If I had to pick one response philosophers give that bothers me more than any other, it's when you criticize philosophy and philosophers get all snarky:
You really think "I'm free to reject a premise" (whatever that means) shows self-defeat arguments are "quite terrible"? As if "I'm free to reject a premise" shows an argument is "quite terrible".
I also noticed you never actually tried charitably constructing the objection. Just went with an uncharitable reading that's easy to knock down & called it a day, only after dropping emotional buzzwords "it's snarky!" & (ironically) calling it uncharitable.
So maybe you could actually try understanding where objectors are coming from instead of cringely emoting "snarky tho"? (facepalm)
For those who actually care to properly interpret the objection, competent proponents (Joe Schmid & Michael Huemer), as opposed to beginner no-name randos, design the point against a very specific view. (See Schmid's video "Is philosophy useless?" 1:29)
They (correctly) point out that the view (held & defended in academia) that philosophy doesn't produce knowledge implies any defense of such a view wouldn't make you know the view's true, as such a defense would be doing philosophy.
It's very basic. And may not apply to the view you hold FYI.
Finally, you strike me as a philosophy-basher who's heavy on vague platitudes "philosophy functions as an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems" & lacking on empirics for your crazy grand claims "many philosophers favor style over substance" (no data provided).
Yes. I do. I'll give an example. Proponents of companions in guilt arguments will often claim that if you reject moral realism, you must also reject epistemic antirealism. But if you do this, it would be "self-defeating" because you'd have no stance-independent epistemic reasons for endorsing epistemic antirealism.
This would be true, but this doesn't trouble me in the slightest. I never figured I needed stance-independent epistemic norms to "justify" beliefs in the first place. This and other objections only "work" if the target is already committed to some other dubious notion, which they could also simply reject.
//I also noticed you never actually tried charitably constructing the objection. Just went with an uncharitable reading that's easy to knock down & called it a day, only after dropping emotional buzzwords "it's snarky!" & (ironically) calling it uncharitable.//
You may be operating under a misapprehension about what my target is and what I’m trying to say here. There are many instances in which people criticize philosophy. Some of these criticisms are well-informed, thoughtful, and carefully expressed. Others are not.
Sometimes people who criticize “philosophy” are criticizing specific instances, forms, practices, subcultures, and so on. They’re not anti-philosophy in some broad and general sense that would include their own criticisms. And yet people defending philosophy will respond to *these people* with the snarky “criticism of philosophy is philosophy” response. In these cases, it is the philosophers who have misunderstood the criticisms and are not being charitable. There’s nothing uncharitable about correctly noting when someone else is being uncharitable.
As far as the “buzzword” remark: I stand by that. Philosophers often give clearly snarky responses to critics. There is nothing inappropriate about noticing when people are being snarky.
//So maybe you could actually try understanding where objectors are coming from instead of cringely emoting "snarky tho"? (facepalm)//
With respect, I am not convinced you are understanding where I’m coming from.
//For those who actually care to properly interpret the objection, competent proponents (Joe Schmid & Michael Huemer), as opposed to beginner no-name randos, design the point against a very specific view. (See Schmid's video "Is philosophy useless?" 1:29)//
Which beginner no-name randos are you referring to?
With respect to the video you suggested, Joe doesn’t seem to me to be responding to a “very specific view.” Joe boils one objection down to “Philosophy is useless.” This is vague. A person who says this may mean any number of things, some of which would be vulnerable to the objections Joe raises and some of which may not be.If someone is saying “literally anything that could be broadly construed as philosophy is useless and a waste of time” in such a way that is inclusive of their own objections, then this would be worth criticizing. He also mentions another, which is that philosophy can’t produce knowledge. This is subject to the same concern, though, which is that a person who is making this claim may not be targeting a conception of “philosophy” so broad that it includes their own position on the matter.
But not all critics are doing this. That is my point. If Joe is specifically targeting actual instances of self-undermining criticisms of philosophy, of course those are self-undermining. The question is whether, in any given instance, the most charitable interpretation of a critic of philosophy actually is that they are making self-undermining claims. Thus, even if Joe were targeting a very specific view…a few which is subject to Joe’s objections, then I simply agree with Joe about those specific instances. But I’m not talking about those instances. Of course there are ill-informed and terrible critics of philosophy. But I specifically stated this in the post, when I said “I’m also not saying there aren’t ill-informed criticisms of philosophy that are critical of all philosophizing, or criticize it for very stupid and ill-informed reasons.”
