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The Ancient Geek's avatar

1. "Subjectivism" should be "relativism".

2. There is certainly a distinct category of (im)moral *behaviour* -- nobody is jailed for having the wrong aesthetic preferences.

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D Gowers's avatar

"BB also says a few other word things:"

I guess this is an editing error. But 'word things' does seem like a funny and apt description of the narratives that develop from this whole 'I can put these words in a sentence and they seem meaningful to me, therefore a) they are not meaningless, and b) they have one determinate meaning' methodology.

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Lance S. Bush's avatar

Hahaha that's a hilarious error. I'll fix it but it almost seems like I could pretend it was intentional.

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Craig's avatar

Either I have finally read enough of your essays or this particular essay was very well written, because now I believe I understand your points and I agree with them. As a test, I predict that you will agree with this short quote from Rob Henderson

> "My view is that morality is “real” in the same way that language is real. Both can change, but still operate within certain constraints. There are rules to every language, and rules to every morality.

> "Saying morality isn’t real is like saying language isn’t real. And saying there is one true morality is like saying there is only one true language."

See:

https://www.robkhenderson.com/p/the-distinctiveness-of-human-aggression

The quote implies that morality is as empirical as language. It also implies that morality is a group phenomenon, just as language is. Imagine a language constructed by one person that no one else ever uses. Likewise imagine a morality invented by one person that never gains any other adherents.

One might think that as an antirealist you should disagree with the quote, and yet I think you would agree that morality is real in the sense that it is a valid subject for empirical study.

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D Gowers's avatar

Yes, I think Lance might have previously made the point that various antirealist conceptions of moral discourse can be understood without any linguistic contortion or extraordinary level of explanation to be 'real' by ordinary people, whereas realist accounts of moral discourse seem as if they are so illegible that it's not even clear what it could mean for the moral facts to be 'real'.

Another way of putting it that I like is 'morality is as real as money is'.

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