> Irreducible (normative) reasons: Reasons as things-in-themselves, as autonomous properties or phenomena which one may “have” in a literal sense.
I fear you're arguing against a scarecrow here by conflating objects with properties. There's no need to reify reasons into *things* which *exist*. Irreducibly normative reasons, it's argued, do not exist anymore than redness exists. Rreasons are normative properties which apply to natural facts of the world just as modal properties apply to natural objects of the world, or mathematical properties apply to natural objects of the world.
Parfit, the archetypical realist about irreducibly normative reasons, argues precisely for a form of realism which posits no metaphysical entities:
> "Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism, these necessary truths are not made to be true by there being some part of reality to which these truths correspond. Since any truth can be said to be really true, there is a trivial sense in which these truths can be said to be about reality. But these truths are not about metaphysical reality, since they do not imply that certain things exist in some ontological sense."
I don't think so. First, when I speak of "things," I don't take this to entail or refer to objects in particular. That's already the kind of metaphysical hairsplitting I don't typically engage in myself. Second, one can "have properties" and I'm entirely comfortable referring to properties as "things." Note, too, in the very comment you quote I refer to them as *properties*.
Are you sure, then, that you're not misinterpreting me? I literally said "property" in the quote itself. If you want to put an ontological spin on things "existing," fine, but my focus is on *having* reasons, not reasons "existing," and, in any case, where I speak of things "existing" I don't take this to entail that what exists is an "object" and not a "property."
I'd also be entirely comfortable speaking of properties "existing." I think you are imposing your own distinctions onto what I say and interpreting what I say in light of how you use terms, and not in light of how I am using them, and, as a result, interpreting what I say partially in terms of your own conceptual distinctions rather than those employed in the article. Maybe I'm not being as precise as you would be with the same terms, or maybe we use terms differently, but the objections you're raising don't seem relevant to what I take my objections to Parfit's talk of "reasons" to be.
I'm not making the mistake of thing they have, e.g., spatiotemporal extension or some other distinctive type of ontological status. The same issue applies to "having properties" as it does to "having reasons" without speaking of existence or being a "thing". I still think this is reifying reasons or if one insists this is too concrete, quasi-reification. I don't think one can have the "property" or "having a reason" in some irreducible sense.
>>Rreasons are normative properties which apply to natural facts of the world just as modal properties apply to natural objects of the world, or mathematical properties apply to natural objects of the world.
This doesn't help. The same point can be phrased in terms of properties: even if reasons are supposed to be "properties" that "apply" to natural facts, what does that mean, and how does that work? This "property" would still entail that someone can "have a reason" to do something independent of their goals and values in an irreducible way, which remains meaningless and still involves divorcing the notion of "a reason" from having any particular reason, in a way analogous to saying something is a "thing" but nothing in particular. Whatever dissimilarities there may be between the former and latter in terms of their ontological commitments aren't relevant for the point. Either way, I think this property talk is just further grounds for confusion among philosophers, and if anything only doubles up the problems with the way philosophers talk.
>>Parfit, the archetypical realist about irreducibly normative reasons, argues precisely for a form of realism which posits no metaphysical entities:
I'm aware of that, but I still think Parfit is making a mistake when he talks of people "having" reasons. If he wants to cash this out in deflationary metaphysical terms that might avoid certain sorts of problems, but those are not the problems I am raising. Note that I'm a pragmatist, I'm not a physicalist, I don't care about things existing in the sense of e.g., spatiotemporal existence, nor do I even care about them existing as abstracta (which I don't believe in, in any case) and am not put off by deflationary notions of truth. Parfit is welcome to set aside metaphysical considerations. I nevertheless maintain that talk of "having" reasons is confused and that Parfit and others are invoking meaningless pseudoconcepts when they speak of reasons.
