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Steve Watson's avatar

Re intuition: it used to be (and still is, to some people) "obvious" that homosexuality was wrong and a perversion of some (also intuitive) "natural order" of things. Now a great many of us (depending on where you live) think that's a wrong and bigoted attitude. So why should we trust our intuitions to reflect anything but our personal prejudices?

Tangentially to your main point: That's one weakness in Street's 2006 paper (which I take to be something of a landmark, given how often I see it cited). IIRC she talks as if specific moral beliefs could be results of natural selection. This seems unlikely; if there's anything there it would be more like the general disposition to form normative beliefs, the content thereof being determined by the cultural environment. And as M&M argue, there is no specifically "moral" subset of normativity, other than what one's culture contingently baptizes as such (as distinct from e.g. aesthetic). I don't think that helps the realists, though.

Alan Grinnell Jones's avatar

"'Moral intuitions' is an underspecified pseudopsychological term invented by philosophers."

I like a synthesis of the naturalistic ways that Mark Solms (affective neuroscience), Karl Friston (Free Energy Principle and active inference), and Hugh LaFollette (Deweyan pragmatic inquiry) use to dismantle the concept of "moral intuition."

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