I suspect a lot of judgments about other people's taste preference are often a form of character judgment, so in the virtue ethics sense they might also be moral judgment.
If someone likes playing gacha mobile games with microtransactions pop up every two minute, PC/Console gamers who play the likes of RDR2 and Elden Ring might judge them badly, because either their choice reflects an incompetency in finding good games to play (and thus incompetency in probably other domains including moral beliefs), or it reflects their feeble-mindedness and other vices for succumbing to the cheap mental tricks of gacha games.
Or consider someone who otherwise eats meat but not offals. People who eat offals might dislike them even tho technically it's none of their business, because it could reflect a type of culinary bigotry, from which they may deduce a general closed-mindedness on the part of the offal-abstainer. And if they are bigots in food, who's to say they aren't bigots in other things like sexuality or nationality as well! This might be the thought process (maybe unconscious and automatic) behind many preference judgments, which is basically how people judge people's virtues and characters in other moral judgments.
I don't believe it's possible to hold a moral conviction without wanting to impose it on others, at least on some level, however subtly. So I don't quite buy the abortion example of someone thinking it's morally bad, but at the same time thinking "but hey, you do you". I don't think that attitude actually exists in the wild (but I could be mistaken). To moralize something is to believe that something ought to or ought not to be done, not only by me, but by some or most other people. This is why I voted for "no overlap" on the poll question. Otherwise it simply deflates what it means for something to be defined as 'moral'.
//To moralize something is to believe that something ought to or ought not to be done, not only by me, but by some or most other people.//
This just seems like stipulating what you mean by the term "moralize." It doesn't follow that this necessarily maps onto how people actually think. I don't see any reason in principle why a person couldn't want to live by some moral code but have absolutely no interest in imposing it on anyone else. Why couldn't they?
Then what exactly are we talking about? If there is no moral domain, then the poll question makes no sense, since without knowing whether a moral domain exists, we can't know whether there is an overlap between taste and something which we are calling 'moral' norms. We would need to know what counts as 'moral' or not.
Moreover, without a moral domain, what is the subject of inquiry in metaethics?
If I ask a question, I don't just assume everything I think is true and frame the question accordingly. I'm not quite sure how to address your questions concisely. I feel like adequately responding might take more work than I could justify in a comment section here.
Regarding the latter question though: I'm a quietist. I don't think there should be a subject matter; I think much of my role is to try to get people to realize that much of what people are arguing about in analytic metaethics are pseudoproblems, that they are wasting their time, and that there are more productive things to do. So, I'm entirely fine with the suggestion that there may not be a legitimate subject matter.
How or why one enjoys aesthetics is important to the good life. Most often, I judge people for being overly negative about an aesthetic experience. Artistic empathy is a moral good.
I suspect a lot of judgments about other people's taste preference are often a form of character judgment, so in the virtue ethics sense they might also be moral judgment.
If someone likes playing gacha mobile games with microtransactions pop up every two minute, PC/Console gamers who play the likes of RDR2 and Elden Ring might judge them badly, because either their choice reflects an incompetency in finding good games to play (and thus incompetency in probably other domains including moral beliefs), or it reflects their feeble-mindedness and other vices for succumbing to the cheap mental tricks of gacha games.
Or consider someone who otherwise eats meat but not offals. People who eat offals might dislike them even tho technically it's none of their business, because it could reflect a type of culinary bigotry, from which they may deduce a general closed-mindedness on the part of the offal-abstainer. And if they are bigots in food, who's to say they aren't bigots in other things like sexuality or nationality as well! This might be the thought process (maybe unconscious and automatic) behind many preference judgments, which is basically how people judge people's virtues and characters in other moral judgments.
I don't believe it's possible to hold a moral conviction without wanting to impose it on others, at least on some level, however subtly. So I don't quite buy the abortion example of someone thinking it's morally bad, but at the same time thinking "but hey, you do you". I don't think that attitude actually exists in the wild (but I could be mistaken). To moralize something is to believe that something ought to or ought not to be done, not only by me, but by some or most other people. This is why I voted for "no overlap" on the poll question. Otherwise it simply deflates what it means for something to be defined as 'moral'.
Why?
//To moralize something is to believe that something ought to or ought not to be done, not only by me, but by some or most other people.//
This just seems like stipulating what you mean by the term "moralize." It doesn't follow that this necessarily maps onto how people actually think. I don't see any reason in principle why a person couldn't want to live by some moral code but have absolutely no interest in imposing it on anyone else. Why couldn't they?
Well, ok, then this gets to the very heart of what do we mean by 'moral'. What is the best way to define it? What is the moral domain?
I don't think there is a moral domain.
Then what exactly are we talking about? If there is no moral domain, then the poll question makes no sense, since without knowing whether a moral domain exists, we can't know whether there is an overlap between taste and something which we are calling 'moral' norms. We would need to know what counts as 'moral' or not.
Moreover, without a moral domain, what is the subject of inquiry in metaethics?
If I ask a question, I don't just assume everything I think is true and frame the question accordingly. I'm not quite sure how to address your questions concisely. I feel like adequately responding might take more work than I could justify in a comment section here.
Regarding the latter question though: I'm a quietist. I don't think there should be a subject matter; I think much of my role is to try to get people to realize that much of what people are arguing about in analytic metaethics are pseudoproblems, that they are wasting their time, and that there are more productive things to do. So, I'm entirely fine with the suggestion that there may not be a legitimate subject matter.
How or why one enjoys aesthetics is important to the good life. Most often, I judge people for being overly negative about an aesthetic experience. Artistic empathy is a moral good.