[Edited to add: I just checked and I never refer to normative reasons as objects in the article, as far as I can tell. I only use "object" or "objects" as a verb (to oppose) or when discussing my analogy to things, which I do refer to as objects.]
my point is that in your definition you seem to be equating things-in-themselves and properties as if they were the same thing. specifically, you call them "*autonomous* properties" which sounds a lot like saying "object" again. but then you say they are phenomena which "things may have" which is now property speak. i'm open to this distinction not being fundamental, but i think it does shape much of how we can clearly communicate
the more important crux here is:
>even if reasons are supposed to be "properties" that "apply" to natural facts, what does that mean, and how does that work?
first i would say not to be too literal about the verbs here, it can make things seem needlessly confusing when in reality there's plenty of properties which apply in analogous ways which you're presumably comfortable with: mathematical and logical truths
the truth of a mathematical/logical property attaching to some object is made true by virtue of some axiom set (if you don’t like truth, then we can suffice with just validity, the point is these statements have some elevated status that we care about). similarly, normative properties (that of having a reason) attach to objects (considerations) by virtue of normative axioms. so normative properties aren't that spooky after all, and make plenty of sense to talk about for a pragmatist, no metaphysics required
the primary challenge to this ~realist account becomes "which axiom set?" even after assuming a minimal constraint for internal consistency, there's still several islands of internally consistent axioms sets. and this, i agree, is a problem if we want a One True Morality to Rule Them All. but this is also progress, as now we've earned the right to talk about irreducibly normative reasons which is what this disagreement was about, albeit we’ve earned this right only *from within a given system*
to address any realist skepticism we can ask why adopt any system at all? this is where we can fall back on *descriptive* facts. you, i, and everybody else, factually, have normative beliefs. this is our *starting point* of normative justification. in practice, all of us have a hodge podge of inconsistent axioms/beliefs. the project, then, becomes to "get our house in order", to move iteratively towards a state of reflective equilibrium, assuming we value consistency which is a minimum assumption typically assumed by all in truth-seeking dialogues anyways. now is it possible that many of us would nevertheless end up in different islands of reflective equilibrium? of course! but it's also possible that we converge. ultimately this is an empirical question. and if the latter is true, and if these beliefs are non-evolutionarily advantageous, then robust realism would a solid explanation for this agreement
I'm really not talking about objects. If I had meant to describe norms as "objects" I would have done so (and in fact did do so for the comparison to “things,” which is a talk that’s ostensibly about objects. That I did so for things but not for reasons is, if anything, an indication that I implicitly *wasn’t* conflating them as you’ve suggested).
You say “which sounds a lot like saying ‘object’ again.” To you, perhaps, but I think you’re imputing an interpretation onto what I said that isn’t clearly present and wasn’t intended.
>>first i would say not to be too literal about the verbs here,
I’m fine with not taking it too literally. But if it’s not literal, then I want to know what the non-literal meaning is. I’m not comfortable with any conventional philosophical talk of properties without qualification. If philosophers want to talk about properties I am going to have questions about the sense in which they’re using the term.
>>the truth of a mathematical/logical property attaching to some object is made true by virtue of some axiom set (if you don’t like truth, then we can suffice with just validity, the point is these statements have some elevated status that we care about). similarly, normative properties (that of having a reason) attach to objects (considerations) by virtue of normative axioms. so normative properties aren't that spooky after all, and make plenty of sense to talk about for a pragmatist, no metaphysics required.
There are some things I could say about this, but I’m not talking about irreducible reasons being “spooky.” I’m talking about the notion being a conceptual mistake that results from confusions about language. Talk of things being “spooky” usually strikes me as a metaphysical concern. If that’s what you have in mind, my concerns here are not metaphysical. They’re conceptual, and perhaps psychological.
I don't think I disagree with much of what you say towards the end of that, but I feel like it's raising concerns orthogonal to the main concerns raised in my post.
Enjoyed this, Lance! Curious: are there specific philosophers you have in mind who talk about reasons as though they are irreducible? I've read a handful of books on practical reason (Williams, Frankfurt, Velleman, Korsgaarsd, Dancy) and nothing you say here immediately strikes me as seriously in conflict with their ways of thinking. Maybe this is just because they're mostly internalists about reasons?
