I suspect they mean it’s the default because 1) vast majority have realist intuitions and 2) there are enough with realist intuitions without good defeaters (ofc these are empirical claims that require substantiation) and therefore even if you don’t personally have these intuitions (perhaps there are then defeaters for that - another empirical claim but even if not) you should acquiesce to the higher order evidence (all else equal, if more ppl report X then X is more probable).
If they think that, they should say that, instead of saying "it's the default," or "it's intuitive," and so on without qualification.
Either way, I take the claim that most people have realist intuitions to (a) be an empirical claim and (b) I don't think there's any good empirical evidence it's true. Philosophers shouldn't go around making empirical claims if they can't support those claims, and in this case, I don't think they can. Even if they do think these sorts of things, that doesn't excuse the sloppy and imprecise way philosophers speak and write on these subjects.
Most realists are pretty confident on claim 1 and 2 (perhaps more then they should be) and so instead demand that anti-realists have good theoretical reasons to reject the view - it’s in this sense, they mean it’s the default, I suspect.
That's fine, but if that's what they think, why not be explicit and clear about it? It's weird for philosophers to rely on empirical presuppositions and then not make them explicit.
This problem isn't limited to moral realism, either. It's everywhere.
I suspect they mean it’s the default because 1) vast majority have realist intuitions and 2) there are enough with realist intuitions without good defeaters (ofc these are empirical claims that require substantiation) and therefore even if you don’t personally have these intuitions (perhaps there are then defeaters for that - another empirical claim but even if not) you should acquiesce to the higher order evidence (all else equal, if more ppl report X then X is more probable).
If they think that, they should say that, instead of saying "it's the default," or "it's intuitive," and so on without qualification.
Either way, I take the claim that most people have realist intuitions to (a) be an empirical claim and (b) I don't think there's any good empirical evidence it's true. Philosophers shouldn't go around making empirical claims if they can't support those claims, and in this case, I don't think they can. Even if they do think these sorts of things, that doesn't excuse the sloppy and imprecise way philosophers speak and write on these subjects.
Most realists are pretty confident on claim 1 and 2 (perhaps more then they should be) and so instead demand that anti-realists have good theoretical reasons to reject the view - it’s in this sense, they mean it’s the default, I suspect.
That's fine, but if that's what they think, why not be explicit and clear about it? It's weird for philosophers to rely on empirical presuppositions and then not make them explicit.
This problem isn't limited to moral realism, either. It's everywhere.