"People disposed towards theism are more likely to study philosophy of religion, leading to a higher self-selected total proportion of theists among specialists in philosophy of religion."
Could a similar thing be said about people disposed toward anthropogenic climate change? They are more likely to become climate scientists than people who think the Earth's climate will take care of itself; climate change has happened before without human involvement. This leads to a higher self-selected total proportion of proponents of anthropogenic climate change among specialists in climate change?
Lance, thanks for reading my work and engaging! I have to say, this was my first time writing about the academic culture of philosophy itself, and I took the empirical claim as a point from which to launch off into first order philosophical survey. I didn’t consider diving into the details of the empirical claim about philosophers itself in further detail.
I’m intrigued that you have this whole series on the philpapers survey, and the implications we take from it. Looking forward to digging in further.
As far as my sense of what the general population out there thinks, you may be right, but I conceived of myself as thinking of the non-specialists who are interested in philosophy on the Internet, who tend to clump into Niwtzschean atheists and Dostoevskian theists - both thinking that if there is no God, then there is no morality.
Perhaps my essential point was simply this: that most mainstream analytic metaethics does not take this for granted, and that there is reason to break free from that kind of assumption. Looks like you are opposed to moral realism, but I believe there are some good arguments, though it hasn’t been the area I specialized in. I incline toward making the argument in Claire Kirwin’s way: https://elucidations.vercel.app/posts/episode-134/
This is genuinely embarrassing. If what Claire Kirwin is doing counts as serious philosophy, we're fucking cooked. Completely sidestep the is-ought problem, appeal to modern moral intuitions and pretend that just because we have changed our opinions on some things that implies "progress", appeals to god, calling her socialist commitments "value expertise".
Also, I looked her up and she claims that one of her areas of expertise is Nietzsche? These are not the words of someone who's even attempted to grapple with Nietzsche, what the hell. The academy is fucked.
I’d be curious what you think counts as serious philosophy. I’m thinking you mean it has to take a certain framing for granted.
Also, I don’t see her sidestepping the is-ought problem, but facing squarely that we’re not going to give a basis for ought in is. Rather, if we all recognize that we find ourselves believing we have reason for action every day, we must recognize that we already all see the world as a place laden with value, providing affordances for action.
On that front, I don’t think Nietzsche thought the world had no value, he just rejected the Christian moral version (which inverted values in his view).
Also, the coalition of theists and atheists who together think that without God there can be no goodness, value, or morality do not have the final word. And back to the framing issue, if you accept that framing, then the entire debate is just those two sides, battling it out. Someone like Kirwin is challenging the framing, which I find to be even more serious philosophy, not that that makes her correct. But I understand if it’s not your cup of tea!
You don't have to accept a framing, but you have to actually deal with the objections to it, not just dismiss them as a framing problem. The is-ought gap doesn't disappear because you've reframed it.
My point is simple: there's a difference between "things have value" and "we value things." If you're claiming moral realism, you need to bridge that gap. Pointing out that we all experience the world as value-laden is just restating the second claim and calling it the first.
And you're wrong about Nietzsche. He definitely believed that nothing has inherent value. Value is something we bestow upon the world as living beings. He personally rejected the Christian moral version *himself* but that's not a claim about inherent value, it's a claim he makes about his own preferences (while also being an attempt to sway you to his side!).
"People disposed towards theism are more likely to study philosophy of religion, leading to a higher self-selected total proportion of theists among specialists in philosophy of religion."
Could a similar thing be said about people disposed toward anthropogenic climate change? They are more likely to become climate scientists than people who think the Earth's climate will take care of itself; climate change has happened before without human involvement. This leads to a higher self-selected total proportion of proponents of anthropogenic climate change among specialists in climate change?
Yes, that seems likely. I doubt many people disposed towards climate change denial become climate scientists.
Lance, thanks for reading my work and engaging! I have to say, this was my first time writing about the academic culture of philosophy itself, and I took the empirical claim as a point from which to launch off into first order philosophical survey. I didn’t consider diving into the details of the empirical claim about philosophers itself in further detail.
I’m intrigued that you have this whole series on the philpapers survey, and the implications we take from it. Looking forward to digging in further.
As far as my sense of what the general population out there thinks, you may be right, but I conceived of myself as thinking of the non-specialists who are interested in philosophy on the Internet, who tend to clump into Niwtzschean atheists and Dostoevskian theists - both thinking that if there is no God, then there is no morality.
Perhaps my essential point was simply this: that most mainstream analytic metaethics does not take this for granted, and that there is reason to break free from that kind of assumption. Looks like you are opposed to moral realism, but I believe there are some good arguments, though it hasn’t been the area I specialized in. I incline toward making the argument in Claire Kirwin’s way: https://elucidations.vercel.app/posts/episode-134/
This is genuinely embarrassing. If what Claire Kirwin is doing counts as serious philosophy, we're fucking cooked. Completely sidestep the is-ought problem, appeal to modern moral intuitions and pretend that just because we have changed our opinions on some things that implies "progress", appeals to god, calling her socialist commitments "value expertise".
Also, I looked her up and she claims that one of her areas of expertise is Nietzsche? These are not the words of someone who's even attempted to grapple with Nietzsche, what the hell. The academy is fucked.
I’d be curious what you think counts as serious philosophy. I’m thinking you mean it has to take a certain framing for granted.
Also, I don’t see her sidestepping the is-ought problem, but facing squarely that we’re not going to give a basis for ought in is. Rather, if we all recognize that we find ourselves believing we have reason for action every day, we must recognize that we already all see the world as a place laden with value, providing affordances for action.
On that front, I don’t think Nietzsche thought the world had no value, he just rejected the Christian moral version (which inverted values in his view).
Also, the coalition of theists and atheists who together think that without God there can be no goodness, value, or morality do not have the final word. And back to the framing issue, if you accept that framing, then the entire debate is just those two sides, battling it out. Someone like Kirwin is challenging the framing, which I find to be even more serious philosophy, not that that makes her correct. But I understand if it’s not your cup of tea!
You don't have to accept a framing, but you have to actually deal with the objections to it, not just dismiss them as a framing problem. The is-ought gap doesn't disappear because you've reframed it.
My point is simple: there's a difference between "things have value" and "we value things." If you're claiming moral realism, you need to bridge that gap. Pointing out that we all experience the world as value-laden is just restating the second claim and calling it the first.
And you're wrong about Nietzsche. He definitely believed that nothing has inherent value. Value is something we bestow upon the world as living beings. He personally rejected the Christian moral version *himself* but that's not a claim about inherent value, it's a claim he makes about his own preferences (while also being an attempt to sway you to his side!).