The argument of this article feels rather strange to me. I take the primary purpose of moral philosophy to be descriptive, it is in the business of describing what morality is. If you’re a utilitarian, you think that all morality really is at bottom is an attempt at people to maximize utility. For the utilitarian, this is what everybody is doing when they are engaging in morality, whether they realize it or not.
A utilitarian might argue that people go to the hospital because actions promoting health are considered to maximize their expected utility over time. A non-utilitarian might counter that if utility was all people cared about, then most people would agree that it would be okay for a doctor to kill and steal five organs from one person to save five people, but most don’t in fact agree that this is moral. The utilitarian might well respond that actually when you weigh the long-term costs of such an action, like the institutional reputational harm accrued to the hospital (no sane person would ever again visit such a hospital if they knew there was a risk of getting their organs stolen), then it’s clear that stealing organs to save people doesn’t maximize expected utility, and is therefore wrong, in accordance with people’s beliefs.
In short, philosophers are in the business of judging whether moral theories are accurate. That is, whether they accurately describe people’s general moral intuitions, beliefs, and actions. Of course it’s possible to deny whether there’s even something like a general moral intuition or behavior to begin with, rendering the whole discipline of moral philosophy moot. But that’s the goal of moral philosophy as I see it, and as I think most philosophers see it. Just as it would be silly to wonder why historians don’t adopt one religion over another whenever they argue for particular theories relating to the history of religion (e.g. historicity of Jesus), it’s equally not at all strange that moral theorists don’t modify their moral behavior as a result of their beliefs. They are two entirely different things!
Of course this is not to say that there’s no connection, in the same way as we might imagine a Christian historian might be tempted to drop their belief provided they concluded that the evidence for the historicity of Jesus was thin or something.
>For the utilitarian, this is what everybody is doing when they are engaging in morality, whether they realize it or not.
There's a big difference between saying that utilitarianism is true in the sense that one ought to maximize utility, and saying that utilitarianism is true in the sense of being a descriptively accurate account of human moral practices or human psychology.
I don't believe it to be a standard feature of utilitarianism that everyone is implicitly a utilitarian, or that people are all trying to be utilitarians. I suspect many utilitarians probably think many others aren't utilitarians and that this is a problem.
Well maybe yes maybe no. I think that moral theories are descriptive yes, but that doesn’t mean they necessarily amount to descriptions of social practices. One can describe what morality amounts to without necessarily giving an account of what morality is. So you can be be a moral cognitive subjectivist, in which case you would think that utilitarianism is solely in the business of describing people’s social attitudes and behaviors, and whether it happens to be true is purely a matter of whether it accurately describes such things.
Or you might subscribe to some other account of moral ontology, in which case you might think that theories like utilitarianism are true based on whether they align with God’s commandments etc…
But in all cases, the common link is that moral theories are held to be descriptive. They are in the business of describing and accounting for moral facts, whatever they may be. Also I don’t think it’s right to say that the utilitarian must believe that everyone is in the business of trying to be a utilitarian. To be a utilitarian means that you think that moral facts are of that sort etc… Even if you think that moral facts just reduce to people’s social attitudes, that still just means that the utilitarian claims that people behave y on basis x, as opposed to z or something else that other moral theorists claim. But this doesn’t mean that people are actively trying to act like a utilitarian (whatever that means).
To be fair, I’m sure a lot of internet philosophy proponents do in fact think of moral philosophy in the way you describe. But based on what I know, that’s not how academic moral philosophers think of the topic. When they publish a paper it’s not “see how cool my moral theory is, join up now!” it’s “see how well my moral theory accounts for the facts”
I think this is true of people in general, but it's not true of the sorts of people who spend significant time debating moral philosophy online. The latter — when they're not just trolls (probably a substantial subpopulation) — tend to be exactly the sorts of people who will happily follow a deductive argument over the edge of a cliff.
Maybe, but I think a lot of it is still just talk. If someone accepts that solipsism is true, or that objects don't exist, or they accept some bizarre moral theory, what changes about their behavior? I think the answer is: usually nothing at all. I think most of the time shifts in philosophical views are shallow and largely verbal.
There definitely exist people who change their behaviour based on their acceptance of bizarre moral theories. For metaphysical (or even metaethical) theories, not so much.
Here is a good working paper that is related to your point about different action.
Pretty speculative: Id say that one can make the claim (I am quite sympathetic to this) that arguments about normative theories are less important for individuals and more important for states and policy (when they eventually affect how economists and policymakers think). Disagreement among people just motivates people to come up with disagreements and is largely irrelevant to individual behavior.
I would say that this seems not to apply to Effective Altruists, which I think is an excellent thing!
i'm not smartypants or anything but this seems true.
not just about analytic philosophy but belief generally.
people claim they believe x,y,z but don't do anything different from anybody else, except say stuff.
