I'm almost entirely in agreement with you. But I don't see the need to deny at we have literal reasons, even if all reason-talk terminates in desires. I can completely agree with your picture of what's going on, but, to me, having a reason, even literally, just means the same thing that you mean when you use it figuratively. It's sort of a real pattern, in Dennett's sense, so I'm comfortable saying they actually exist and people literally have reasons.
I think the distinction between reasons and desires is useful, but that's maybe because I think of desires differently than you do. For you, it seems, desires determine what we ultimately do after considering all options, so that we always desire to do only what we end up doing. I don't think of desires this way. I think we can have competing desires. Somebody can really desire to eat a cake, but choose not to eat it, because the desire to be healthy wins out.
With this in mind, I think the distinction between "desire" and "reason" indicates a distinction between terminal goals and instrumental goals. So I might say that I desire to eat the cake, but I have reason not to, because it conflicts with my greater desire to be healthy. I'm less inclined to say that I desire to avoid the cake, even if that's what I actually do.
(Although, in the right context, I might agree that I desire to avoid the cake. If someone asks me if I want the cake, and pragmatically I interpret this as a request for a decision to eat it or not, then I will say that I don't want it.)
But yeah, substantively, I agree with you. It makes no real sense to say that we have stance-independent reasons to do anything, and I can only motivated by reasons that relate to my desires/values.
The literal sense of denial is one that avoids reifying on the basis of grammar. Real patterns talk shouldn’t be taken as a basis for granting ontological status to incidental features of the way people happen to speak in English.
For you, it seems, desires determine what we ultimately do after considering all options
Not sure how I gave that impression but I don’t think that (I wrote a lot so maybe I got sloppy somewhere). That desires are tied to motivation doesn’t mean that all desires ultimately prompt action. Not all motivations are acted on.
I think we can have competing desires. Somebody can really desire to eat a cake, but choose not to eat it, because the desire to be healthy wins out.
I also think that. What I’d add, though, is it’s important to emphasize that “desire” is a folk term, and that a technical language of human psychology might not always describe conflicting processes contributing to our motivations as “desires.”
Entirely aside from whether you and I are roughly correct, I am frustrated at the poor quality of Bentham’s arguments and his general lack of engagement with views like mine.
You say "you have a good reason" just means "it would not promote your values." But what then are values? Things we desire?
If that's the case, then "you have a reason" means "you have a desire" which is just plain old vanilla internalism. But internalism doesn't answer the question "what should I do?" it only answers "what do I want to do?" which no one is asking when they ask the former question. This removes all normativity as the only claims being made are descriptive, natural claims. This is akin to nihilism.
They would be whatever values the person has in mind when they say that.
>>If that's the case, then "you have a reason" means "you have a desire" which is just plain old vanilla internalism
What kind of internalism are you talking about?
>> This removes all normativity as the only claims being made are descriptive, natural claims. This is akin to nihilism.
I don't think the only claims people make have to be natural, so that doesn't seem right. In any case, I think normativity is a grammatical or linguistic category, not a metaphysical one. As far as whether such a view entails "nihilism," you'll have to be very specific about what exactly that means. That term is used in all sorts of ways, some of which are loaded with various negative connotations I wouldn't accept as an accurate characterization of my position.
Oh, sorry, I thought you said "what are *the* values." I misread your remark.
As far as what "values," are, as I said I'm using the term to distinguish it from the term "desires." "Values" is thus being used as a placeholder term to distinguish the relevant considerations from desires. It is neither my purpose nor goal to offer some full account of what would be relevant from an antirealist view if we're not opting for the term "desires" but something else instead. But a very rough account would be something like this: if you considered all of the factors that motivate you, the relevant values would be those that you yourself had a higher-order preference for taking precedent over the others. In very crude terms, it would be something like "those desires when in a sober state of mind one considered to have greater overarching worth than one's other desires." The problem with any of these terms: value, goal, desire, etc. is that they don't carve the relevant aspects of human cognition at their joints, and we don't have the research or vocabulary to do so in an empirically informed and robust way, at least not yet.
I think there can be a layer in between purely descriptiveness and saying that universally true values exist.
For instance, you can say “I believe that human well being is a good thing, which values promote that?” I think most people implicitly try to optimize something like that, and so humanity continues to function. But there’s no third party enforcing it, or declaring it true.
And when you make the judgement that something is good, or valuable what's the implication of that? The implication is that you have a reason to do something which promotes that end. That is a normative reason which comes from a judgement, not a desire. So that is not subjectivism.
Subjectivism as a view isn't bound to the notion that truth is determined by "desires." What it holds is that whether a moral statement is true or false depends on individual standards. If a person believes stealing is wrong, and regards this belief as a reflection of their preferences, values, standards, or whatever, then this is entirely consistent with subjectivism.
What is a higher order preference and why should that take priority over my more immediate desires? For e.g. if I'm in a fit a rage, why should I not prioritize my strongest desire in that moment vs. what I would later desire? It's unclear how a subjectivist could give a principled reason for giving priority to "sober" or higher-order desires vs the stronger desires in the moment without slipping in an objective claim. If desires are what give us reasons to act, are those considerations which count in favor of one act over another, why do sober ones get priority?
Nice work, Lance.
