I am denying what I take to be a fairly standard conception of phenomenal consciousness as a distinctive private, qualitative aspect of experience characterized by qualia, which I regard as ineffable, intrinsic properties of experience that cannot be understood even in principle in third personal terms. This is often described in terms of "what it is like" to have an experience. I don't just deny that phenomenal consciousness exists; I deny it's even an intelligible notion.
I also deny the cogito but I don't take that to be directly related to phenomenal consciousness.
I suppose, to be more clear: since you think people like Chalmers are fundamentally mistaken about what consciousness is, what do you think consciousness consists in? Say you feel a sharp stabbing pain in your side. What is that thing that just happened?
I don't think there is any distinctive thing that consciousness is. Much of what I think people are talking about when talking about human consciousness is a range of processes that likely fragment and don't pick out any distinctive phenomenon.
Even so, I've sometimes repeated a remark I made before about a Dennettian view some of the key features of human consciousness I do endorse:
"I think that what we take to be our conscious experience involves a capacity for "checking in" on an ongoing internal narrative, or story that we are constantly "telling ourselves" that functions to provide a unified timeline which we can utilize, report on, and talk about with others. I think this "narrative center of gravity" requires a degree of cultural input, and the inculcation of specific memes/concepts that lead us to form a sense of a self that integrates our experiences and that can think about "our" past experiences and "our" future experiences. In a sense, I think that conscious experience is built up as a sort of software that we have the hardware to develop, but requires a degree of developmental and cultural input to become fully operational."
Is it possible for me to know that a red car is red without being phenomenally conscious? If I can, I don't know what the phrase is supposed to mean.
Ideally, a good writer would briefly make sure the reader knows what is intended by such an important phrase. Maybe this is not possible, or would be tedious, and the writer must depend on the readers being familiar enough with the phrase to detect the nuance, or willing to look it up.
"I worry that analytic philosophers are operating with a tangled knot of questionable presuppositions and methods, and that they have very strong incentives not to appreciate how flawed their overall approach to at least certain questions may be."
What do you think an analytic philosopher might say that could begin to assuage your worries? Put another way, what would you regard as possible reasons to view an issue (e.g., the hard problem) as a genuine problem rather than a psuedo-problem?
A related question: you rightly point out the dangers of slipping too easily into talk of what 'we' think about a certain topic. Isn't there also a danger that in characterising analytic philosophers in the general terms you use (as mostly trained in a certain way, as mostly using a methodology which centres on certain analyses, as emotionally attached to the importance of certain problems, etc) that you in effect slip into a similar way of talking about what 'they' think? From my own (admittedly limited) experience of analytic philosophy, I would say there is rather more variation in attitudes towards, e.g., the methods you describe and the importance of phenomenal consciousness than you acknowledge here.
I look at all of these matters through a pragmatist lens, and I ask: what difference would this or that view make? Why would it matter? How could I observe or experience differences in these truths? Interact with them? If the answer is there wouldn't be any difference, then these alleged "truths" are of little interest to me. So if they could make their truths practically relevant, I'd be open to that. If not, I think we'd have to dig into the foundations of what we're even trying to do, much less how we're trying to do it.
Regarding the latter concern: I usually include qualifiers or speak in general terms without the implication that all analytic philosophers think, speak, or approach philosophy the same way. My background is in psychology, and I tend to think in terms of distributions and patterns that admit of exceptions, so I don't really think I'm at much at risk of making the same kinds of mistakes. I may develop a bad verbal habit of not using the right qualifications, but I'd be receptive to recognizing and correcting for that. Here, though, I am largely shouting into an empty gorge. Almost no professional philosophers read this blog and I doubt I can effectuate any significant change in the field's practices.
Regarding there being more variation in attitudes towards methods than I acknowledge: I mostly write critical pieces, and rarely talk about what works or what's good or what I like. But I do sometimes talk about it. I do experimental philosophy. Most of the people doing that are analytic philosophers. I'm technically trained in analytic philosophy. Most of my favorite philosophers are analytic philosophers. And most of the critiques of the field that I endorse or that have influenced me come from analytic philosophers.
