"'Moral intuitions' is an underspecified pseudopsychological term invented by philosophers."
I like a synthesis of the naturalistic ways that Mark Solms (affective neuroscience), Karl Friston (Free Energy Principle and active inference), and Hugh LaFollette (Deweyan pragmatic inquiry) use to dismantle the concept of "moral intuition."
As far as I understand Bentham seems to subscribe to phenomenal conservatism ( if Im wrong and You are reading this please forgive me Matthew), which to me is a kind of a defensive move. By Intuitive he means probably Intuitive to him and to people who share those intuitions, and he than focuses on knocking out the objections to that realism and helping them maintain this version of realism. (Not in Psychological, but in philosophical sense like someone defending a basic belief they find very probable from the get go). Its the same thing with moreean arguments, they at least in my view were never supposed to convince a skeptic but help or motivate that persons belief or philosophical position. Can and does this often mean an impasse of philosophical discourse? Yes, but this is not necessarily a problem. Anyways have a good day Lance and everyone who reads this and sorry to Matthew if I misrepresented his views.
Right, but if he's doing that, why not be more explicit about it? Why the indirect and vague language? Why not report that he personally finds it intuitive? Is he being intentionally misleading?
I do not know I will not try to psychologize Matthew, I can only say that from experience that the approach Im talking about seems to be assumed and need not to be made explicit. Maybe its just a Poland thing idk.
Re intuition: it used to be (and still is, to some people) "obvious" that homosexuality was wrong and a perversion of some (also intuitive) "natural order" of things. Now a great many of us (depending on where you live) think that's a wrong and bigoted attitude. So why should we trust our intuitions to reflect anything but our personal prejudices?
Tangentially to your main point: That's one weakness in Street's 2006 paper (which I take to be something of a landmark, given how often I see it cited). IIRC she talks as if specific moral beliefs could be results of natural selection. This seems unlikely; if there's anything there it would be more like the general disposition to form normative beliefs, the content thereof being determined by the cultural environment. And as M&M argue, there is no specifically "moral" subset of normativity, other than what one's culture contingently baptizes as such (as distinct from e.g. aesthetic). I don't think that helps the realists, though.
"'Moral intuitions' is an underspecified pseudopsychological term invented by philosophers."
I like a synthesis of the naturalistic ways that Mark Solms (affective neuroscience), Karl Friston (Free Energy Principle and active inference), and Hugh LaFollette (Deweyan pragmatic inquiry) use to dismantle the concept of "moral intuition."
As far as I understand Bentham seems to subscribe to phenomenal conservatism ( if Im wrong and You are reading this please forgive me Matthew), which to me is a kind of a defensive move. By Intuitive he means probably Intuitive to him and to people who share those intuitions, and he than focuses on knocking out the objections to that realism and helping them maintain this version of realism. (Not in Psychological, but in philosophical sense like someone defending a basic belief they find very probable from the get go). Its the same thing with moreean arguments, they at least in my view were never supposed to convince a skeptic but help or motivate that persons belief or philosophical position. Can and does this often mean an impasse of philosophical discourse? Yes, but this is not necessarily a problem. Anyways have a good day Lance and everyone who reads this and sorry to Matthew if I misrepresented his views.
Right, but if he's doing that, why not be more explicit about it? Why the indirect and vague language? Why not report that he personally finds it intuitive? Is he being intentionally misleading?
I do not know I will not try to psychologize Matthew, I can only say that from experience that the approach Im talking about seems to be assumed and need not to be made explicit. Maybe its just a Poland thing idk.
It should be explicit. Precision is central to good philosophy.
Re intuition: it used to be (and still is, to some people) "obvious" that homosexuality was wrong and a perversion of some (also intuitive) "natural order" of things. Now a great many of us (depending on where you live) think that's a wrong and bigoted attitude. So why should we trust our intuitions to reflect anything but our personal prejudices?
Tangentially to your main point: That's one weakness in Street's 2006 paper (which I take to be something of a landmark, given how often I see it cited). IIRC she talks as if specific moral beliefs could be results of natural selection. This seems unlikely; if there's anything there it would be more like the general disposition to form normative beliefs, the content thereof being determined by the cultural environment. And as M&M argue, there is no specifically "moral" subset of normativity, other than what one's culture contingently baptizes as such (as distinct from e.g. aesthetic). I don't think that helps the realists, though.
Yep. People weirdly just act like moral intuitions are a direct product of natural selection.