When I read "it seems obvious that X," what I think most philosophers mean is that "any rational person would find it to be prima facie suggested that X." Whether this is—for lack of a better term—a load of shit when applied to phenomenal experience or not isn't that important, because I see literally no importance to whether some guy without thinking would find something a certain way. The point of philosophy (last time I checked) was thinking, so resorting to argument-by-not-thinking isn't a good look.
For a claim to be evaluated as true or false it needs to be sufficiently clear to serve as a propositional claim. A lot of philosophy is mired in conceptual and linguistic confusions, and doesn't even rise to the level of propositions. But when claims are made clear, they can be evaluated as true or false. Philosophers make plenty of claims that end up being false: claims about moral realism, about God, you name it.
I think all the solutions to philosophical debates I know of are through dissolution of the problem (disambiguation of the concepts used). Imo a well formed problem always begs an empirical answer, and is therefore a scientific problem. I might be too narrow-minded but I think philosophy is all about clarifying concepts. May I ask for an example of a philosophical problem that can be / was answered empirically ?
I don't think philosophy has any special domain of inquiry so I'm hesitant to say that there's any distinctively "philosophical questions." Questions about how people use terms, for instance, often fall within the scope of what philosophers address, and some of those questions can be answered empirically. That's what I do in my own work: I address the question of whether nonphilosophers endorse moral realism or not (I think the answer is mostly 'no').
Some of the claims moral naturalists make might also be amenable to empirical inquiry. There may be other cases as well.
Sep 24, 2023·edited Sep 24, 2023Liked by Lance S. Bush
Chalmers says that's the best argument against strong illusionism, but he doesn't actually claim it's a good argument:
"Dialectically, the illusionist side is much more interesting than the realist side. Looking at the dialectic abstractly, it is easy to sympathize with the illusionist’s debunking against the realist’s foot-stamping. Still, reflecting on all the data, I think that the realist’s side is the right one."
That would be true if we assume that the strength of a position is determined by the quality of the arguments in its favor. But I think this is rarely the case. (Indeed, isn't that one of your main claims here?)
Liam Kofi Bright's recent remarks on the role of argument are also illuminating:
"Positions are indeed what is interesting, but they are opaque. We don't have access to the full contours of a philosophical view simply by having its presuppositions and concepts laid before us. Through argument we come to learn what it is we are saying."
This view of arguments seems to better describe Chalmers' presentation of the Moorean argument than the supposition the only legitimate discursive function of an argument is establish the truth of its conclusion.
I think your broader criticism still stands, even if it doesn't apply to Chalmers. There are plenty of anglophone philosophers — especially younger ones, or those facing certain types of professional incentives — who naively take this sort of argument at face value or cynically pretend to do so. It is not clear to me whether Kammerer belongs to the naive or cynical category, or whether he just thinks there is intrinsic intellectual interest in the dialectical game surrounding this argument.
Lance, this is just FYI. Radical Eliminativism means that phenomenal mental states have no causal power. But they actually do and this is testable. Below an idea of psychological test of kind I use when I speak with R.E.-sts.
-----
I am now addressing you as an Observer who “sees the light.” Suppose I inform you that starting tomorrow your “inner light” will go out. How exactly this happens is not so important. Almost every person has experience of falling asleep, has experience of being in a state of hypnosis and anesthesia (this is not the case for everyone, that’s not the point). Your “inner light bulb” will go out and “you” will disappear completely. No dreams, no worries or awareness. You won’t even know that something happened, just as the sleeping person doesn’t know. And there will be no transition process such as falling asleep. Your inner light bulb will go out forever. You will never “wake up” again. However, from the point of view of an outside observer, little or nothing will change. Your body will still communicate with the same people, go to work, pay taxes, engage in “Strong AI”, etc.
The question is: did you feel _scared_ even for a moment? Just a little bit? The answer must be honest.
---
Emotion of fear to lose the "inner light", that technically can be measured objectively, is a clear sign that corresponding phenomenal metal state has causal power. This test is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphysical consciousness. Reports of this kind can be built up, so if a computer generates it, it does not necessary mean the computer is conscious.