Parfit, Scanlon, Enoch, Cuneo, FitzPatrick, Huemer, Nagel, Shafer-Landau, probably a bunch of others I'm not thinking of immediately. Korsgaard probably doesn't belong on the list but not sure about the others, but I don't think Williams was a moral realist.
Another thought: I wonder if the expression “irreducibly normative” is ambiguous about the type of reduction, e.g., semantic vs ontological. I recently read something that argued G.E. Moore thought “good” was semantically irreducible, but metaphysically he thought moral facts were natural facts. I don’t have an opinion on that claim, but it caused me to realize that “irreducibly” could refer to different types of reduction.
“Reason” is ambiguous. Commonly, it refers to a cause, motive, or ground (but can have other meanings). Cause: The reason the ground is wet is that it rained last night. Motive: The reason he apologized is that he felt guilty. Ground: The reason I believe the sun will rise tomorrow is that it has risen every morning in human history. One reason to define key terms near the beginning of a discussion is to establish clarity and precision.
Nice read, and agreed with your conclusion. For me, it's useful to think of reasons as acceptable answers to why-questions, whether those be causal explanations, normative assertions, or anything else.
This framing makes it easier to explain good vs. bad reasons, and conditions under which we say there are no reasons, or that something is *the* reason.
It also supports the intuition you develop in your argument re: the weirdness of believing in reasons simpliciter. They're more productively thought of as handy but humble approximations of longer-winded responses.
The important part, though, is that reasons presuppose dialectical contexts. We wouldn't use/reference them otherwise.
“In any given instance in which one references a normative reason, such talk could always (in principle) be replaced with reference to some descriptive fact or other.”
What do you mean by “descriptive” and “fact” in this case?
Note: full transparency, this line of questioning is meant to see if there is a sort of experience you have where something is represented to you that causes you to have a belief in what is being represented. I believe that thing will be an intuition and (in my view) that will be the same sort of experience that can justify belief in an ethical fact.
For example, in the case of you saying you have a reason to avoid pain, because you desire not to be in pain, how do you know that is what you desire? What sensory experience are you relying on to know that this belief forming method is reliable?
The words 'reason' and 'rational' are semantically linked, and I suspect that many statements of the form "[antecedent] is a reason for [consequent]" are intended to convey something like "given the (assumed) truth of [antecedent], there is a rational argument for [consequent]."
In ordinary usage, it is commonplace to leave out what seem to be obvious antecedents, and in the phrase "Alex had a reason to avoid being set on fire", they are completely missing, but we can guess that Alex desires to avoid pain. This, however, does not yet yield a valid argument; for that, we have to add further premises, such as that Alex believes that being set on fire would cause him pain.
In this view, the statement "we have reasons to avoid pain" is more-or-less tautological, given that pain is practically defined as sensations which induce strong desires for their avoidance.
I feel this gives us a way to analyze "gives/has a reason" talk which conforms to your distinction between reasons_reducible and reasons_irreducible, and furthermore justifies your rejection of the latter: reasons_irreducible turn into arguments without even tacit premises, which is to say they are not well-formed arguments at all (or maybe they are question-begging ones; I am uncertain about which fallacy best captures their problem.)
Thanks for this; it may help me make sense of some of Street's writings. She sometimes talks of "normative reasons" as distinct from plain generic "reasons", and I was puzzled by the implied difference. I see that she's probably responding to a discursive context of which I'm unaware (not being professionally in the field).
yeah thats exactly what is going on. one contrast that i suspect is being drawn in the writings you refer to is with *instrumental* and *pragmatic* reasons. that contrast doestnt exhaust the meaning of normative, and i certainly would want to actually look at the text before making any proniuncements of what is meant, ofc.
