When making an argument against moral anti-realism, you most often hear some kind of 'but doesn't that mean you think (x hyperbolic example) isn't wrong!?', but this has transferred the question from 'are morals mind-independently real', to 'does moral belief drive action', an entirely different question. The implication is that the person is more likely to do those things, and it amounts to a barely transparent accusation, as we expected from the apostles of 'charity'. If this implication isn't intended, then that response amounts to 'How can you think realism is wrong? That would mean you think realism is wrong!', a simple tautology. You've spoken at length about how 'isn't wrong' is entirely conflated with 'isn't mind-independently wrong' here.
People do not make 'moral decisions' on the basis of abstract judgments about types of actions, but about actual concrete situations in the world. And this explains why among the same people who say 'but you can't be serious about saying genocide isn't wrong', probably also can be found those supporting actual genocide as in Palestine or more likely just not caring, as in South Sudan. I suspect the popularity of moral realism amongst anglophone analytics has got to do with the fact that it is actually easier to justify anything and everything on its basis than it is with anti-realism.
When making an argument against moral anti-realism, you most often hear some kind of 'but doesn't that mean you think (x hyperbolic example) isn't wrong!?', but this has transferred the question from 'are morals mind-independently real', to 'does moral belief drive action', an entirely different question. The implication is that the person is more likely to do those things, and it amounts to a barely transparent accusation, as we expected from the apostles of 'charity'. If this implication isn't intended, then that response amounts to 'How can you think realism is wrong? That would mean you think realism is wrong!', a simple tautology. You've spoken at length about how 'isn't wrong' is entirely conflated with 'isn't mind-independently wrong' here.
People do not make 'moral decisions' on the basis of abstract judgments about types of actions, but about actual concrete situations in the world. And this explains why among the same people who say 'but you can't be serious about saying genocide isn't wrong', probably also can be found those supporting actual genocide as in Palestine or more likely just not caring, as in South Sudan. I suspect the popularity of moral realism amongst anglophone analytics has got to do with the fact that it is actually easier to justify anything and everything on its basis than it is with anti-realism.
>there should be a word for and/or
Holy based
I wish I could use the math/cs “or” and “xor” more often instead of the regular English “and/or” and “or"
No love for nand?
Thanks, for the post! I think any philosophy using the word ‘subjectivity’ needs 347% more Searle: https://open.substack.com/pub/fourfoldphilosopher/p/thats-just-your-opinion-man?r=4bks72&utm_medium=ios
The 1000 word philosophy footnotes triggered me