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Tudor Marginean's avatar

I'm watching debates on philosophical topics almost every day, and my experience is quite a bit different. When I see debates between philosophers and non-philosophers on topics which are clearly philosophical, usually the professional philosopher has the upper hand, to put it mildly. For example, the debate between Huemer and Sapolsky on free will - I don't think Huemer had a strong case, but Sapolsky didn't even seem to understand the issue (btw, generally I find Sapolsky's work more interesting, because those empirical facts about what may influence human behavior are intriguing). Another example was the debate between David Benatar and Jordan Peterson about antinatalism - Peterson was hopeless in that debate. I can list many examples from debates in philosophy of religion, where the non-philosopher usually simply doesn't have a coherent view about confirmation theory, or misrepresents what theism/naturalism entails.

Now I agree that facing non-philosophers can be useful: out of a lot of weak objections, some interesting idea can come to surface.

With respect to the excessive politeness and 'performativeness', I agree that the latter is annoying, but I think the most likely explanation is lazyness - maybe some people don't put their best efforts in trying to defeat the opponent, because it would take time and a thorough review of the literature, in addition to empirical research, where is the case. I have no problem with politeness, even when it's excessive, because there are too many debates on youtube which err in the opposite direction, so excessive charity doesn't do much harm.

I am curious what is particularily deffective about the methods employed by analytic philosophers, other than assuming some empirical claims about intuitions to be true. I think it can be revised: instead of saying 'it is obvious that P, and since P entails Q, you have to accept Q', I can say 'if it is obvious to you that P, as it is obvious to me, then you have to consider its consequence Q'.

Finally, the jargon thing. I think this is a very serious problem for continental philosophers, but we, in the analytic tradition, at least try to make our cases clear, even though we sometimes fail to do so. At least no one argues, in analytic philosophy, about what Kripke wanted to said in one of his articles. Maybe there still is too much jargon, but I don't think we can just get rid off it. A bit more worrying, to me, is that many analytic philosophers are likely monolingual, and they rely too much on some peculiar properties of the English language. I am Romanian, and translating analytic philosophy into Romanian is quite challenging, and that may be an indication that some jargon, at least, is idiosyncratic to English.

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