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Contradiction Clubber's avatar

I accept intuition-based philosophy, but I agree with most of what you say. I am embarrassed that I did not realize the serious flaws you point out in thought experiment methdology, and I am shocked I haven’t seen these problems more prominently discussed in analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, I think intuitions can justify belief in philosophical theories. (I’d construe intuitions as intellectual seemings, though I know you don’t believe in such things.)

Michael Huemer has defended phenomenal conservatism by claiming that alternative epistemologies are self-defeating. He argues that all beliefs are based on seemings (such as intuitions), and if seemings do not justify belief, then no beliefs are justified. I think you’d deny that beliefs are based on seemings because there are no such things as seemings. Elsewhere, you’ve argued that we shouldn’t believe in seemings because they may be ruled out by a completed cognitive science. I think this assumes a realist view of cognitive science, namely, that a completed theory of cognitive science would be true. Since I don’t accept realism about science, I’m not convinced by this argument.

> “It just renders our primary philosophical toolbox: our own minds, an unopened black box that we only access via its outputs and not by examining its internal workings. That’s not a way I think we can or should do philosophy, and it is highly vulnerable to producing mountains of baloney.”

You’re right. Intuitions probably make us believe mountains of baloney because they don’t have the right connections to the world to reliably produce true beliefs. Nevertheless, I offer two justifications for intuition-based philosophy. First, intuitions may provide epistemic justification for belief because there is no alternative. (This is true only if basically all beliefs are based on seemings.) If there is nothing better than intuition to get at metaphysical truth, then it may be reasonable to use our intuitions to try to discover metaphysical truths. I think this holds even if my beliefs based on intuition are true, say, 0.1% of the time. Of course, no one is required to use intuitions, and if you want to be a skeptic about intuition, I have no problem with that. Second, there’s pragmatic justifications for intuition-based philosophy. I find using intuitions satisfying because I like holding metaphysical beliefs. It’s not the case that the only purpose of inquiry is avoiding error. Personally, I am willing to take the epistemic risk to form beliefs based on intuitions. I want to believe.

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Idoubtit's avatar

Great post as always! Sad to hear about your personal problems, but congratulations on the baby.

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