Some time ago, Mike Huemer wrote an article discussing “absurd” theories of truth. I don’t want to address the article as a whole, but instead want to focus on two components: the linguistic tests Huemer favors, and pragmatic accounts of truth.
Hey, Lance. Great read. I disagreed with you here on some fronts.
Firstly, you commented that Huemer's critique doesn't apply to all formulations of pragmatism.
However, a critique doesn't need to apply to all formulations of a view. For example, in the case of meta-ethics, I'd raise the unintelligibility critique against some forms of moral realism, but that doesn't apply to all forms of moral realism (such as, moral naturalism). Instead, I have different critiques depending on the formulation of moral realism. Critiques don't need to be catch-all. It's fine if Huemer's critique only applies to one or two versions of pragmatism.
Secondly, you said Huemer's construal of Pragmatism as Truth=Useful is a strawman. I believe you argued that according to Classical Pragmatism, Truth is more than simply local expedience.
Now yes, if Huemer conflated "useful" with "local expedience", then that would be a very bad objection to pragmatism. However, I never saw Huemer adopt an extremely narrow conception of "usefulness" as simply "local expedience". I doubt many people have that conception of "useful". It seemed like Huemer was just going with what "useful" means to Pragmatists, and mounting his argument on that basis.
So I never saw any evidence Huemer conflated "useful" with "local expedience" (which, yes, would be fallacious). Other than that, I actually enjoyed reading this, and agreed with a lot of other points.
You have completely misunderstood Huemer's article. Just to address your three concluding points from the last paragraph:
1. "At least some forms of pragmatism don’t regard the notion of useful falsehoods as nonsensical, so it would make no sense to predict that ordinary people (if they were pragmatists) should do so."
Reply: Huemer never said they all do. In his article the crude proposal that what's true is what's useful serves as an illustrative example.
2. "Second, pragmatism is not necessarily in the business of making such predictions in the first place."
Reply: And it was not stated to be. In fact two options were presented, one where what Huemer called the trivial theory is rejected on conceptual grounds and a second where its rejected on semantic grounds.
3. "Third, even if pragmatism were intended to offer a description of ordinary thought and practice, and even if it did hold that useful falsehoods were nonsensical, it wouldn’t necessarily predict that nonphilosophers would explicitly agree when prompted."
Reply: And it was not stated to necessarily predict any such thing. All that was said is that if it a theory of ordinary thought and practice, then the thing to do would be to see how well it fits the linguistic data and compare that with how well rival theories fit that data. Obviously no one here is talking about anything like entailment, neither explicitly nor implicitly.
And it is addressed, just not in the way you described. To see how the argument applies to whatever version of pragmatism you have in mind just replace the crude example with that version throughout the whole line of reasoning, making necessary adjustments as needed. Of course this will also involve changing this section:
"For example, the Pragmatic theory predicts that ordinary speakers should find the phrase “useful falsehood” nonsensical. They should disagree with T-schema sentences (e.g., “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.”) They should judge that “Is it useful to believe what’s true?” means the same as “Is it useful to believe what’s useful to believe?” They should be happy with changing the standard courtroom oath from “I solemnly swear to tell the truth…” to “I solemnly swear to say what is useful…”"
Specifically, replace examples relevant to the crude theory with examples relevant to your preferred version. Of course this only matters if you don't think the motivation for that version was what Huemer described in section one, namely the conceptual defectiveness of the trivial theory. Alternatively you could present another proposal of what such a theory is supposed to do - Huemer said that he sees two possibilities, and that's what he discusses - another legitimate line of response is to propose a third possibility.
Thanks, this was very helpful. What I found most interesting is exploring the sense in which a useful falsehood makes sense under pragmatism. I probably have as inaccurate a picture of pragmatism as Huemer, so it's good to be set straight(er) on this stuff.
Hey, Lance. Great read. I disagreed with you here on some fronts.
Firstly, you commented that Huemer's critique doesn't apply to all formulations of pragmatism.