But I specialize in wrecking ball type work. I focus on what I don't like. I just don't write about what's good so often. But I didn't build up my views from nothing. My own views are a synthesis of many ideas and thoughts that came before me. I just don't talk about that so much. But I am happy to acknowledge it if the opportunity arises.
Thanks Lance. Unfortunately I wasn't able to reply before now, so maybe this is wasted, but a couple of things occurred to me reading your response.
As regards the first point, I think we may just disagree over which views do or do not matter. I think a view's being correct can matter even if it makes little practical difference (e.g., I think it matters which views about the origins of the first World War are more or less correct, even if this makes little practical difference in 2025).
As regards the rest of your reply, I think you've laid out your approach very clearly. I want to push back a little on how your characterise analytic philosophy / philosophers. I appreciate that you are not making claims about how *every* analytic philosopher thinks or which problems they regard as very important. But I don't think this in itself deals with the worry that you may, at least some of the time, be generalising too hastily. By way of comparison, a philosopher who said something like 'Surely *most* of us would agree that such-and-such is true of conscious experiences' does not automatically dodge the worry you raised in your article. In my experience many philosophers who I would regard as mainstream analytic types do not, for instance, make analysis of natural language sentences central to their methodology. Perhaps this varies between sub-disciplines, but to give one example, a lot of recent work in metaphysics is inspired by what is regarded as scientific methodology (e.g., inference to the best explanation). There are plenty of criticisms which could be made of how this method is used by philosophers, but it does not seem to me to rely on linguistic or conceptual analysis.
No Lance we don’t see the weird goblin that’s telling you to watch every meta ethics video on YouTube or else he’s going to torture and kill you. You should see a psychiatrist.
What, exactly, do you mean by phenomenal consciousness to say that we don't have it? Do you deny the Cartesian cogito?
I am denying what I take to be a fairly standard conception of phenomenal consciousness as a distinctive private, qualitative aspect of experience characterized by qualia, which I regard as ineffable, intrinsic properties of experience that cannot be understood even in principle in third personal terms. This is often described in terms of "what it is like" to have an experience. I don't just deny that phenomenal consciousness exists; I deny it's even an intelligible notion.
I also deny the cogito but I don't take that to be directly related to phenomenal consciousness.
Interesting. Have you written about your rejection of the cogito anywhere?
I suppose, to be more clear: since you think people like Chalmers are fundamentally mistaken about what consciousness is, what do you think consciousness consists in? Say you feel a sharp stabbing pain in your side. What is that thing that just happened?
I don't think there is any distinctive thing that consciousness is. Much of what I think people are talking about when talking about human consciousness is a range of processes that likely fragment and don't pick out any distinctive phenomenon.
Even so, I've sometimes repeated a remark I made before about a Dennettian view some of the key features of human consciousness I do endorse:
"I think that what we take to be our conscious experience involves a capacity for "checking in" on an ongoing internal narrative, or story that we are constantly "telling ourselves" that functions to provide a unified timeline which we can utilize, report on, and talk about with others. I think this "narrative center of gravity" requires a degree of cultural input, and the inculcation of specific memes/concepts that lead us to form a sense of a self that integrates our experiences and that can think about "our" past experiences and "our" future experiences. In a sense, I think that conscious experience is built up as a sort of software that we have the hardware to develop, but requires a degree of developmental and cultural input to become fully operational."
As soon as I saw the title of this article I heard Bing Crosby singing in my head. This proves that phenomenal consciousness exists.
Is it possible for me to know that a red car is red without being phenomenally conscious? If I can, I don't know what the phrase is supposed to mean.
Ideally, a good writer would briefly make sure the reader knows what is intended by such an important phrase. Maybe this is not possible, or would be tedious, and the writer must depend on the readers being familiar enough with the phrase to detect the nuance, or willing to look it up.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online was not much help to me. (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#PheStr)
Psychology Today sought to answer the question of what phenomenal consciousness is, but failed to show me my mistake. (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/theory-of-consciousness/202105/what-is-phenomenal-consciousness#:~:text=Phenomenal%20consciousness%20is%20the%20feeling,provide%20the%20contents%20to%20consciousness.)