Before I can assess your post, I am stuck on the meaning of "normativity." What is it? This is something I have been thinking about for a very long time, often resulting in headaches or my brain feeling fried. I'm curious how you define it.
The person who answered on my behalf did a great job. I don't feel especially inclined to offer any sort of account or analysis of "normativity." This is some term philosophers throw around. If it's unclear or ambiguous, that's only one more feather in the cap of whatever critique I would direct against what they say, as I see little use for the term myself.
i had the same problem for a long time. "normativity" is a problem term for definitions for multiple reasons. many of them spiral into giant whirlpools like "what do we mean by meaning" as with most questions of definition. since presumably you would prefer NOT to fall into these whirlpools here, i would suggest we need to disambiguate usages *prior* to asking the question of what lance would dewfine the term to mean. he is responding to a certain common usage of the term that i dont believe he would LIKE to be the common usage of the term, so asking how he would define it risks getting an answer that describes the latter rather the former, and therefore makes it confusing what he is responding to.
the typical use in meta-ethics is like a pure should-ness. in this usage, normativity does NOT come from human norms or conventions (these can be differentiated from each other but we dont need to do that here). for real sticklers about moral realism, its often required that moral statements be viewed as truth-apt assertions/negations of propositions. this isnt the kind of true that i mean when i say its true that it would be good to eat a sandwich (almost lunchtime!). this is not *always* true for *everyone* in *any circumstance* and since i didnt explicitly limit (indexicalize is the turbonerd term) the claim to myself, right now, etc, its not *properly* truth-apt.
moral claims like "murder is wrong" are (by the stickler) taken to be not just casually true like the goodness of sandwich eating. they are Really True! what makes them true? normativity is precisely the answer to this question.
“Reasons” are just objective explanations.
See the below article on this point
https://open.substack.com/pub/neonomos/p/what-is-a-reason?r=1pded0&utm_medium=ios
> Irreducible (normative) reasons: Reasons as things-in-themselves, as autonomous properties or phenomena which one may “have” in a literal sense.
I fear you're arguing against a scarecrow here by conflating objects with properties. There's no need to reify reasons into *things* which *exist*. Irreducibly normative reasons, it's argued, do not exist anymore than redness exists. Rreasons are normative properties which apply to natural facts of the world just as modal properties apply to natural objects of the world, or mathematical properties apply to natural objects of the world.
Parfit, the archetypical realist about irreducibly normative reasons, argues precisely for a form of realism which posits no metaphysical entities:
> "Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism, these necessary truths are not made to be true by there being some part of reality to which these truths correspond. Since any truth can be said to be really true, there is a trivial sense in which these truths can be said to be about reality. But these truths are not about metaphysical reality, since they do not imply that certain things exist in some ontological sense."
I don't think so. First, when I speak of "things," I don't take this to entail or refer to objects in particular. That's already the kind of metaphysical hairsplitting I don't typically engage in myself. Second, one can "have properties" and I'm entirely comfortable referring to properties as "things." Note, too, in the very comment you quote I refer to them as *properties*.
Are you sure, then, that you're not misinterpreting me? I literally said "property" in the quote itself. If you want to put an ontological spin on things "existing," fine, but my focus is on *having* reasons, not reasons "existing," and, in any case, where I speak of things "existing" I don't take this to entail that what exists is an "object" and not a "property."
I'd also be entirely comfortable speaking of properties "existing." I think you are imposing your own distinctions onto what I say and interpreting what I say in light of how you use terms, and not in light of how I am using them, and, as a result, interpreting what I say partially in terms of your own conceptual distinctions rather than those employed in the article. Maybe I'm not being as precise as you would be with the same terms, or maybe we use terms differently, but the objections you're raising don't seem relevant to what I take my objections to Parfit's talk of "reasons" to be.
I'm not making the mistake of thing they have, e.g., spatiotemporal extension or some other distinctive type of ontological status. The same issue applies to "having properties" as it does to "having reasons" without speaking of existence or being a "thing". I still think this is reifying reasons or if one insists this is too concrete, quasi-reification. I don't think one can have the "property" or "having a reason" in some irreducible sense.
