If stance independent epistemologiccal norms don't exist, it doesn't matter what anyone believes. So moral realists might as well carry on believing moral realism.
I don't agree and don't think you've shown that. The notion on things "mattering" in a realist way is nonsense. Things matter to people. Your claims help themselves to the very ways of thinking I'm claiming are confused or wrong.
"Mattering" was the very word that facilitated my transition from moral realist to metaethical skeptic. By introspecting on what it could possibly mean for something to "matter", I found that nothing seemed to matter except by my desires and aversions.
If stance independent epistemologiccal norms don't exist, it doesn't matter what anyone believes. So moral realists might as well carry on believing moral realism.
I don't agree and don't think you've shown that. The notion on things "mattering" in a realist way is nonsense. Things matter to people. Your claims help themselves to the very ways of thinking I'm claiming are confused or wrong.
"Mattering" was the very word that facilitated my transition from moral realist to metaethical skeptic. By introspecting on what it could possibly mean for something to "matter", I found that nothing seemed to matter except by my desires and aversions.