Bentham’s Bulldog still discusses moral realism in the same underspecified, derivative, and generally underdeveloped way as he has for years. I’d say this is astonishing, but it isn’t. Bentham’s views on theism have changed, as have his views on many other topics, and while I don’t expect his stance on moral realism to change, I’d at least expect him to up his game with respect to how he discusses the topic in a way that incorporates objections. Unfortunately, this simply hasn’t happened. Here are some of his latest remarks from this article:
The central argument for moral realism is that it’s the intuitive view. It seems very obvious that torturing babies for fun is wrong, and this fact doesn’t depend on what people think about it. That I or my culture disapproves of boiling babies or being pointlessly cruel to people isn’t part of why it’s wrong. In general, you should believe things that seem obvious when you think about them.
That is why, even before hearing the proof, you should think that in non-curved space the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, that the inside of relation is transitive, and that simpler hypotheses are likelier than more complex ones. You believe these because they appear obvious when you think about them. For similar reasons, you should believe moral realism.
Consider the very first remark: that it’s the intuitive view. What, exactly, does this mean? Is this an exclusively descriptive claim about the proportion of people who find it intuitive? And does this claim transcend any particular population? Or is the descriptive claim circumscribed to a particular subpopulation, e.g., people who are reflecting under adequate conditions (thereby making it both a descriptive and a normative claim)? Is it instead a normative claim about what one ought to find intuitive if one has properly functioning intuitive faculties?
The claim is too underspecified to have a clear meaning, so it’s hard to know what to make of it. And this isn’t even addressing the question of what Bentham has in mind by an “intuition.” Does Bentham’s claim lean on a particular account of intuition or will any account do? Presumably not just any account will do, since not all accounts grant epistemic weight to intuitions. So what conception or conceptions of intuitions are needed for such arguments to be viable in the first place? As I’ve argued at length, this is not a trivial matter; pinning down one’s methods isn’t optional in any other field; it shouldn’t be considered a nuisance or afterthought to address it in philosophy, either.
And yet we get remarks like this:
It seems very obvious that torturing babies for fun is wrong, and this fact doesn’t depend on what people think about it.
It seems obvious to who? This doesn’t seem obvious to me because, again, it is underspecified. What does Bentham mean by “wrong”? My views about what’s right or wrong do depend on what people think about the matter in question: namely, me. So is Bentham making a personal biographical report, an empirical claim about what some proportion of other people think, an appeal to his readers, a normative claim of some kind, or something else?
Analytic philosophers are supposed to be precise. Bentham’s remarks are the opposite of precise. They are so underspecified that it’s not clear he’s even saying something meaningful. I’m not the only person to notice this:

Rohan asks, “intuitive to whom?” Yes, good question. Rohan continues:
If you just mean it's intuitive to you then that doesnt have much force. If you mean that it's intuitive to most philosophers then that has more force, but although a majority of philosophers lean towards/accept moral realism, it's not that big of a majority.Also not sure that's the same as it being intuitive. They could accept it while not thinking it's intuitive and that you have to reason a lot to get there.
If you mean ordinary people then likely false since most people just dont have any coherent meta ethical views. If you ask meta ethical questions to them they *very* often misinterpret them. If it was an intuitive view I wouldnt expect that to be the case
Rohan is on point with every remark. Bentham has yet to address these remarks, and I don’t expect him to in any substantive way since he’s exhibited a consistent pattern of failing to adequately address these concerns. Meanwhile, others have simply pointed out that the empirical evidence doesn’t suggest moral realism is intuitive to most nonphilosophers:
Again, Bentham has yet to adequately address these sorts of concerns. His reaction to this literature has, historically, been perfunctory and dismissive.
The rest of Bentham’s post is dedicated to critiquing evolutionary debunking arguments:
The evolutionary debunking argument is a response to that core argument. The basic idea is that we don’t need to invoke moral facts to explain our moral intuitions. Instead, we can explain them evolutionarily. Moral beliefs would be likely to evolve, even if they weren’t accurate, because they’re adaptive. They help facilitate cooperation. Thus, because we’d have moral beliefs whether or not there were moral facts, we shouldn’t treat our moral beliefs as confirming that there are moral facts.