>>Rreasons are normative properties which apply to natural facts of the world just as modal properties apply to natural objects of the world, or mathematical properties apply to natural objects of the world.
This doesn't help. The same point can be phrased in terms of properties: even if reasons are supposed to be "properties" that "apply" to natural facts, what does that mean, and how does that work? This "property" would still entail that someone can "have a reason" to do something independent of their goals and values in an irreducible way, which remains meaningless and still involves divorcing the notion of "a reason" from having any particular reason, in a way analogous to saying something is a "thing" but nothing in particular. Whatever dissimilarities there may be between the former and latter in terms of their ontological commitments aren't relevant for the point. Either way, I think this property talk is just further grounds for confusion among philosophers, and if anything only doubles up the problems with the way philosophers talk.
>>Parfit, the archetypical realist about irreducibly normative reasons, argues precisely for a form of realism which posits no metaphysical entities:
I'm aware of that, but I still think Parfit is making a mistake when he talks of people "having" reasons. If he wants to cash this out in deflationary metaphysical terms that might avoid certain sorts of problems, but those are not the problems I am raising. Note that I'm a pragmatist, I'm not a physicalist, I don't care about things existing in the sense of e.g., spatiotemporal existence, nor do I even care about them existing as abstracta (which I don't believe in, in any case) and am not put off by deflationary notions of truth. Parfit is welcome to set aside metaphysical considerations. I nevertheless maintain that talk of "having" reasons is confused and that Parfit and others are invoking meaningless pseudoconcepts when they speak of reasons.
[Edited to add: I just checked and I never refer to normative reasons as objects in the article, as far as I can tell. I only use "object" or "objects" as a verb (to oppose) or when discussing my analogy to things, which I do refer to as objects.]
my point is that in your definition you seem to be equating things-in-themselves and properties as if they were the same thing. specifically, you call them "*autonomous* properties" which sounds a lot like saying "object" again. but then you say they are phenomena which "things may have" which is now property speak. i'm open to this distinction not being fundamental, but i think it does shape much of how we can clearly communicate
the more important crux here is:
>even if reasons are supposed to be "properties" that "apply" to natural facts, what does that mean, and how does that work?
first i would say not to be too literal about the verbs here, it can make things seem needlessly confusing when in reality there's plenty of properties which apply in analogous ways which you're presumably comfortable with: mathematical and logical truths
the truth of a mathematical/logical property attaching to some object is made true by virtue of some axiom set (if you don’t like truth, then we can suffice with just validity, the point is these statements have some elevated status that we care about). similarly, normative properties (that of having a reason) attach to objects (considerations) by virtue of normative axioms. so normative properties aren't that spooky after all, and make plenty of sense to talk about for a pragmatist, no metaphysics required
the primary challenge to this ~realist account becomes "which axiom set?" even after assuming a minimal constraint for internal consistency, there's still several islands of internally consistent axioms sets. and this, i agree, is a problem if we want a One True Morality to Rule Them All. but this is also progress, as now we've earned the right to talk about irreducibly normative reasons which is what this disagreement was about, albeit we’ve earned this right only *from within a given system*
to address any realist skepticism we can ask why adopt any system at all? this is where we can fall back on *descriptive* facts. you, i, and everybody else, factually, have normative beliefs. this is our *starting point* of normative justification. in practice, all of us have a hodge podge of inconsistent axioms/beliefs. the project, then, becomes to "get our house in order", to move iteratively towards a state of reflective equilibrium, assuming we value consistency which is a minimum assumption typically assumed by all in truth-seeking dialogues anyways. now is it possible that many of us would nevertheless end up in different islands of reflective equilibrium? of course! but it's also possible that we converge. ultimately this is an empirical question. and if the latter is true, and if these beliefs are non-evolutionarily advantageous, then robust realism would a solid explanation for this agreement
I'm really not talking about objects. If I had meant to describe norms as "objects" I would have done so (and in fact did do so for the comparison to “things,” which is a talk that’s ostensibly about objects. That I did so for things but not for reasons is, if anything, an indication that I implicitly *wasn’t* conflating them as you’ve suggested).
