The illusion of a cumulative case
The illusion of a cumulative case
There are a variety of arguments for moral realism and against moral antirealism. However, many of these arguments appeal in some way or another, in at least one premise, directly to the intuition that moral realism is true, or that something is true that would entail moral realism (e.g., that at least one moral claim is stance-independently true).
This creates the illusion of a cumulative case for moral realism. That is, it creates the impression that there are lots of distinct arguments for moral realism, which collectively make a stronger case for it than the case for realism actually is. There are exceptions to this, e.g., arguments from moral convergence, but many of the central arguments for realism and against antirealism seem to be iterations of what amounts to "realism seems true" and "this version of antirealism seems absurd or has absurd implications."
Ultimately, the case for moral realism rests to a significant extent merely on the realist's claim that it "seems true" or is "intuitive," with much of the literature giving the superficial impression that there's more to it than that, that the breadth and depth of the arguments for realism are far greater than they actually are.