Philosophers should stop saying "we" think this way, or "it's intuitive" without specifying who they're talking about

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(Status: this was stream of thought and not really intended to be a composed post. So it’s more of a cranky rant)

It's strange when moral realists say "realism is the default position."

The default position? Who is it a default position for? Everyone? Do we all have the same default position? Is it the default position for me? If so, why?

I would have thought something can be a default position for someone but not necessarily for others. But it's really weird to say it's "the" default position.

I think this is yet another case of philosophers just completely failing to be clear, precise, rigorous, etc. They are just constantly making claims about things being "intuitive" or saying "we" think this way, without any specification about who "we" are, who things are intuitive to, and so on.

Imagine someone describing their experiences on a vacation this way:

"We saw the Eiffel tower."

"That it was the best beach is the default position."

"It's counterintuitive that one should go to a museum instead of a good restaurant."

If this person kept speaking as if we were a part of their vacation or as if their personal experiences reflected everyone else's experiences, I think we'd be equal parts disturbed and confused.

Yet analytic philosophers routinely do exactly this, and nobody seems to point it out or object to it. It's super weird. If you find something intuitive, why not say that *you* find it intuitive? Why say it "is intuitive," as though things can be intrinsically intuitive? Or even imply *I* find it intuitive?

This can get so silly that I've had philosophers tell me what my intuitions are. Then if I say "No...I don't find that intuitive" while some have said "oh" and then adjusted their points without a problem, others have reacted with varying forms of:

(1) Incredulity, shock, and confusion

(2) The insistence I really do have the intuition but don't realize it

(3) Accusations that I am lying

I suspect these reactions are due to philosophers in many cases presuming everyone has the same intuitions they do, and since many philosophers accept a kind of canonical set of "intuitive" claims (e.g., realism is true), those of us who claim not to have these intuitions throw a wrench in a narrative and way of speaking they've internalized and become far too comfortable with it.

Lastly, note: claims about how "intuitive" something is are psychological claims. Even if you're talking about yourself, it's still a psychological claim, but the moment you start generalizing to how other people think, you're doing psychology.

Philosophers are often fond of pointing out how scientists who dismiss philosophy as useless are unwittingly employing philosophical assumptions in their scientific research, and scientists have no choice but to either do philosophy explicitly and try to do it well, or to do it implicitly and ensure they do it poorly.

The same can be said of philosophers: they routinely brush up against or dive right into making psychological claims, and then eschew any substantive engagement with psychology. “We’re competent judges of how people use the words.” Are you? That’s an empirical claim. Claims about intuitions, about how nonphilosophers think or use words, what people would say in this or that situation, and so on are all questions about behavior. What people would say if you asked them a question isn’t merely a question of linguistics. It is a question of psychology, since the moment you ask such questions, you’re interacting with people, and psychological considerations come into play.

Philosophers who want to talk about intuitions or about how ordinary people think can either explicitly acknowledge they’re engaging in psychology and do psychology well, or they can do it poorly, by, e.g., engaging in exclusively speculatively armchair psychology, or try to insist that somehow what they’re doing just isn’t psychology, or isn’t empirical, or double dog swear they can reach justified conclusions about what people think or how they act without engaging in any empirical research at all.