You say “which sounds a lot like saying ‘object’ again.” To you, perhaps, but I think you’re imputing an interpretation onto what I said that isn’t clearly present and wasn’t intended.
>>first i would say not to be too literal about the verbs here,
I’m fine with not taking it too literally. But if it’s not literal, then I want to know what the non-literal meaning is. I’m not comfortable with any conventional philosophical talk of properties without qualification. If philosophers want to talk about properties I am going to have questions about the sense in which they’re using the term.
>>the truth of a mathematical/logical property attaching to some object is made true by virtue of some axiom set (if you don’t like truth, then we can suffice with just validity, the point is these statements have some elevated status that we care about). similarly, normative properties (that of having a reason) attach to objects (considerations) by virtue of normative axioms. so normative properties aren't that spooky after all, and make plenty of sense to talk about for a pragmatist, no metaphysics required.
There are some things I could say about this, but I’m not talking about irreducible reasons being “spooky.” I’m talking about the notion being a conceptual mistake that results from confusions about language. Talk of things being “spooky” usually strikes me as a metaphysical concern. If that’s what you have in mind, my concerns here are not metaphysical. They’re conceptual, and perhaps psychological.
I don't think I disagree with much of what you say towards the end of that, but I feel like it's raising concerns orthogonal to the main concerns raised in my post.
Enjoyed this, Lance! Curious: are there specific philosophers you have in mind who talk about reasons as though they are irreducible? I've read a handful of books on practical reason (Williams, Frankfurt, Velleman, Korsgaarsd, Dancy) and nothing you say here immediately strikes me as seriously in conflict with their ways of thinking. Maybe this is just because they're mostly internalists about reasons?
Parfit, Scanlon, Enoch, Cuneo, FitzPatrick, Huemer, Nagel, Shafer-Landau, probably a bunch of others I'm not thinking of immediately. Korsgaard probably doesn't belong on the list but not sure about the others, but I don't think Williams was a moral realist.
Another thought: I wonder if the expression “irreducibly normative” is ambiguous about the type of reduction, e.g., semantic vs ontological. I recently read something that argued G.E. Moore thought “good” was semantically irreducible, but metaphysically he thought moral facts were natural facts. I don’t have an opinion on that claim, but it caused me to realize that “irreducibly” could refer to different types of reduction.
I've never heard of Moore thinking they could be reduced to natural facts, where'd you hear that? And yea...it might.
I’ve read so much recently I don’t remember where i read that. I will post another reply if I can find it for you.
Agree with pretty much all of this
great post, i have lots of thoughts about this but they all pretty much align with yours so im just commenting to boost visibility for now :)
“Reason” is ambiguous. Commonly, it refers to a cause, motive, or ground (but can have other meanings). Cause: The reason the ground is wet is that it rained last night. Motive: The reason he apologized is that he felt guilty. Ground: The reason I believe the sun will rise tomorrow is that it has risen every morning in human history. One reason to define key terms near the beginning of a discussion is to establish clarity and precision.
Nice read, and agreed with your conclusion. For me, it's useful to think of reasons as acceptable answers to why-questions, whether those be causal explanations, normative assertions, or anything else.
This framing makes it easier to explain good vs. bad reasons, and conditions under which we say there are no reasons, or that something is *the* reason.
It also supports the intuition you develop in your argument re: the weirdness of believing in reasons simpliciter. They're more productively thought of as handy but humble approximations of longer-winded responses.
The important part, though, is that reasons presuppose dialectical contexts. We wouldn't use/reference them otherwise.
“In any given instance in which one references a normative reason, such talk could always (in principle) be replaced with reference to some descriptive fact or other.”
