Philosophers frequently make claims about how nonphilosophers think, saying things like “it’s commonsense that,” or “most of us think that,” or “we find it intuitive that…” and so on.
I think these criticisms are well-posed but I'm curious about when you think the force of a philosophical argument actually turns on an accurate empirical psychology. I can easily imagine cases where a philosopher writes a rhetorical flourish about what's common or intuitive which may be wrong but, ordinarily, it shouldn't matter to the logic whether their position is common or intuitive or not, so I normally gloss over such things as manipulation.
Given the methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, what position is common or intuitive often matters a lot, since it partially determines what the subject matter even is.
I think these criticisms are well-posed but I'm curious about when you think the force of a philosophical argument actually turns on an accurate empirical psychology. I can easily imagine cases where a philosopher writes a rhetorical flourish about what's common or intuitive which may be wrong but, ordinarily, it shouldn't matter to the logic whether their position is common or intuitive or not, so I normally gloss over such things as manipulation.
Given the methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, what position is common or intuitive often matters a lot, since it partially determines what the subject matter even is.