When I read "it seems obvious that X," what I think most philosophers mean is that "any rational person would find it to be prima facie suggested that X." Whether this is—for lack of a better term—a load of shit when applied to phenomenal experience or not isn't that important, because I see literally no importance to whether some guy without thinking would find something a certain way. The point of philosophy (last time I checked) was thinking, so resorting to argument-by-not-thinking isn't a good look.
- Nathaniel
Is there one such thing as a false meaningful philosophical claim ?
For a claim to be evaluated as true or false it needs to be sufficiently clear to serve as a propositional claim. A lot of philosophy is mired in conceptual and linguistic confusions, and doesn't even rise to the level of propositions. But when claims are made clear, they can be evaluated as true or false. Philosophers make plenty of claims that end up being false: claims about moral realism, about God, you name it.
I think all the solutions to philosophical debates I know of are through dissolution of the problem (disambiguation of the concepts used). Imo a well formed problem always begs an empirical answer, and is therefore a scientific problem. I might be too narrow-minded but I think philosophy is all about clarifying concepts. May I ask for an example of a philosophical problem that can be / was answered empirically ?
I don't think philosophy has any special domain of inquiry so I'm hesitant to say that there's any distinctively "philosophical questions." Questions about how people use terms, for instance, often fall within the scope of what philosophers address, and some of those questions can be answered empirically. That's what I do in my own work: I address the question of whether nonphilosophers endorse moral realism or not (I think the answer is mostly 'no').
Some of the claims moral naturalists make might also be amenable to empirical inquiry. There may be other cases as well.
Makes sense, thanks !
Chalmers says that's the best argument against strong illusionism, but he doesn't actually claim it's a good argument:
"Dialectically, the illusionist side is much more interesting than the realist side. Looking at the dialectic abstractly, it is easy to sympathize with the illusionist’s debunking against the realist’s foot-stamping. Still, reflecting on all the data, I think that the realist’s side is the right one."
If the best argument isn't even a good one, I think the illusionist is in a pretty good position.
That would be true if we assume that the strength of a position is determined by the quality of the arguments in its favor. But I think this is rarely the case. (Indeed, isn't that one of your main claims here?)
Liam Kofi Bright's recent remarks on the role of argument are also illuminating:
http://sootyempiric.blogspot.com/2023/09/arguments-in-philosophy.html
"Positions are indeed what is interesting, but they are opaque. We don't have access to the full contours of a philosophical view simply by having its presuppositions and concepts laid before us. Through argument we come to learn what it is we are saying."
This view of arguments seems to better describe Chalmers' presentation of the Moorean argument than the supposition the only legitimate discursive function of an argument is establish the truth of its conclusion.
I think your broader criticism still stands, even if it doesn't apply to Chalmers. There are plenty of anglophone philosophers — especially younger ones, or those facing certain types of professional incentives — who naively take this sort of argument at face value or cynically pretend to do so. It is not clear to me whether Kammerer belongs to the naive or cynical category, or whether he just thinks there is intrinsic intellectual interest in the dialectical game surrounding this argument.
Your comments are awesome. Thank you.
Lance, this is just FYI. Radical Eliminativism means that phenomenal mental states have no causal power. But they actually do and this is testable. Below an idea of psychological test of kind I use when I speak with R.E.-sts.
-----
I am now addressing you as an Observer who “sees the light.” Suppose I inform you that starting tomorrow your “inner light” will go out. How exactly this happens is not so important. Almost every person has experience of falling asleep, has experience of being in a state of hypnosis and anesthesia (this is not the case for everyone, that’s not the point). Your “inner light bulb” will go out and “you” will disappear completely. No dreams, no worries or awareness. You won’t even know that something happened, just as the sleeping person doesn’t know. And there will be no transition process such as falling asleep. Your inner light bulb will go out forever. You will never “wake up” again. However, from the point of view of an outside observer, little or nothing will change. Your body will still communicate with the same people, go to work, pay taxes, engage in “Strong AI”, etc.
The question is: did you feel _scared_ even for a moment? Just a little bit? The answer must be honest.
---
Emotion of fear to lose the "inner light", that technically can be measured objectively, is a clear sign that corresponding phenomenal metal state has causal power. This test is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphysical consciousness. Reports of this kind can be built up, so if a computer generates it, it does not necessary mean the computer is conscious.