What do you mean by “descriptive” and “fact” in this case?
Note: full transparency, this line of questioning is meant to see if there is a sort of experience you have where something is represented to you that causes you to have a belief in what is being represented. I believe that thing will be an intuition and (in my view) that will be the same sort of experience that can justify belief in an ethical fact.
For example, in the case of you saying you have a reason to avoid pain, because you desire not to be in pain, how do you know that is what you desire? What sensory experience are you relying on to know that this belief forming method is reliable?
The words 'reason' and 'rational' are semantically linked, and I suspect that many statements of the form "[antecedent] is a reason for [consequent]" are intended to convey something like "given the (assumed) truth of [antecedent], there is a rational argument for [consequent]."
In ordinary usage, it is commonplace to leave out what seem to be obvious antecedents, and in the phrase "Alex had a reason to avoid being set on fire", they are completely missing, but we can guess that Alex desires to avoid pain. This, however, does not yet yield a valid argument; for that, we have to add further premises, such as that Alex believes that being set on fire would cause him pain.
In this view, the statement "we have reasons to avoid pain" is more-or-less tautological, given that pain is practically defined as sensations which induce strong desires for their avoidance.
I feel this gives us a way to analyze "gives/has a reason" talk which conforms to your distinction between reasons_reducible and reasons_irreducible, and furthermore justifies your rejection of the latter: reasons_irreducible turn into arguments without even tacit premises, which is to say they are not well-formed arguments at all (or maybe they are question-begging ones; I am uncertain about which fallacy best captures their problem.)
Thanks for this; it may help me make sense of some of Street's writings. She sometimes talks of "normative reasons" as distinct from plain generic "reasons", and I was puzzled by the implied difference. I see that she's probably responding to a discursive context of which I'm unaware (not being professionally in the field).
yeah thats exactly what is going on. one contrast that i suspect is being drawn in the writings you refer to is with *instrumental* and *pragmatic* reasons. that contrast doestnt exhaust the meaning of normative, and i certainly would want to actually look at the text before making any proniuncements of what is meant, ofc.
Hi Lance,
Before I can assess your post, I am stuck on the meaning of "normativity." What is it? This is something I have been thinking about for a very long time, often resulting in headaches or my brain feeling fried. I'm curious how you define it.
The person who answered on my behalf did a great job. I don't feel especially inclined to offer any sort of account or analysis of "normativity." This is some term philosophers throw around. If it's unclear or ambiguous, that's only one more feather in the cap of whatever critique I would direct against what they say, as I see little use for the term myself.
i had the same problem for a long time. "normativity" is a problem term for definitions for multiple reasons. many of them spiral into giant whirlpools like "what do we mean by meaning" as with most questions of definition. since presumably you would prefer NOT to fall into these whirlpools here, i would suggest we need to disambiguate usages *prior* to asking the question of what lance would dewfine the term to mean. he is responding to a certain common usage of the term that i dont believe he would LIKE to be the common usage of the term, so asking how he would define it risks getting an answer that describes the latter rather the former, and therefore makes it confusing what he is responding to.
the typical use in meta-ethics is like a pure should-ness. in this usage, normativity does NOT come from human norms or conventions (these can be differentiated from each other but we dont need to do that here). for real sticklers about moral realism, its often required that moral statements be viewed as truth-apt assertions/negations of propositions. this isnt the kind of true that i mean when i say its true that it would be good to eat a sandwich (almost lunchtime!). this is not *always* true for *everyone* in *any circumstance* and since i didnt explicitly limit (indexicalize is the turbonerd term) the claim to myself, right now, etc, its not *properly* truth-apt.
moral claims like "murder is wrong" are (by the stickler) taken to be not just casually true like the goodness of sandwich eating. they are Really True! what makes them true? normativity is precisely the answer to this question.
Thanks for the reply. To me, that suggests that common usage equates normativity with end-neutrality (as opposed to end-relativity).