I'm almost entirely in agreement with you. But I don't see the need to deny at we have literal reasons, even if all reason-talk terminates in desires. I can completely agree with your picture of what's going on, but, to me, having a reason, even literally, just means the same thing that you mean when you use it figuratively. It's sort of a real pattern, in Dennett's sense, so I'm comfortable saying they actually exist and people literally have reasons.
I think the distinction between reasons and desires is useful, but that's maybe because I think of desires differently than you do. For you, it seems, desires determine what we ultimately do after considering all options, so that we always desire to do only what we end up doing. I don't think of desires this way. I think we can have competing desires. Somebody can really desire to eat a cake, but choose not to eat it, because the desire to be healthy wins out.
With this in mind, I think the distinction between "desire" and "reason" indicates a distinction between terminal goals and instrumental goals. So I might say that I desire to eat the cake, but I have reason not to, because it conflicts with my greater desire to be healthy. I'm less inclined to say that I desire to avoid the cake, even if that's what I actually do.
(Although, in the right context, I might agree that I desire to avoid the cake. If someone asks me if I want the cake, and pragmatically I interpret this as a request for a decision to eat it or not, then I will say that I don't want it.)
But yeah, substantively, I agree with you. It makes no real sense to say that we have stance-independent reasons to do anything, and I can only motivated by reasons that relate to my desires/values.
The literal sense of denial is one that avoids reifying on the basis of grammar. Real patterns talk shouldn’t be taken as a basis for granting ontological status to incidental features of the way people happen to speak in English.
For you, it seems, desires determine what we ultimately do after considering all options
Not sure how I gave that impression but I don’t think that (I wrote a lot so maybe I got sloppy somewhere). That desires are tied to motivation doesn’t mean that all desires ultimately prompt action. Not all motivations are acted on.
I think we can have competing desires. Somebody can really desire to eat a cake, but choose not to eat it, because the desire to be healthy wins out.
I also think that. What I’d add, though, is it’s important to emphasize that “desire” is a folk term, and that a technical language of human psychology might not always describe conflicting processes contributing to our motivations as “desires.”
Entirely aside from whether you and I are roughly correct, I am frustrated at the poor quality of Bentham’s arguments and his general lack of engagement with views like mine.
You say "you have a good reason" just means "it would not promote your values." But what then are values? Things we desire?
If that's the case, then "you have a reason" means "you have a desire" which is just plain old vanilla internalism. But internalism doesn't answer the question "what should I do?" it only answers "what do I want to do?" which no one is asking when they ask the former question. This removes all normativity as the only claims being made are descriptive, natural claims. This is akin to nihilism.
They would be whatever values the person has in mind when they say that.
>>If that's the case, then "you have a reason" means "you have a desire" which is just plain old vanilla internalism
What kind of internalism are you talking about?
>> This removes all normativity as the only claims being made are descriptive, natural claims. This is akin to nihilism.
I don't think the only claims people make have to be natural, so that doesn't seem right. In any case, I think normativity is a grammatical or linguistic category, not a metaphysical one. As far as whether such a view entails "nihilism," you'll have to be very specific about what exactly that means. That term is used in all sorts of ways, some of which are loaded with various negative connotations I wouldn't accept as an accurate characterization of my position.
Me: what then are values?
You: They would be whatever values the person has in mind when they say that
This does not answer the question
Oh, sorry, I thought you said "what are *the* values." I misread your remark.
As far as what "values," are, as I said I'm using the term to distinguish it from the term "desires." "Values" is thus being used as a placeholder term to distinguish the relevant considerations from desires. It is neither my purpose nor goal to offer some full account of what would be relevant from an antirealist view if we're not opting for the term "desires" but something else instead. But a very rough account would be something like this: if you considered all of the factors that motivate you, the relevant values would be those that you yourself had a higher-order preference for taking precedent over the others. In very crude terms, it would be something like "those desires when in a sober state of mind one considered to have greater overarching worth than one's other desires." The problem with any of these terms: value, goal, desire, etc. is that they don't carve the relevant aspects of human cognition at their joints, and we don't have the research or vocabulary to do so in an empirically informed and robust way, at least not yet.
I think there can be a layer in between purely descriptiveness and saying that universally true values exist.
For instance, you can say “I believe that human well being is a good thing, which values promote that?” I think most people implicitly try to optimize something like that, and so humanity continues to function. But there’s no third party enforcing it, or declaring it true.
And when you make the judgement that something is good, or valuable what's the implication of that? The implication is that you have a reason to do something which promotes that end. That is a normative reason which comes from a judgement, not a desire. So that is not subjectivism.
Subjectivism as a view isn't bound to the notion that truth is determined by "desires." What it holds is that whether a moral statement is true or false depends on individual standards. If a person believes stealing is wrong, and regards this belief as a reflection of their preferences, values, standards, or whatever, then this is entirely consistent with subjectivism.
Missed the parent comment.
What is a higher order preference and why should that take priority over my more immediate desires? For e.g. if I'm in a fit a rage, why should I not prioritize my strongest desire in that moment vs. what I would later desire? It's unclear how a subjectivist could give a principled reason for giving priority to "sober" or higher-order desires vs the stronger desires in the moment without slipping in an objective claim. If desires are what give us reasons to act, are those considerations which count in favor of one act over another, why do sober ones get priority?