The argument of this article feels rather strange to me. I take the primary purpose of moral philosophy to be descriptive, it is in the business of describing what morality is. If you’re a utilitarian, you think that all morality really is at bottom is an attempt at people to maximize utility. For the utilitarian, this is what everybody is doing when they are engaging in morality, whether they realize it or not.
A utilitarian might argue that people go to the hospital because actions promoting health are considered to maximize their expected utility over time. A non-utilitarian might counter that if utility was all people cared about, then most people would agree that it would be okay for a doctor to kill and steal five organs from one person to save five people, but most don’t in fact agree that this is moral. The utilitarian might well respond that actually when you weigh the long-term costs of such an action, like the institutional reputational harm accrued to the hospital (no sane person would ever again visit such a hospital if they knew there was a risk of getting their organs stolen), then it’s clear that stealing organs to save people doesn’t maximize expected utility, and is therefore wrong, in accordance with people’s beliefs.
In short, philosophers are in the business of judging whether moral theories are accurate. That is, whether they accurately describe people’s general moral intuitions, beliefs, and actions. Of course it’s possible to deny whether there’s even something like a general moral intuition or behavior to begin with, rendering the whole discipline of moral philosophy moot. But that’s the goal of moral philosophy as I see it, and as I think most philosophers see it. Just as it would be silly to wonder why historians don’t adopt one religion over another whenever they argue for particular theories relating to the history of religion (e.g. historicity of Jesus), it’s equally not at all strange that moral theorists don’t modify their moral behavior as a result of their beliefs. They are two entirely different things!
Of course this is not to say that there’s no connection, in the same way as we might imagine a Christian historian might be tempted to drop their belief provided they concluded that the evidence for the historicity of Jesus was thin or something.
>For the utilitarian, this is what everybody is doing when they are engaging in morality, whether they realize it or not.
There's a big difference between saying that utilitarianism is true in the sense that one ought to maximize utility, and saying that utilitarianism is true in the sense of being a descriptively accurate account of human moral practices or human psychology.
I don't believe it to be a standard feature of utilitarianism that everyone is implicitly a utilitarian, or that people are all trying to be utilitarians. I suspect many utilitarians probably think many others aren't utilitarians and that this is a problem.
Well maybe yes maybe no. I think that moral theories are descriptive yes, but that doesn’t mean they necessarily amount to descriptions of social practices. One can describe what morality amounts to without necessarily giving an account of what morality is. So you can be be a moral cognitive subjectivist, in which case you would think that utilitarianism is solely in the business of describing people’s social attitudes and behaviors, and whether it happens to be true is purely a matter of whether it accurately describes such things.
Or you might subscribe to some other account of moral ontology, in which case you might think that theories like utilitarianism are true based on whether they align with God’s commandments etc…
But in all cases, the common link is that moral theories are held to be descriptive. They are in the business of describing and accounting for moral facts, whatever they may be. Also I don’t think it’s right to say that the utilitarian must believe that everyone is in the business of trying to be a utilitarian. To be a utilitarian means that you think that moral facts are of that sort etc… Even if you think that moral facts just reduce to people’s social attitudes, that still just means that the utilitarian claims that people behave y on basis x, as opposed to z or something else that other moral theorists claim. But this doesn’t mean that people are actively trying to act like a utilitarian (whatever that means).
We could ask some utilitarians if they take their task to be descriptive, and if so, in what ways. I'd be curious to hear what they have to say.
To be fair, I’m sure a lot of internet philosophy proponents do in fact think of moral philosophy in the way you describe. But based on what I know, that’s not how academic moral philosophers think of the topic. When they publish a paper it’s not “see how cool my moral theory is, join up now!” it’s “see how well my moral theory accounts for the facts”
I suspect you may be largely correct.
I think this is true of people in general, but it's not true of the sorts of people who spend significant time debating moral philosophy online. The latter — when they're not just trolls (probably a substantial subpopulation) — tend to be exactly the sorts of people who will happily follow a deductive argument over the edge of a cliff.
Maybe, but I think a lot of it is still just talk. If someone accepts that solipsism is true, or that objects don't exist, or they accept some bizarre moral theory, what changes about their behavior? I think the answer is: usually nothing at all. I think most of the time shifts in philosophical views are shallow and largely verbal.
There definitely exist people who change their behaviour based on their acceptance of bizarre moral theories. For metaphysical (or even metaethical) theories, not so much.
Yes, I just think it's the exception. Effective altruists are a good example of people who do change their actions based on moral beliefs.
Bro might be riding the rorty train
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32073/w32073.pdf
Here is a good working paper that is related to your point about different action.
Pretty speculative: Id say that one can make the claim (I am quite sympathetic to this) that arguments about normative theories are less important for individuals and more important for states and policy (when they eventually affect how economists and policymakers think). Disagreement among people just motivates people to come up with disagreements and is largely irrelevant to individual behavior.
I would say that this seems not to apply to Effective Altruists, which I think is an excellent thing!
That's my response to a lot of things.