with phenomenal conservatism is its only purpose is to provide *personal* justification. It does not provide (at least in a non-negligible form) any kind of public justification, the kinds of arguments, reasons, and evidence one would present to someone else if they wanted to persuade that person of their views.

So instead of asking, “Why do you think X?” we could ask, “Do you think I should agree with you about X? If so, why?”

Once the question is posed in this way, it would no longer make much sense to appeal to phenomenal conservatism alone.

There’s something very strange about the appeals to phenomenal conservatism that I’ve seen. It is almost as if those who appeal to these views lose any interest in defending their views or offering publicly evaluable arguments or evidence for them. It’s as though they’ve become epistemically complacent. Since they’re justified in thinking X is true unless someone provides defeaters, they feel content to stop there, thinking, “It seems like X is true, so I’ll assume it is until someone comes along and presents arguments against it.” I fear this kind of attitude can motivate a kind of dialectical apathy that will cause people to stop being concerned about seeking arguments and evidence for their views.

Finally, there is another concern here. Phenomenal conservatism often allows people to skip over much of what would (or should) occur when presenting actual arguments (in, say, premise/premise/conclusion format). Namely, that people who present arguments are often asked to clarify or elaborate on elements of the argument, e.g.,

“What do you mean when you say ‘must’ in premise 2?”

“What does your conclusion mean exactly?”

…Yet people who appeal to phenomenal conservatism seem content to lay claim not only to having justification for believing “X,” but often skip over whether X is even an actual proposition.

Suppose, for instance, I said that it seems to me that “stargles are tallarific.”

Am I thereby justified in believing “stargles are tallarific” is true?

Well, what if what I said isn’t even a proposition? What if it’s just meaningless nonsense? If so, I wouldn’t have justification for believing “X” is true because X isn’t even a proposition, and thus cannot be true.

People who appeal to phenomenal conservatism as support for a given claim being true can and should be challenged on whether the claim in question is intelligible, when there is genuine doubt about whether it is. And if they’re unable to communicate what the alleged proposition is to others, then we face another problem. Not only are they claiming to have private access to a supposed propositional claim, they now may also have private access to what the claim even means. Imagine just how bizarre it would be to enter a discussion where someone said:

“I know the Great Zorf exists. It seems to me that the Great Zorf exists, so I have defeasible justification for believing this.”

…suppose this person not only can’t provide you with any good reasons to believe the Great Zorf exists, they cannot even communicate what “the Great Zorf” even means. Is it a being? Is it an object? Is it a place? They cannot tell you. It’s a primitive, unanalyzable concept.

Nothing could come of such a conversation. I fear phenomenal conservatism is being misused by people who want to avoid having to shoulder the argumentative burden of making a case for their positions, and even the explanatory burden of explaining what their position even is. Hopefully this misuse of phenomenal conservatism won’t become too entrenched, because it is undermining the norms that typify philosophical discussions in ways that large serve to stultify and inhibit productive discussion.