Critics of philosophy can be and often are specific in their objections to the value of philosophy. They may hold that a specific aspect of philosophy isn’t useful for some specific purpose or end. Or they may be thinking of “philosophy” specifically with respect to academic philosophy, or specifically Western or analytic philosophy. And even there, they may think only certain practices, methods, subfields, and so on are useless. Often these critics are not, themselves, philosophers, and are expressing broad and critical impressions of the field as a whole. There may be (and, I believe, often is) merit in some of those concerns, e.g., philosophy’s relative lack of progress, or the concern that a great deal of philosophy has become hyperspecialized, cliquish, and overly concerned with narrow technical issues. For instance, Haack (2016) addresses the latter set of concerns in this article.
Unfortunately, philosophers are often defensive about their field, and will react to objections to philosophy as though the objections are so broad and nonspecific as to be objections to literally any systematic or rigorous or abstract thinking at all, as if the critic were against thinking itself. In many cases, such critics have no such broad target in mind. If they do, then sure, such objections may be bad ones. But often they’re not, and philosophers often fail to handle criticism of the field with care. Instead, any and all critics are treated like drooling idiots.
//Finally, you strike me as a philosophy-basher who's heavy on vague platitudes "philosophy functions as an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems" & lacking on empirics for your crazy grand claims "many philosophers favor style over substance" (no data provided).//
A few concerns. First, I work in academic philosophy. I do not hold the view that philosophy in its entirety functions as “an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems.” Are you attributing such a view to me?
Second, the objection that I’m “lacking empirics” for a claim, when it comes to a critique of philosophy, is a bit strange. How often do philosophers present empirical evidence for the many empirical claims they make? Hardly ever. Contemporary philosophers are especially terrible at making empirical claims but not supporting those claims with data. Yet I went out of my way to work in a second discipline (psychology) so that I could study and conduct empirical studies, some of which I employ to support my claims. If you’re going to end an objection with “no data provided,” then, to apply this consistently, that same objection could be raised with respect to an absolutely titanic amount of claims philosophers make.
In this particular case, the claim that I “lack empirics” is especially bizarre, though, because this is a simple blog post where I’m reporting in a broad and general sense on my observations and experiences. It’s not intended to be some kind of rigorous analysis of the published literature. Philosophers, and people in general, can and should be free to speak in general terms about their experiences and observations without an expectation that they provide robust survey data (or whatever it was you had in mind) to make such claims. This particular post was, incidentally, inspired by a recent interaction with a philosopher.
Sometimes my discussions with people prompt thoughts like the ones I’ve shared here, but I am unable or unwilling to describe the specific exchange that prompted the post either because it took place in a private setting or because I don’t want to publicly excoriate specific individuals.
But again, this is a blog. Many of my blog posts do, incidentally, present or evaluate empirical data in support of my claims, something that is comparatively rare among mainstream analytic philosophers. But not every blog post is like that. This is a casual and informal setting, and I am going to discuss my personal experiences or observations here without feeling that I need to do an enormous amount of empirical research or provide comprehensive documentation of examples every time.
References
Haack, S. (2016). The Fragmentation of Philosophy, the Road to Reintegration. In: Göhner, J., Jung, EM. (eds) Susan Haack: Reintegrating Philosophy. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24969-8_1
Sigh. Lots of off-topic rambling here. Will reply to the on-topic bits.
> You really think "I'm free to reject a premise" (whatever that means) shows self-defeat arguments are "quite terrible"? As if "I'm free to reject a premise" shows an argument is "quite terrible".
> Yes. I do.
Hahaha hard to believe you actually said "Yes."
I am free to reject the personal anecdotes you base the article off of - is your article's arguments now "quite terrible"? The standards are comical.
Honest thing to do is agree with me that "I am free to reject a premise" doesn't make an argument "quite terrible".
// people defending philosophy will respond to *these people* with the snarky “criticism of philosophy is philosophy” response //
To be clear, that's being disputed - unless, of course, you're talking about non-specialist randos on Discord or Twitter doing this. Which would be going after low-hanging fruit instead of replying to the best the other side has to offer (like Joe Schmid).
// As far as the “buzzword” remark: I stand by that. Philosophers often give clearly snarky responses to critics. There is nothing inappropriate about noticing when people are being snarky. //
Look, you're not tracking. That's being disputed. Regurgitating the claim doesn't count as justification. We're doubting if they're even being "snarky". Sounds like you're projecting a weird boogeyman-image on them rather than genuinely understanding they're POV (ironically).
// Which beginner no-name randos are you referring to? //
Just the usual non-specialists you'd find on Discord or Twitter. It's not that deep.
