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Robin McKenna's avatar

This is why experimental philosophy is such an important development: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_philosophy

Lance S. Bush's avatar

Yep! I am an experimental philosopher!

Deimos's avatar

You’d think that most philosophers would know not to just base their reasons off what boils down to some sort of subjective “hunch” in their heads.

Lance S. Bush's avatar

Many take arriving at conclusions on the basis of intuitions to be one of their primary methodological tools.

John Ketchum's avatar

The 2020 PhilPapers survey of academic philosophers and philosophy graduate students provides evidence that your assessment of contemporary American philosophy is at least partially correct. When respondents were asked whether they accepted or leaned toward empiricism or rationalism, a larger percentage chose the former. However, when asked which philosophical method is the most useful or important, of seven options offered, empirical philosophy ranked second behind conceptual analysis, intuition-based philosophy took fourth place, and experimental philosophy came in last.

The survey provides indirect evidence that intuition isn't very reliable. If it were, you'd expect a large majority of respondents would intuitively agree on a large majority of issues. But on nearly half the issues, every position was a minority position. The apparent agreement of a majority on some issues is misleading. For example, a small majority were said to accept or lean toward the correspondence theory of truth. But there are different and incompatible versions of the correspondence theory. So every specific truth theory is a minority theory.

Lance S. Bush's avatar

>>The survey provides indirect evidence that intuition isn't very reliable. If it were, you'd expect a large majority of respondents would intuitively agree on a large majority of issues.

Arguably, many of these positions aren't held exclusively or primarily on intuitive grounds, so this might not be true. We have to distinguish what people believe from why they believe it, and I don't know how much of a role intuitions are supposed to be playing in these judgments.

The latter point about inconsistency within a category is a great one. There's going to be subdivisions within subdivisions, many of which are incompatible, much as finding X% of a population is "Christian" doesn't mean they all have consistent beliefs.

John Ketchum's avatar

Thank you for your long response. Socrates influenced Plato, whom surveys have shown influenced more modern philosophers than any other philosopher except Aristotle. Socrates repeatedly questioned others about what reasons they have for positions they take. The process is like reasoning backwards from conclusions to premises in order to reveal their presuppositions and fundamental beliefs for which they can offer no further grounds. Modern philosophers often start with basic ideas and try to show what follows from them. If a foundational proposition is neither self-evident nor accepted intuitively, how would you explain it?

Lance S. Bush's avatar

I don't understand the question. What is a "foundational proposition," and what is it I'm supposed to be explaining? Why it's true? Why someone believes it's true? I don't think intuitions exist and I don't grant that anything is "self-evident," but I'm not sure what it is you want me to explain.

John Ketchum's avatar

A foundational proposition is a basic belief or statement that depends on no other belief or statement and serves as the ultimate ground for some argument. For example, in Chapter 5 of John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, Locke begins with the principle of self-ownership from which he derives certain rights, including the right to property His influence can be seen in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which states that all men are endowed with certain unalienable rights and the Constitution's 5th Amendment that states no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property (Locke's three main natural rights) without due process of law. I realize you don't believe in intuitions or self-evident propositions, although I don't understand why you don't or what evidence would persuade you to change your mind. What I was hoping you would explain are the answers to several questions I asked in my comment. Your position isn't clear to me, and I'm trying to understand it.

John Ketchum's avatar

It may be that most allegedly self-evident claims fit Ambrose Bierce's definition of “self-evident” as “evident to one's self and to nobody else.” However, some propositions are self-evident in a different sense. For example, the law of identity, usually formulated symbolically as “A is A, “ is an analytic proposition whose truth is guaranteed by the fact that its denial, “A is not A,” is a necessarily false self-contradiction. Besides, it's self-guaranteeing in the sense that it must be presupposed in the attempt to deny it. If I were to deny the law of identity, you could ask me whether my denial is, indeed, a denial. I'd have to affirm the law of identity in at least that case.

I understand intuition to be the alleged acquisition of knowledge without conscious reasoning. To the extent it's reliable, I'd guess it's the result of unconscious reasoning. Perhaps a proposition seems intuitively correct because it appears to be consistent with our background beliefs. As a psychologist, I expect you have a better understanding of the nature of intuition than we readers do. How would you define/explain intuition?

