I am not sure about the non-ampliativity of deduction. Computing the n-th digit of sqrt(2) is entirely deductive, to the point that we consider sqrt(2) to be perfectly defined by its property of giving 2 when squared (plus being positive). Yet before computing what comes after 1.4142… I can’t say I know it.
A person with contradictory beliefs may not realize this until confronted with the fact. That would be a discovery about their psychology, not a new discovery about what the world is like. It's the same thing here.
I don’t think that me not knowing what the implications of my beliefs are implies that I hold contradictory beliefs though (the other side of the implication probably holds though: to be able to hold contradictory beliefs you must be ignoring at least some of their implications). Also I am not sure about the usefulness of drawing a sharp line between psychology and “what the world is like”.
I wasn't suggesting not knowing the implications of your beliefs means you hold contradictory beliefs. It was another example of the kind of thing you can learn via deduction: you can uncover inconsistencies in your views. You can also discover that some view you hold has implications you didn't realize that it had. Both are discoveries about your own psychology, they aren't demonstrations of new information; they're just situations in which you learn about information that was already implicit in your other commitments/beliefs.
I think this has a lot to do with the Brouwer/Hilbert debate, with intuitionism essentially accepting that until we hold the consequences of our beliefs firmly in our (metaphorical) hand then they aren’t really there, while coherently saying that mathematics *is* psychology. Though I have not studied intuitionism anywhere near enough to be able to assert this with confidence.
Basically what is math about? An abstract formal “game” whose correctness can be mechanically checked (Hilbert) versus an ultimately psychological reality (Brouwer).
Why is this relevant to the issue of (moral) realism? It seems that one’s position about “facts” (including moral “facts”) must depend on whether one considers “the n-th digit of pi is 8” to be a fact (true or false as it may be) whether the n-th digit has been calculated or not. One could say it is contained is the definition of pi, so it is already existing before we compute it, like translating a piece of text from German to English creates the English text, but does not create its meaning (which is assumed to exist already inside the German text). On the other hand the definition of pi just exists as a (shared) psychological fact within the heads of mathematicians and as such it does not in any meaningful way contain any of the digits of pi. In particular if someone were to need the value of the n-th digit of pi for practical purposes they would have to calculate it, thereby creating a psychological state (a feeling of truth or falsehood) regarding the statement “the n-th digit of pi is 8”. If every german speaker died, would we still claim that the original German text had a translation-independent meaning? If I were the only person with a supercomputer powerful enough to compute the n-th digit of pi, would the truth of the statement become a subjective matter? Etc…
It seems to me there is a hidden assumed stance "All moral actors are human beings". Imagine a species probably not from earth to whom it seems obviously true that "Torturing hatchlings for fun is good and helpful". Perhaps this process removes harmful gene combinations. In humans a similar thing happens when a fertilized egg fails to result in a pregnancy. (But of course without the torture.)
It may be empirically true that in all human cultures it is considered normatively wrong to torture babies for fun. Or even that it is impossible for any human culture to condone torturing babies. (Excepting e.g. short lived cults with charismatic leaders.) I'm willing to grant that without waiting for a scientific study. If you accept this as empirical truth and as a valid theory, would that be an example of a stance independent moral fact? Could you easily say no it is not a stance independent moral fact because look at the alien species? Does "stance independent" assume "for humans"?
I am not trained in philosophy. I was not trying to argue for or against any position. I believe that many non-philosophers reading the short argument / tweet at the top of the original post would assume we are only talking about human beings. The existence of stance independent moral facts seem to me to be reasonable in that case where "people with stances" means "only human people", but obviously impossible where "people with stances" includes non-humans. Since you clarified that it includes non-humans, I do agree with the author.
I wish I could understand your last sentence (the one starting with "it's").
sorry, let me clarify. that all the people in your example don't condone baby torture is just part of their normative stance about baby torture.
their stance (a cluster of commitments, dispositions, attitudes, ways of relating, behaving...) isn't explained by the existence of 'SI moral facts', but rather their ways of living, life histories, and evolutionary reasons, and this stance is maintained and propagated through complex intersubjective interactions, relationships, practices.
Ok I see. Are all stances equally valid? Baby torture stance is as good as the normal stance? Stance leading to misery, doom, end of all life on earth is as good as stance leading to happiness joy and flourishing?
that'll depend on evaluating stances relative to other stances/values. it doesn't follow from the particular stances discussed in the post that they're equally 'valid' to other stances.
Michael Huemer and Richard Chapell have both shared thoughts on Substack about the philosophical value* of deductive argument. If you're planning a follow-up to this post, you might want to address them. (Say what you will about the quality of Huemer and Chapell's philosophical arguments, they at least know how to count to three.)
*(My phone wanted this word to be "vampire," which I suppose also works.)
I am not sure about the non-ampliativity of deduction. Computing the n-th digit of sqrt(2) is entirely deductive, to the point that we consider sqrt(2) to be perfectly defined by its property of giving 2 when squared (plus being positive). Yet before computing what comes after 1.4142… I can’t say I know it.
A person with contradictory beliefs may not realize this until confronted with the fact. That would be a discovery about their psychology, not a new discovery about what the world is like. It's the same thing here.