// This is subject to the same concern, though, which is that a person who is making this claim may not be targeting a conception of “philosophy” so broad that it includes their own position on the matter. //
// If Joe is specifically targeting actual instances of self-undermining criticisms of philosophy, of course those are self-undermining. The question is whether, in any given instance, the most charitable interpretation of a critic of philosophy actually is that they are making self-undermining claims. //
Sigh. No. That's not "the question". Charity has limits. Bending over backwards being overly charitable is not our duty. The academics Joe's objecting to are straightforwardly using "philosophy" in the broad sense.
// Unfortunately, philosophers are often defensive about their field, and will react to objections to philosophy as though the objections are so broad and nonspecific as to be objections to literally any systematic or rigorous or abstract thinking at all, as if the critic were against thinking itself. //
Why carelessly toss out another crazy empirical claim (which you have no justification for)? Surely you know we'd notice. What's the data for this new grand empirical claim?
// I do not hold the view that philosophy in its entirety functions as “an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems.” Are you attributing such a view to me? //
No. Never said "entirety". I quoted a vague platitude you said & accidentially left out a qualifier "much of". Still a vague platitude (what does that even mean?)
// If you’re going to end an objection with “no data provided,” then, to apply this consistently, that same objection could be raised with respect to an absolutely titanic amount of claims philosophers make. //
I am consistent (duh). If philosophers are making data-less empirical claims, we'd also ask data on that.
What a pathetic failure attempt at showing hypocrisy. Just a shameless whataboutism dodge. Do you have data or not?
// the objection that I’m “lacking empirics” for a claim, when it comes to a critique of philosophy, is a bit strange. //
And, no, asking for data on empirical claims is not "a bit strange". Level 0 error here.
// the claim that I “lack empirics” is especially bizarre, though, because this is a simple blog post where I’m reporting in a broad and general sense on my observations and experiences. //
As if it isn't your duty as a public figure make your public empirical claims evidence-backed. You're not chatting with grandma.
Imagine we actually followed this demented rule, that we're allowed to spread propaganda like the claim "ordinary people are moral realists" because it's a "causal & informal" setting.
Very disappointing & revealing reply. Epistmeic standards need to be raised, by a lot. Way too low currently. Just vibing your way to empirical claims, letting yourself off the hook with citing cheap slogans, etc. Again, very disappointing.
You really think "I'm free to reject a premise" (whatever that means) shows self-defeat arguments are "quite terrible"? As if "I'm free to reject a premise" shows an argument is "quite terrible".
I also noticed you never actually tried charitably constructing the objection. Just went with an uncharitable reading that's easy to knock down & called it a day, only after dropping emotional buzzwords "it's snarky!" & (ironically) calling it uncharitable.
So maybe you could actually try understanding where objectors are coming from instead of cringely emoting "snarky tho"? (facepalm)
For those who actually care to properly interpret the objection, competent proponents (Joe Schmid & Michael Huemer), as opposed to beginner no-name randos, design the point against a very specific view. (See Schmid's video "Is philosophy useless?" 1:29)
They (correctly) point out that the view (held & defended in academia) that philosophy doesn't produce knowledge implies any defense of such a view wouldn't make you know the view's true, as such a defense would be doing philosophy.
It's very basic. And may not apply to the view you hold FYI.
Finally, you strike me as a philosophy-basher who's heavy on vague platitudes "philosophy functions as an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems" & lacking on empirics for your crazy grand claims "many philosophers favor style over substance" (no data provided).
Yes. I do. I'll give an example. Proponents of companions in guilt arguments will often claim that if you reject moral realism, you must also reject epistemic antirealism. But if you do this, it would be "self-defeating" because you'd have no stance-independent epistemic reasons for endorsing epistemic antirealism.
This would be true, but this doesn't trouble me in the slightest. I never figured I needed stance-independent epistemic norms to "justify" beliefs in the first place. This and other objections only "work" if the target is already committed to some other dubious notion, which they could also simply reject.
//I also noticed you never actually tried charitably constructing the objection. Just went with an uncharitable reading that's easy to knock down & called it a day, only after dropping emotional buzzwords "it's snarky!" & (ironically) calling it uncharitable.//
You may be operating under a misapprehension about what my target is and what I’m trying to say here. There are many instances in which people criticize philosophy. Some of these criticisms are well-informed, thoughtful, and carefully expressed. Others are not.
