This week is a continuation of my response to this tweet from Dominik:
I mean... it's basically impossible to have a productive discussion with Bush because he either lacks concepts which every normal being has or he pretends not to have them. while at the same time being so arrogant to assume that the majority of ethicists are deeply confused
2.2.2 There is no compelling evidence “every normal being” has realist concepts
There is a far bigger issue than the possibility that some prominent philosophers lack the concepts, however. After all, my position is that philosophers are not “ordinary people,” and indeed, I use the latter term interchangeably with “nonphilosophers.” I believe philosophers come to think quite differently from nonphilosophers in virtue of their education and training, and thus, in a certain sense, aren’t the sorts of people for whose psychologies we should generalize from (much more on this below). Instead, we should direct our attention to what nonphilosophers think, i.e., “normal beings.” Does every normal being, as Dominik suggest, have the concepts I claim are meaningless?
We don’t know. There is, at present, no compelling empirical evidence that a substantial majority of people have the concept of irreducibly normative facts, or categorical reasons, or intrinsic goodness or badness. I’m not any studies that explicitly explore any of these questions, though that isn’t to say there aren’t.
Yet Dominik isn’t even claiming that a simple majority of people have the concepts I claim to lack, but that all “normal” people do. I’m not sure what normal means in this context, and I’m not sure why Dominik believes this is true. If Dominik believes there is empirical evidence for this claim, I’d be interested in seeing what that evidence is. Perhaps there is evidence of that kind and I’m not aware of it. That’s definitely possible. I’m familiar with a fairly narrow area of research, so it’s possible I’ve overlooked an important literature.
Characterizing my view on the supposed concepts in question as me claiming to not have the concepts gives the impression that I grant that there are such concepts, but that I personally don’t have them. I am not claiming that there are genuine and meaningful concepts out there, but that I personally lack them. I’m claiming that the supposed concepts aren’t concepts at all, and that terms like “irreducibly normative,” are not meaningful. As a result, those who use these terms and purport to have these concepts don’t have them any more than I do, because there are no concepts to have. For comparison, I don’t believe in souls. Imagine someone describing my position as:
Lance claims to not have a soul.
This would be misleading because it would imply that my view on souls is distinctive to myself, as though I were saying something like “Sure, maybe other people have souls, but I don’t.” A more accurate way of describing the views of someone who denies there are souls is:
Lance doesn’t believe in souls.
Just the same, a more accurate characterization of my position on the concepts in question is:
Lance doesn’t think certain terms that moral realists often use are intelligible.
Instead, Dominik frames my view in a way that implies that there are concepts of the relevant kind, but that I am personally devoid of them.
In short, I deny that I lack a concept that “every normal being” has. I’m open to correction on claims, yet Dominik is framing my view in so tendentious and presumptuous a way that if there’s any difficulty in having a productive discussion, I very much doubt the problem is with me, rather than with those who can’t even seem to frame the terms of our dispute in a way that doesn’t presuppose that they’re correct.
Imagine a theist saying that you can’t have a productive conversation with an atheist because they “deny the existence of God.” Well, sure, of course they do. If the problem is that no productive conversation can proceed because they deny theism, the problem is with the presumptuous theist, not the atheist. Just the same, I am disputing the very claims Dominik seems to appeal to to indicate that no productive discussion can be had.
2.3 I’m not pretending
Another interesting element of this remark is the suggestion that I am pretending not to have the concepts in question. Accusations of dishonesty, in the absence of substantive evidence, are an especially insidious thing to hurl around in philosophical disputes. I am disappointed that someone would feel the need to suggest that if someone does not think the way that they do, or the way that they believe other people think, that it’s not only reasonable to suspect, but to publicly suggest that this person is merely pretending.
It’s difficult (or impossible) to completely refute accusations of dishonesty. Nobody can crack open your mind and see what’s inside. What I can say on the matter is that if I am pretending, I am engaged in an incredibly consistent lie, even in private. My wife could readily testify that I discuss metaethics in private most days of the week, and that I say pretty much exactly the same things to her as I do in my blog posts and video appearances. My friends could say much the same. If I am pretending, I have opted to pretend, in private, with my closest friends and family, for years and years, never breaking character, always keeping up the charade. Of course, maybe I’m lying about this, too. Perhaps my wife and friends wouldn’t confirm that I deny the intelligibility of realist concepts privately as well. I could provide such testimony. But maybe even that wouldn’t convince someone who insists I’m lying. After all, maybe they’re lying, too! Maybe they’re not even real people! Maybe I hired actors to say these things! How deep does the conspiracy go?!
The simple fact is that I’m not lying. And publicly accusing someone of merely pretending to believe what I say is not a nice thing to do, and not very consistent with the goal of having a productive conversation.