I don’t think that me not knowing what the implications of my beliefs are implies that I hold contradictory beliefs though (the other side of the implication probably holds though: to be able to hold contradictory beliefs you must be ignoring at least some of their implications). Also I am not sure about the usefulness of drawing a sharp line between psychology and “what the world is like”.
I wasn't suggesting not knowing the implications of your beliefs means you hold contradictory beliefs. It was another example of the kind of thing you can learn via deduction: you can uncover inconsistencies in your views. You can also discover that some view you hold has implications you didn't realize that it had. Both are discoveries about your own psychology, they aren't demonstrations of new information; they're just situations in which you learn about information that was already implicit in your other commitments/beliefs.
I think this has a lot to do with the Brouwer/Hilbert debate, with intuitionism essentially accepting that until we hold the consequences of our beliefs firmly in our (metaphorical) hand then they aren’t really there, while coherently saying that mathematics *is* psychology. Though I have not studied intuitionism anywhere near enough to be able to assert this with confidence.
I'm not familiar with that debate!
Basically what is math about? An abstract formal “game” whose correctness can be mechanically checked (Hilbert) versus an ultimately psychological reality (Brouwer).
Why is this relevant to the issue of (moral) realism? It seems that one’s position about “facts” (including moral “facts”) must depend on whether one considers “the n-th digit of pi is 8” to be a fact (true or false as it may be) whether the n-th digit has been calculated or not. One could say it is contained is the definition of pi, so it is already existing before we compute it, like translating a piece of text from German to English creates the English text, but does not create its meaning (which is assumed to exist already inside the German text). On the other hand the definition of pi just exists as a (shared) psychological fact within the heads of mathematicians and as such it does not in any meaningful way contain any of the digits of pi. In particular if someone were to need the value of the n-th digit of pi for practical purposes they would have to calculate it, thereby creating a psychological state (a feeling of truth or falsehood) regarding the statement “the n-th digit of pi is 8”. If every german speaker died, would we still claim that the original German text had a translation-independent meaning? If I were the only person with a supercomputer powerful enough to compute the n-th digit of pi, would the truth of the statement become a subjective matter? Etc…
Bunch of truths in this post, great work.
Thought you might be interested in this example of someone using propositional language to talk about examples that are linguistically imperatives:
https://youtu.be/JKBapuo8Eig?si=91f5KyAazxUd5GRF&t=1120s
It seems to me there is a hidden assumed stance "All moral actors are human beings". Imagine a species probably not from earth to whom it seems obviously true that "Torturing hatchlings for fun is good and helpful". Perhaps this process removes harmful gene combinations. In humans a similar thing happens when a fertilized egg fails to result in a pregnancy. (But of course without the torture.)
It may be empirically true that in all human cultures it is considered normatively wrong to torture babies for fun. Or even that it is impossible for any human culture to condone torturing babies. (Excepting e.g. short lived cults with charismatic leaders.) I'm willing to grant that without waiting for a scientific study. If you accept this as empirical truth and as a valid theory, would that be an example of a stance independent moral fact? Could you easily say no it is not a stance independent moral fact because look at the alien species? Does "stance independent" assume "for humans"?
i'd think that 'stance' is restricted to any kind of observer, cognizer, sentient... experiencing existent, not just human.
i don't see how you've arrived at SI with your example, though. it's the intersubjectively established & maintained stances of those people that x.
I am not trained in philosophy. I was not trying to argue for or against any position. I believe that many non-philosophers reading the short argument / tweet at the top of the original post would assume we are only talking about human beings. The existence of stance independent moral facts seem to me to be reasonable in that case where "people with stances" means "only human people", but obviously impossible where "people with stances" includes non-humans. Since you clarified that it includes non-humans, I do agree with the author.
I wish I could understand your last sentence (the one starting with "it's").
sorry, let me clarify. that all the people in your example don't condone baby torture is just part of their normative stance about baby torture.
their stance (a cluster of commitments, dispositions, attitudes, ways of relating, behaving...) isn't explained by the existence of 'SI moral facts', but rather their ways of living, life histories, and evolutionary reasons, and this stance is maintained and propagated through complex intersubjective interactions, relationships, practices.
see: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity
Ok I see. Are all stances equally valid? Baby torture stance is as good as the normal stance? Stance leading to misery, doom, end of all life on earth is as good as stance leading to happiness joy and flourishing?
that'll depend on evaluating stances relative to other stances/values. it doesn't follow from the particular stances discussed in the post that they're equally 'valid' to other stances.
Michael Huemer and Richard Chapell have both shared thoughts on Substack about the philosophical value* of deductive argument. If you're planning a follow-up to this post, you might want to address them. (Say what you will about the quality of Huemer and Chapell's philosophical arguments, they at least know how to count to three.)
*(My phone wanted this word to be "vampire," which I suppose also works.)
Got links?
I can't seem to find the Huemer post I was thinking of, but here is Richard Chappell:
https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/contestable-vs-question-begging-arguments
Thanks.
Great post, very similar to Oppy’s ideas about arguments on “What derivations cannot do” and his vid w Joe Schmid. Highly recommend those two