However, a critique doesn't need to apply to all formulations of a view. For example, in the case of meta-ethics, I'd raise the unintelligibility critique against some forms of moral realism, but that doesn't apply to all forms of moral realism (such as, moral naturalism). Instead, I have different critiques depending on the formulation of moral realism. Critiques don't need to be catch-all. It's fine if Huemer's critique only applies to one or two versions of pragmatism.
Secondly, you said Huemer's construal of Pragmatism as Truth=Useful is a strawman. I believe you argued that according to Classical Pragmatism, Truth is more than simply local expedience.
Now yes, if Huemer conflated "useful" with "local expedience", then that would be a very bad objection to pragmatism. However, I never saw Huemer adopt an extremely narrow conception of "usefulness" as simply "local expedience". I doubt many people have that conception of "useful". It seemed like Huemer was just going with what "useful" means to Pragmatists, and mounting his argument on that basis.
So I never saw any evidence Huemer conflated "useful" with "local expedience" (which, yes, would be fallacious). Other than that, I actually enjoyed reading this, and agreed with a lot of other points.
You have completely misunderstood Huemer's article. Just to address your three concluding points from the last paragraph:
1. "At least some forms of pragmatism don’t regard the notion of useful falsehoods as nonsensical, so it would make no sense to predict that ordinary people (if they were pragmatists) should do so."
Reply: Huemer never said they all do. In his article the crude proposal that what's true is what's useful serves as an illustrative example.
2. "Second, pragmatism is not necessarily in the business of making such predictions in the first place."
Reply: And it was not stated to be. In fact two options were presented, one where what Huemer called the trivial theory is rejected on conceptual grounds and a second where its rejected on semantic grounds.
3. "Third, even if pragmatism were intended to offer a description of ordinary thought and practice, and even if it did hold that useful falsehoods were nonsensical, it wouldn’t necessarily predict that nonphilosophers would explicitly agree when prompted."
Reply: And it was not stated to necessarily predict any such thing. All that was said is that if it a theory of ordinary thought and practice, then the thing to do would be to see how well it fits the linguistic data and compare that with how well rival theories fit that data. Obviously no one here is talking about anything like entailment, neither explicitly nor implicitly.
If someone mentions pragmatism I expect them to engage with actual pragmatism and not a caricature.
And it is addressed, just not in the way you described. To see how the argument applies to whatever version of pragmatism you have in mind just replace the crude example with that version throughout the whole line of reasoning, making necessary adjustments as needed. Of course this will also involve changing this section:
"For example, the Pragmatic theory predicts that ordinary speakers should find the phrase “useful falsehood” nonsensical. They should disagree with T-schema sentences (e.g., “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.”) They should judge that “Is it useful to believe what’s true?” means the same as “Is it useful to believe what’s useful to believe?” They should be happy with changing the standard courtroom oath from “I solemnly swear to tell the truth…” to “I solemnly swear to say what is useful…”"
Specifically, replace examples relevant to the crude theory with examples relevant to your preferred version. Of course this only matters if you don't think the motivation for that version was what Huemer described in section one, namely the conceptual defectiveness of the trivial theory. Alternatively you could present another proposal of what such a theory is supposed to do - Huemer said that he sees two possibilities, and that's what he discusses - another legitimate line of response is to propose a third possibility.
No, it's not addressed.
Why do you just say plainly false things?
I don't like your attitude. You seem unpleasant. And I'm just tired of engaging with unpleasant people, so I will not be engaging with you.
Do you think what you've been doing so far is "engaging"? >_<
Thanks, this was very helpful. What I found most interesting is exploring the sense in which a useful falsehood makes sense under pragmatism. I probably have as inaccurate a picture of pragmatism as Huemer, so it's good to be set straight(er) on this stuff.
I really hope more people learn about pragmatism. It is far richer than the superficial picture people get from the outside.
Useful fiction is a common concept, an LLC for example.