Good post, as usual. I just came here to make the futile suggestion that metaethical discourse would be less polysemous if people generally dropped the natural vs non-natural distinction and, in its place, adopted the concrete vs abstract distinction from metaphysics.
As a moral subjectivist I think there's nothing wrong with wrong and a lot right with right. Being right is good and it's bad to be wrong.
Of all the words in philosophical metaethical discussions "preference" is the most problematic because it implies some mutual disinterest in our respective positions.
Good post, as usual. I just came here to make the futile suggestion that metaethical discourse would be less polysemous if people generally dropped the natural vs non-natural distinction and, in its place, adopted the concrete vs abstract distinction from metaphysics.
Am I the only one seeing the irony in veit using intuitions to arrive at demographic conclusions about what fraction of philosphers use intuition
Note: "Whereas scientists teach their students that intuitions are unreliable garbage" etc should also be part of the quote block.
Love the article. Your sober and exhaustive approach should be emulated by many.
As a moral subjectivist I think there's nothing wrong with wrong and a lot right with right. Being right is good and it's bad to be wrong.
Of all the words in philosophical metaethical discussions "preference" is the most problematic because it implies some mutual disinterest in our respective positions.