"I worry that analytic philosophers are operating with a tangled knot of questionable presuppositions and methods, and that they have very strong incentives not to appreciate how flawed their overall approach to at least certain questions may be."
What do you think an analytic philosopher might say that could begin to assuage your worries? Put another way, what would you regard as possible reasons to view an issue (e.g., the hard problem) as a genuine problem rather than a psuedo-problem?
A related question: you rightly point out the dangers of slipping too easily into talk of what 'we' think about a certain topic. Isn't there also a danger that in characterising analytic philosophers in the general terms you use (as mostly trained in a certain way, as mostly using a methodology which centres on certain analyses, as emotionally attached to the importance of certain problems, etc) that you in effect slip into a similar way of talking about what 'they' think? From my own (admittedly limited) experience of analytic philosophy, I would say there is rather more variation in attitudes towards, e.g., the methods you describe and the importance of phenomenal consciousness than you acknowledge here.
I look at all of these matters through a pragmatist lens, and I ask: what difference would this or that view make? Why would it matter? How could I observe or experience differences in these truths? Interact with them? If the answer is there wouldn't be any difference, then these alleged "truths" are of little interest to me. So if they could make their truths practically relevant, I'd be open to that. If not, I think we'd have to dig into the foundations of what we're even trying to do, much less how we're trying to do it.
Regarding the latter concern: I usually include qualifiers or speak in general terms without the implication that all analytic philosophers think, speak, or approach philosophy the same way. My background is in psychology, and I tend to think in terms of distributions and patterns that admit of exceptions, so I don't really think I'm at much at risk of making the same kinds of mistakes. I may develop a bad verbal habit of not using the right qualifications, but I'd be receptive to recognizing and correcting for that. Here, though, I am largely shouting into an empty gorge. Almost no professional philosophers read this blog and I doubt I can effectuate any significant change in the field's practices.
Regarding there being more variation in attitudes towards methods than I acknowledge: I mostly write critical pieces, and rarely talk about what works or what's good or what I like. But I do sometimes talk about it. I do experimental philosophy. Most of the people doing that are analytic philosophers. I'm technically trained in analytic philosophy. Most of my favorite philosophers are analytic philosophers. And most of the critiques of the field that I endorse or that have influenced me come from analytic philosophers.
But I specialize in wrecking ball type work. I focus on what I don't like. I just don't write about what's good so often. But I didn't build up my views from nothing. My own views are a synthesis of many ideas and thoughts that came before me. I just don't talk about that so much. But I am happy to acknowledge it if the opportunity arises.
Thanks Lance. Unfortunately I wasn't able to reply before now, so maybe this is wasted, but a couple of things occurred to me reading your response.
As regards the first point, I think we may just disagree over which views do or do not matter. I think a view's being correct can matter even if it makes little practical difference (e.g., I think it matters which views about the origins of the first World War are more or less correct, even if this makes little practical difference in 2025).
As regards the rest of your reply, I think you've laid out your approach very clearly. I want to push back a little on how your characterise analytic philosophy / philosophers. I appreciate that you are not making claims about how *every* analytic philosopher thinks or which problems they regard as very important. But I don't think this in itself deals with the worry that you may, at least some of the time, be generalising too hastily. By way of comparison, a philosopher who said something like 'Surely *most* of us would agree that such-and-such is true of conscious experiences' does not automatically dodge the worry you raised in your article. In my experience many philosophers who I would regard as mainstream analytic types do not, for instance, make analysis of natural language sentences central to their methodology. Perhaps this varies between sub-disciplines, but to give one example, a lot of recent work in metaphysics is inspired by what is regarded as scientific methodology (e.g., inference to the best explanation). There are plenty of criticisms which could be made of how this method is used by philosophers, but it does not seem to me to rely on linguistic or conceptual analysis.
No Lance we don’t see the weird goblin that’s telling you to watch every meta ethics video on YouTube or else he’s going to torture and kill you. You should see a psychiatrist.
I don't know if that's a well intentioned joke or a criticism.
It’s a joke. I’m addicted to your videos and articles. Please don’t stop producing them!