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OccamsSawzall's avatar

Hey Lance, I enjoyed reading your article. I actually think the position you take is theoretically coherent. I don’t think your position can even be proved wrong. I also appreciated the various distinctions you made, and it was a pleasure to see someone articulate this position in a sophisticated way. My issue with the antirealist position and the moral relativist position is on the practical side of things. In fact, I think together they have a real demonstrable practical instability that counts against them in comparison with the moral realist position and the moral absolutist or objectivist position which do not have this practical instability.

You say: “Neither BSB nor anyone else is entitled to make such sweeping generalizations in the absence of corroborating data.”

“BSB is, in short, making an unreasonable, isolated demand for rigor.”

“it isn’t an instructor’s place to browbeat metaethical views out of students: yes, clear up confusions and reluctance to engage in serious thinking, but this should not come at the cost of coercing students into holding views more amenable to one’s own. That isn’t, or at least shouldn’t be, the role of philosophical instruction.”

“There is no good reason to ignore such conceptual possibilities merely because such views aren’t endorsed by contemporary academics.”

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Ok, when you say something like “Neither BSB nor anyone else is entitled to make etc.” are you saying that normative statement is reducible to a preference? How is it binding on “anyone else” in this universal/absolute way if you are not smuggling in moral realism or absolutism here?

Then you say “that... shouldn’t be, the role etc.” What do you mean by this “shouldn’t”? Just a preference? If so, then why are you arguing as if this is binding on anyone else but yourself? If I have the opposite preference i.e., “that should be”. Then the conversation ends right there. So, if you intend more bite than that, I am not so sure you can stay within reducible normativity.

Also, “an unreasonable, isolated demand”? A preference too? Why should he care, then, if he has different preferences?

Anyway, it sounds at the very least like you see yourself as having the reasonable position, but what does that really mean if you really think that is true and you don’t just prefer to think you have the more reasonable position?

Now either your position is more reasonable than whatever position negates your own or it is not. If it is, then either that position is stance-independently a more reasonable position than the positions that negate it, or it is stance-dependently a more reasonable position. But if it is merely stance-dependently a more reasonable position, then it is no more reasonable to hold than the opposite position, but only more reasonable depending on a certain stance. But if its being more reasonable depends on a certain stance, then that stance itself is a more reasonable stance or it is not. If it is, then the stance upon which its superior reasonableness depends cannot be reduced to preferences or descriptive facts. If it were, then the position you hold cannot be more reasonable than any other position, though you might prefer it over any other position. If it is not more reasonable than any other position, then you cannot reject any other position on rational grounds. But for moral antirealism to be true, it must be stance-independently more reasonable to hold than whatever position negates it. And if it is stance-independently more reasonable to hold, then how is it not also stance-independently more reasonable to act in accordance with it than not to? And if it is stance-independently more reasonable to act in accordance with it than not to, then it is stance-independently less reasonable not to act in accordance with it. But if you maintain that you hold your position on the basis of rational grounds as the precondition for the truth of that position, then you are rationally obligated to act in accordance with that position; that is, you ought to act in accordance with it. But that means that you must believe acting in accordance with this position is stance-independently better than not doing so only insofar as you make the rational the sufficient reason for your actions, which include the adopting of positions. If you do not believe it is stance-independently better, then you cannot hold your own position on the basis of reason. And if you cannot hold your position on the basis of reason, then you cannot criticize another position for being unreasonable without involving yourself in a performative contradiction. And so, any rational critique of the moral realist position, if it is to land, presupposes a belief in the existence of a stance-independent normative imperative that one ought to follow the dictates of reason—which does not alone mean, mind you, that such an imperative actually exists. In the moment of the critique, then, the antirealist, despite whatever he has said prior or whatever he says after, is, in this respect, also a realist and perforce believes that at least in this sense irreducible normativity is coherent. The same goes for the relativist vs. the moral absolutist. If I have misunderstood you, please let me know. Be well.

Ready for more?