Reading this, hearing your continuous differentiation between agent and appraiser relativism, and seeing the repeated attempts by realists to force normative agent-relativism onto almost any anti-realist account, got me thinking along the same lines. I believe this agent-relativity feature can be compatible with normative accounts of moral realism, too.
Egoism is a perfect example of agent-relative realist framework. What a person ought to do is indexed specifically to their own self-interest, happiness, or good, and this is true independent of their personal stance on the matter. The realist egoist would have to call the child torturer's action "right," since it increases their self-interest. By the same token, they would also have to call the child's attempt to flee "right," as it increases theirs, and be completely consistent with the egoist stance independent moral truth.
And even though most egoists are naturalists—and I can't say I've ever seen a non-natural realist actually adopt egoism—I really don't think the two are incompatible. If non-naturalists believe moral anti-realism implies normative agent-relativism—even if almost no one adopts that position—then moral realism implies egoism by the same merits.
When making an argument against moral anti-realism, you most often hear some kind of 'but doesn't that mean you think (x hyperbolic example) isn't wrong!?', but this has transferred the question from 'are morals mind-independently real', to 'does moral belief drive action', an entirely different question. The implication is that the person is more likely to do those things, and it amounts to a barely transparent accusation, as we expected from the apostles of 'charity'. If this implication isn't intended, then that response amounts to 'How can you think realism is wrong? That would mean you think realism is wrong!', a simple tautology. You've spoken at length about how 'isn't wrong' is entirely conflated with 'isn't mind-independently wrong' here.
People do not make 'moral decisions' on the basis of abstract judgments about types of actions, but about actual concrete situations in the world. And this explains why among the same people who say 'but you can't be serious about saying genocide isn't wrong', probably also can be found those supporting actual genocide as in Palestine or more likely just not caring, as in South Sudan. I suspect the popularity of moral realism amongst anglophone analytics has got to do with the fact that it is actually easier to justify anything and everything on its basis than it is with anti-realism.
Have you discussed the pragmatic view of truth in more detail elsewhere?
No, not yet!
Reading this, hearing your continuous differentiation between agent and appraiser relativism, and seeing the repeated attempts by realists to force normative agent-relativism onto almost any anti-realist account, got me thinking along the same lines. I believe this agent-relativity feature can be compatible with normative accounts of moral realism, too.
Egoism is a perfect example of agent-relative realist framework. What a person ought to do is indexed specifically to their own self-interest, happiness, or good, and this is true independent of their personal stance on the matter. The realist egoist would have to call the child torturer's action "right," since it increases their self-interest. By the same token, they would also have to call the child's attempt to flee "right," as it increases theirs, and be completely consistent with the egoist stance independent moral truth.
And even though most egoists are naturalists—and I can't say I've ever seen a non-natural realist actually adopt egoism—I really don't think the two are incompatible. If non-naturalists believe moral anti-realism implies normative agent-relativism—even if almost no one adopts that position—then moral realism implies egoism by the same merits.
When making an argument against moral anti-realism, you most often hear some kind of 'but doesn't that mean you think (x hyperbolic example) isn't wrong!?', but this has transferred the question from 'are morals mind-independently real', to 'does moral belief drive action', an entirely different question. The implication is that the person is more likely to do those things, and it amounts to a barely transparent accusation, as we expected from the apostles of 'charity'. If this implication isn't intended, then that response amounts to 'How can you think realism is wrong? That would mean you think realism is wrong!', a simple tautology. You've spoken at length about how 'isn't wrong' is entirely conflated with 'isn't mind-independently wrong' here.
People do not make 'moral decisions' on the basis of abstract judgments about types of actions, but about actual concrete situations in the world. And this explains why among the same people who say 'but you can't be serious about saying genocide isn't wrong', probably also can be found those supporting actual genocide as in Palestine or more likely just not caring, as in South Sudan. I suspect the popularity of moral realism amongst anglophone analytics has got to do with the fact that it is actually easier to justify anything and everything on its basis than it is with anti-realism.
Thanks, for the post! I think any philosophy using the word ‘subjectivity’ needs 347% more Searle: https://open.substack.com/pub/fourfoldphilosopher/p/thats-just-your-opinion-man?r=4bks72&utm_medium=ios
It's called inclusive or ;)
I wish I could use the math/cs “or” and “xor” more often instead of the regular English “and/or” and “or"
You can!
I believe in you.
In fact, you just did it here!