Sometimes people who criticize “philosophy” are criticizing specific instances, forms, practices, subcultures, and so on. They’re not anti-philosophy in some broad and general sense that would include their own criticisms. And yet people defending philosophy will respond to *these people* with the snarky “criticism of philosophy is philosophy” response. In these cases, it is the philosophers who have misunderstood the criticisms and are not being charitable. There’s nothing uncharitable about correctly noting when someone else is being uncharitable.
As far as the “buzzword” remark: I stand by that. Philosophers often give clearly snarky responses to critics. There is nothing inappropriate about noticing when people are being snarky.
//So maybe you could actually try understanding where objectors are coming from instead of cringely emoting "snarky tho"? (facepalm)//
With respect, I am not convinced you are understanding where I’m coming from.
//For those who actually care to properly interpret the objection, competent proponents (Joe Schmid & Michael Huemer), as opposed to beginner no-name randos, design the point against a very specific view. (See Schmid's video "Is philosophy useless?" 1:29)//
Which beginner no-name randos are you referring to?
With respect to the video you suggested, Joe doesn’t seem to me to be responding to a “very specific view.” Joe boils one objection down to “Philosophy is useless.” This is vague. A person who says this may mean any number of things, some of which would be vulnerable to the objections Joe raises and some of which may not be.If someone is saying “literally anything that could be broadly construed as philosophy is useless and a waste of time” in such a way that is inclusive of their own objections, then this would be worth criticizing. He also mentions another, which is that philosophy can’t produce knowledge. This is subject to the same concern, though, which is that a person who is making this claim may not be targeting a conception of “philosophy” so broad that it includes their own position on the matter.
But not all critics are doing this. That is my point. If Joe is specifically targeting actual instances of self-undermining criticisms of philosophy, of course those are self-undermining. The question is whether, in any given instance, the most charitable interpretation of a critic of philosophy actually is that they are making self-undermining claims. Thus, even if Joe were targeting a very specific view…a few which is subject to Joe’s objections, then I simply agree with Joe about those specific instances. But I’m not talking about those instances. Of course there are ill-informed and terrible critics of philosophy. But I specifically stated this in the post, when I said “I’m also not saying there aren’t ill-informed criticisms of philosophy that are critical of all philosophizing, or criticize it for very stupid and ill-informed reasons.”
Critics of philosophy can be and often are specific in their objections to the value of philosophy. They may hold that a specific aspect of philosophy isn’t useful for some specific purpose or end. Or they may be thinking of “philosophy” specifically with respect to academic philosophy, or specifically Western or analytic philosophy. And even there, they may think only certain practices, methods, subfields, and so on are useless. Often these critics are not, themselves, philosophers, and are expressing broad and critical impressions of the field as a whole. There may be (and, I believe, often is) merit in some of those concerns, e.g., philosophy’s relative lack of progress, or the concern that a great deal of philosophy has become hyperspecialized, cliquish, and overly concerned with narrow technical issues. For instance, Haack (2016) addresses the latter set of concerns in this article.
Unfortunately, philosophers are often defensive about their field, and will react to objections to philosophy as though the objections are so broad and nonspecific as to be objections to literally any systematic or rigorous or abstract thinking at all, as if the critic were against thinking itself. In many cases, such critics have no such broad target in mind. If they do, then sure, such objections may be bad ones. But often they’re not, and philosophers often fail to handle criticism of the field with care. Instead, any and all critics are treated like drooling idiots.
//Finally, you strike me as a philosophy-basher who's heavy on vague platitudes "philosophy functions as an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems" & lacking on empirics for your crazy grand claims "many philosophers favor style over substance" (no data provided).//
A few concerns. First, I work in academic philosophy. I do not hold the view that philosophy in its entirety functions as “an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems.” Are you attributing such a view to me?
Second, the objection that I’m “lacking empirics” for a claim, when it comes to a critique of philosophy, is a bit strange. How often do philosophers present empirical evidence for the many empirical claims they make? Hardly ever. Contemporary philosophers are especially terrible at making empirical claims but not supporting those claims with data. Yet I went out of my way to work in a second discipline (psychology) so that I could study and conduct empirical studies, some of which I employ to support my claims. If you’re going to end an objection with “no data provided,” then, to apply this consistently, that same objection could be raised with respect to an absolutely titanic amount of claims philosophers make.
In this particular case, the claim that I “lack empirics” is especially bizarre, though, because this is a simple blog post where I’m reporting in a broad and general sense on my observations and experiences. It’s not intended to be some kind of rigorous analysis of the published literature. Philosophers, and people in general, can and should be free to speak in general terms about their experiences and observations without an expectation that they provide robust survey data (or whatever it was you had in mind) to make such claims. This particular post was, incidentally, inspired by a recent interaction with a philosopher.