There is no need to do any of this. “Moral intuitions” is an underspecified pseudopsychological term invented by philosophers. If people want to appeal to natural selection to account for “moral intuitions” then they’re engaging in evolutionary psychology. And if you want to do psychology well, you need a clear and testable account of what the relevant psychological phenomena in question are. So what are moral intuitions?
Who knows? Virtually nobody discussing this topic bothers to take the psychological aspect of these discussions seriously enough to consider such questions in a remotely adequate way. There is, at present, no particularly good evidence of a universal, shared, evolved capacity for engaging in moral judgment and reasoning as a distinctive form of cognition (Machery & Mallon, 2010). The best available evidence suggests that while thinking in normative terms may be a product of natural selection, efforts to identify a distinctive normative domain, morality, coupled with evidence that we evolved specifically to think in such terms, are not similarly grounded in strong evidence (for more on this, see Machery & Mallon, 2010).
Morality is, I suspect, far more likely to be a historically contingent phenomenon that arose only in certain populations (Machery, 2018). It is most likely a sociolinguistic phenomenon culturally transmitted largely as a tendency to partition off a subset of normative considerations, declare them “moral” or some cognate/equivalent, and treat them differently than other norms in ways that are largely culturally mediated and historically contingent, not something built into the shared fabric of human DNA.
This would explain why attempts by both philosophers and psychologists to identify a nomological cluster of properties reliably associated with our tendency to label certain normative concerns “moral” have failed, and why philosophers have been unable to provide a convincing, principled way of distinguishing moral from nonmoral norms: there simply isn’t any principled way of doing so. “Moral norms” aren’t a natural kind, and aren’t unified by a shared set of properties independent of human convention; rather, what unifies moral norms is our tendency to label and regard them as such, and our disposition to do so is inconsistent, unprincipled, and contingent. See Stich’s (2018) article on the moral domain, which discusses the historical failure of efforts to offer a principled account of the moral domain.
Given this, one response to evolutionary debunking arguments is to simply deny, outright, that morality-as-such is a product of natural selection in the first place. Given that there’s very little good evidence that moral cognition did evolve, why don’t moral realists simply opt for this approach? You don’t need to explain why moral truth accounts for our moral beliefs despite them being a product of natural selection if it simply isn’t true that they’re a product of natural selection in the first place.
This is a rare case where I think moral realists are conceding too much to their critics, and much of it is predicated on ignorance, naivety, or false beliefs (in the case of those who study the matter) about the relationship between evolution and morality (e.g., moral nativism, which is false). Morality is a cultural phenomenon, not a biological one.
References
Machery, E. (2018). Morality: A historical invention. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.), Atlas of moral psychology (pp. 259–265). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Machery, E., & Mallon, R. (2010). Evolution of morality. In J. M. Doris & The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The moral psychology handbook (pp. 3–47). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Stich, S. (2018). The moral domain. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.), Atlas of moral psychology (pp. 547–555). New York, NY: Guilford Press.





Re intuition: it used to be (and still is, to some people) "obvious" that homosexuality was wrong and a perversion of some (also intuitive) "natural order" of things. Now a great many of us (depending on where you live) think that's a wrong and bigoted attitude. So why should we trust our intuitions to reflect anything but our personal prejudices?
Tangentially to your main point: That's one weakness in Street's 2006 paper (which I take to be something of a landmark, given how often I see it cited). IIRC she talks as if specific moral beliefs could be results of natural selection. This seems unlikely; if there's anything there it would be more like the general disposition to form normative beliefs, the content thereof being determined by the cultural environment. And as M&M argue, there is no specifically "moral" subset of normativity, other than what one's culture contingently baptizes as such (as distinct from e.g. aesthetic). I don't think that helps the realists, though.
"'Moral intuitions' is an underspecified pseudopsychological term invented by philosophers."
I like a synthesis of the naturalistic ways that Mark Solms (affective neuroscience), Karl Friston (Free Energy Principle and active inference), and Hugh LaFollette (Deweyan pragmatic inquiry) use to dismantle the concept of "moral intuition."