Lance S. Bush's avatar

I don't think anything is self-evident, including the law of identity. Any claim that denying it is somehow self-negating is only true relative to a framework in which this is the case, and I take these frameworks to be constructions every bit as much as the rules of monopoly or chess. I don't think our thoughts or actions are somehow subordinated to the laws of logic. So I simply deny that anything is "self-guaranteeing" in some undeniable sense. Behold: I deny it! So it can be denied.

I also don't grant that anything must be presupposed. I take whether something is "presupposed" to be a psychological fact (and if one doesn't, then I disagree with them about the nature of presupposition, which I'd also maintain I'm not obligated to agree with them about). And it may simply be that a person doesn't presuppose (as a matter of psychological fact) the notion in question. I reject, outright, any approach to philosophy that bestows musts and must nots on the way people speak or think as though we are bound by the diktat of a council of logicians.

>>How would you define/explain intuition?

I'd have a lot more to say than this but I think the notion of an "intuition" is a pseudopsychological invention of philosophers. To it put it simply: I don't think intuitions are real for much the same reason I don't think people can see auras.

John Ketchum's avatar

The laws of thought—those of identity, of contradiction (aka, non-contradiction, and of excluded middle—have been called the fundamental principles of proof, without which no proof would be possible. They're interderivable; one can start with any of those laws and, using standard rules of inference, derive the other two laws from it. Denying any one entails denying all three. I didn't claim that you can't deny the law of identity. To the contrary, I gave an example of explicitly denying it and showed that entails implicitly affirming it. Do you maintain that your denial of the law of identity is a denial of the law of identity rather than, say, an affirmation of it? If so, you implicitly accept it. The laws of logic are not like physical laws that, presumably, can't be violated. They're similar to principles of mathematics. Indeed, symbolic logic is often called modern mathematical logic because logic and mathematics contain some of the same principles. People frequently violate the principles of logic and mathematics, but they err in doing so. For example, you can fail to correctly add a column of figures, but you won't get the correct sum. Both logic and mathematics require consistency, i.e., the absence of contradiction. You understand that the denial of the law of identity is a self-contradiction don't you? If so, then apparently you deny the law of contradiction, reject mathematics, and accept such a contradiction as this: Any given proposition can be both true and not true at the same time and in the same sense of “true.” Understand that would apply to your own propositions. Do you claim that everything you say is both true and not true? Or do you limit the contradictions you'll tolerate, as by accepting dialetheism, the view that some propositions are only true, others are only false, and still others are both true and false?

Lance S. Bush's avatar

I need to clarify something before I respond to this at any greater length: are you a pragmatist and do you have a pragmatic conception of logic and truth that is operative in your comments?

John Ketchum's avatar

The principle of explosion in standard logic can be used to prove that any given proposition, including its negation, follows from a contradiction. You can avoid that consequence by accepting paraconsistent logic, a weakened form of logic specifically designed to avoid explosion or by rejecting logic altogether. From what you say, I suspect you'd do the latter. I can't help but get the impression you're rejecting something you don't adequately understand. But if you do understand, you seem to have abandoned rationality. Are you a proponent of irrationalism, the belief system that rejects reason in favor of something else such as instinct, feeling, or faith? I don't mean to be insulting, but I don't know how to make sense out of what you say. I've been following you with interest, but almost every time I think I understand you, I learn that I'm mistaken. I can't reasonably either agree or disagree with a position I don't understand.

Jacob3's avatar

Say we accept something being intuitive is stance-dependent. (Which you're correct it clearly is.) Why is it anymore wrong to use unqualified intuition talk than it is for anti-realists to use unqualified moral talk?

Lance S. Bush's avatar

Antirealism is a position according to which there are no stance-independent moral facts. If by "unqualified moral talk" you mean something like first-order moral claims, then we can draw a distinction between making first-order moral claims in a philosophical context vs. an ordinary context.