Sometimes my discussions with people prompt thoughts like the ones I’ve shared here, but I am unable or unwilling to describe the specific exchange that prompted the post either because it took place in a private setting or because I don’t want to publicly excoriate specific individuals.
But again, this is a blog. Many of my blog posts do, incidentally, present or evaluate empirical data in support of my claims, something that is comparatively rare among mainstream analytic philosophers. But not every blog post is like that. This is a casual and informal setting, and I am going to discuss my personal experiences or observations here without feeling that I need to do an enormous amount of empirical research or provide comprehensive documentation of examples every time.
References
Haack, S. (2016). The Fragmentation of Philosophy, the Road to Reintegration. In: Göhner, J., Jung, EM. (eds) Susan Haack: Reintegrating Philosophy. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24969-8_1
Sigh. Lots of off-topic rambling here. Will reply to the on-topic bits.
> You really think "I'm free to reject a premise" (whatever that means) shows self-defeat arguments are "quite terrible"? As if "I'm free to reject a premise" shows an argument is "quite terrible".
> Yes. I do.
Hahaha hard to believe you actually said "Yes."
I am free to reject the personal anecdotes you base the article off of - is your article's arguments now "quite terrible"? The standards are comical.
Honest thing to do is agree with me that "I am free to reject a premise" doesn't make an argument "quite terrible".
// people defending philosophy will respond to *these people* with the snarky “criticism of philosophy is philosophy” response //
To be clear, that's being disputed - unless, of course, you're talking about non-specialist randos on Discord or Twitter doing this. Which would be going after low-hanging fruit instead of replying to the best the other side has to offer (like Joe Schmid).
// As far as the “buzzword” remark: I stand by that. Philosophers often give clearly snarky responses to critics. There is nothing inappropriate about noticing when people are being snarky. //
Look, you're not tracking. That's being disputed. Regurgitating the claim doesn't count as justification. We're doubting if they're even being "snarky". Sounds like you're projecting a weird boogeyman-image on them rather than genuinely understanding they're POV (ironically).
// Which beginner no-name randos are you referring to? //
Just the usual non-specialists you'd find on Discord or Twitter. It's not that deep.
// This is subject to the same concern, though, which is that a person who is making this claim may not be targeting a conception of “philosophy” so broad that it includes their own position on the matter. //
// If Joe is specifically targeting actual instances of self-undermining criticisms of philosophy, of course those are self-undermining. The question is whether, in any given instance, the most charitable interpretation of a critic of philosophy actually is that they are making self-undermining claims. //
Sigh. No. That's not "the question". Charity has limits. Bending over backwards being overly charitable is not our duty. The academics Joe's objecting to are straightforwardly using "philosophy" in the broad sense.
// Unfortunately, philosophers are often defensive about their field, and will react to objections to philosophy as though the objections are so broad and nonspecific as to be objections to literally any systematic or rigorous or abstract thinking at all, as if the critic were against thinking itself. //
Why carelessly toss out another crazy empirical claim (which you have no justification for)? Surely you know we'd notice. What's the data for this new grand empirical claim?
// I do not hold the view that philosophy in its entirety functions as “an intellectual game rather than a serious approach to solving problems.” Are you attributing such a view to me? //
No. Never said "entirety". I quoted a vague platitude you said & accidentially left out a qualifier "much of". Still a vague platitude (what does that even mean?)
// If you’re going to end an objection with “no data provided,” then, to apply this consistently, that same objection could be raised with respect to an absolutely titanic amount of claims philosophers make. //
I am consistent (duh). If philosophers are making data-less empirical claims, we'd also ask data on that.
What a pathetic failure attempt at showing hypocrisy. Just a shameless whataboutism dodge. Do you have data or not?
// the objection that I’m “lacking empirics” for a claim, when it comes to a critique of philosophy, is a bit strange. //
And, no, asking for data on empirical claims is not "a bit strange". Level 0 error here.
// the claim that I “lack empirics” is especially bizarre, though, because this is a simple blog post where I’m reporting in a broad and general sense on my observations and experiences. //
As if it isn't your duty as a public figure make your public empirical claims evidence-backed. You're not chatting with grandma.
Imagine we actually followed this demented rule, that we're allowed to spread propaganda like the claim "ordinary people are moral realists" because it's a "causal & informal" setting.
Very disappointing & revealing reply. Epistmeic standards need to be raised, by a lot. Way too low currently. Just vibing your way to empirical claims, letting yourself off the hook with citing cheap slogans, etc. Again, very disappointing.