There is no argument for psychophysical harmony (Part 3)
Psychophysical Harmony #3
This post is part of a series. See other parts of the series here:
In Part 1 I argued that we can reject the argument for psychophysical harmony by endorsing type-A physicalism. In doing so, we deny that there are phenomenal states. And if there are no phenomenal states, there isn't anything to harmonize. Problem solved.
In Part 2 I argued that there were substantial internal problems with the argument for psychophysical harmony. Namely, that it involves appeals to various types of harmony that critics can readily reject. I focused on normative harmony, and argued that we can deny that the kinds of conceptions of normativity behind this notion of harmony are intelligible. However, both with respect to psychophysical harmony in general, and with respect to normative harmony in particular, there are at least two available moves. In the case of psychophysical harmony, you could (a) deny that there are phenomenal states or (b) deny that the concept of a phenomenal state is meaningful. You could also do something similar with respect to normative harmony: you could (a) deny that there are normative facts of the relevant kind, or you could (b) deny that the relevant notion of normativity is intelligible.
I want to develop the latter argumentative thread here by arguing that there is no argument for psychophysical harmony.
1.0 The there-is-no-argument argument
One problem with arguments for psychophysical harmony is that they appeal to the concept of a “phenomenal state.” However, if the concept of a phenomenal state is unintelligible, and arguments for psychophysical harmony would require at least one premise to appeal to such concepts, then at least one of the premises for any argument for psychophysical harmony would also be unintelligible. And if at least one of the premises isn’t a proposition, then it isn’t an argument.
As such, it’s not simply that I reject the argument from psychophysical harmony. I deny there even are any arguments for psychophysical harmony, since any attempt at such an argument would have to include only propositions in its premises. And since arguments for psychophysical harmony rely on concepts that aren't intelligible, if those concepts figure into at least one of the premises, then at least one of the premises won't be a proposition. Hence, there can be no argument for psychophysical harmony, unless its proponents can show that the concept of a phenomenal state is meaningful.
Given this objection, no direct appeal to type-A physicalism is necessary. So I don’t have to endorse type-A physicalism to reject arguments for psychophysical harmony. I only need to maintain that at least one of the premises in any argument for psychophysical harmony is unintelligible. The result is not a rejection of the argument for psychophysical harmony on offer, but a denial that an argument has been given.
Here’s a simplified formalization of the objection:
(P1) If at least one of the premises in “the argument from psychophysical harmony” isn’t a proposition, then “the argument from psychophysical harmony” isn’t an argument.
(P2) At least one of the premises in “the argument from psychophysical harmony” isn’t a proposition.
(C) Therefore, “the argument from psychophysical harmony” isn’t an argument.
This is a standard modus ponens, i.e., If P then Q. P. Therefore Q.
I take it anyone who disagrees with me is likely to reject (P2).
However, if I am correct about (P2), then it doesn't make sense to ask questions about how we would respond if it were intelligible, since if one regards at least one of the premises as unintelligible, there is no way to imagine changing the truth value of the unintelligible premises (from F to T, or T to F), since the premise in question isn’t (at least from the perspective of the person who thinks it isn’t a proposition) actually a proposition.
To ask someone to consider what they would think if they did accept the premise would be like asking someone what they would think if a string of unintelligible symbols was “true.” If it isn’t obvious why this is a problem, then imagine that P1 in this argument is true.
(P1) If lkjl34kj1l, then lqleljl.
(P2) lkjl34kj1l.
(C) Therefore, lqleljl.
If you accepted P1, how would you respond to this argument? I take it no reader would be able to accept (P1) unless they knew what it meant. And one cannot consider what one would think if they endorsed (P1) unless, at a minimum, they knew what (P1) meant.
My objection to putative arguments for psychophysical harmony is that they are not meaningfully different from this: they will always include at least one premise that employs a meaningless concept (in this case, phenomenal states).
In short: I’m not simply rejecting the argument for psychophysical harmony. I’m denying there even is an argument.
I should also add, to head off concerns about what it is I am rejecting: I do not deny the existence of mental states or consciousness. Rather, I think both can be accounted for in a way consistent with physicalism (e.g., in terms of functional states). What I am denying is the philosophical term of art, “phenomenal state,” along with associated terminology (e.g., “qualia”), and what I consider inadequate attempts to clarify what this means (e.g., “what-it’s-likeness”). I think these notions are all pseudoconcepts created by philosophers, and don’t actually refer to any meaningful concepts or phenomena.
I am not alone in endorsing such a view. The philosopher of mind Pete Mandik (2016) puts forward the positions I endorse, qualia quietism and meta-illusionism in this paper:
Mandik, P. (2016). Meta-illusionism and qualia quietism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 140-148.
Furthermore, Goff recently spoke with Machery about this topic, just three days ago, in a video titled, “Is the ‘Hard problem of Consciousness’ Nonsense Invented by Philosophers?”
I think the answer is “yes.” As Machery argues, there is little empirical evidence that nonphilosophers recognize a hard problem of consciousness. I suspect that the hard problem, along with the associated cluster of terms and concepts used to refer to it and to discuss phenomenal states, qualia, and so on, are conceptual phantoms created by philosophers, and are the output of mistaken presuppositions and errors in introspection.
I’m not the first, nor will I be the last, to raise this kind of objection. Similar objections were raised by Wittgenstein in his later work. I think philosophers haven't adequately grappled with the force of Wittgenstein's insights. As a result, As a result, they continue to rely on flawed methods and mistaken assumptions about language and meaning that result in the manufacturing of pseudoproblems and pseudosolutions. Perhaps I am mistaken. If so, I look forward to encountering substantive arguments and explanations that have the potential to convince me that this or that philosophical dispute is a substantive one, and that contemporary analytic philosophy’s methods are adequate for the task of resolving it.