Antirealists typically hold some view about the meaning of ordinary moral terms. In these cases, it would make little sense to criticize the antirealist for speaking in a way consistent with (what they take to be) ordinary usage in an ordinary context. In a philosophical context, the antirealist will typically specify their stance on first-order moral claims, so they'd be being explicit. So in neither context can I see much sense in criticizing them for using "unqualified moral claims."

The same isn't true of people saying this or that thing "is intuitive." They're not making ordinary claims; they're making philosophical claims in a philosophical context, where the position isn't one about the nature of ordinary first-order claims. As such, I don't think the comparison is an appropriate one.

Alex Cb's avatar

I was gonna do a Bayesian analysis to demonstrate why you're correct based on my reasonable priors, but then I realized that this was just commonsense. No need to argue any further.

Rafael Kaufmann's avatar

Sounds like Dennett! "[Philosophers] mistake a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity"

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Aug 16, 2025
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Lance S. Bush's avatar

Philosophers frequently use the term in ways that are inconsistent with that interpretation.

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Jun 20, 2025
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Ash's avatar

I think definitions are a problem of authority, not type. The question feels important and I need you to know that it was fucking dumb and rude of you to treat it so dismissively, Lance. Nice piece, opened the discussion. It’s not clear then why you might try to subsequently shut it down?

Lance S. Bush's avatar

Nothing I said was rude or dumb. The question did not make sense. I am criticizing other people for the things they say, e.g., “it’s intuitive that,” or “it seems to us that.” Nothing about my criticism requires me to specify any particular conception of what other people mean when they talk about “intuitions” or “seemings” or whatever.

I even put the term intuitive in scare quotes in the title and in the text, along with the other terms to which I am referring. This was intended to illustrate that I am referring to things other people say and I am criticizing them for their lack of clarity about their claims. How on earth does it make any sense to ask me to specify which account of “intuition” I am referring to? Nothing about any points I am making require specification about any particular conception of what an intuition is, and in most instances I am mentioning the use of the term, not using it; see e.g., the use/mention distinction:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use%E2%80%93mention_distinction

When I do use the term, it’s to make an auxiliary point about intuitions: that they are psychological phenomena; that’s all. I need not specify what they are or defend any particular account any more than that to make any of the points I am making.

People do this extremely annoying thing where they ask for you to specify or offer a specific account of some notion or concept. This makes sense in some contexts, but this isn't one of them. Yet people make such demands reflexively and thoughtlessly, then use anything other than an immediate and clear articulation of a satisfactory response as a weapon against you, to criticize you. I have no idea what this person's intent was, but given their subsequent response, it's certainly consistent with using this sort of question as a trap.

In any case, when it comes to intuitions, I deny there even is any clear or specific account. But since I am not defending that position in this post, or even talking about it, I didn’t feel obliged to go in that direction.

It’s fine for someone to ask a bad question, like their original question. I gave a curt response, but while it might seem dismissive my intent was to convey my own attitude towards intuition talk: that it’s unclear what people are even talking about when they refer to intuitions. Maybe that was misinterpreted as being dismissive. But if you respond to that by asking a rude and obnoxious question like this:

>>You don't have a firm definition of your topic? Okay.

…then I may respond as I did. All I did was say this:

“You may want to reconsider your original question and my response before drawing that obnoxious conclusion.”

They declined, as is their right. And, as is my right, I am not interested in engaging with this person further. I have no obligation engage with people who are stubborn and rude.

Also, note, that I don't think there is a "firm definition" of intuition, but my topic isn't one that requires a firm definition of the term intuition. My topic isn't even about what intuitions are, so their response makes no sense. My topic is about patterns of things philosophers say, not about what intuitions are. So not only did their original question not make sense, but their obnoxious follow-up remark also didn't make any sense.

And now look what you’ve made me do: exactly what I did not want to do, which is to have to explain all this over the course of several paragraphs. But I did so to illustrate a point: I can explain myself, but I have very little interest in constantly doing so for every rude jerk that shows up in my comment section.

I hope that clarifies why I responded the way I did. And, with that clarification, perhaps you should now reconsider your remarks about me being “fucking dumb and rude” before you also draw an obnoxious conclusion.

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Jun 20, 2025
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Lance S. Bush's avatar

You may want to reconsider your original question and my response before drawing that obnoxious conclusion.