I accept intuition-based philosophy, but I agree with most of what you say. I am embarrassed that I did not realize the serious flaws you point out in thought experiment methdology, and I am shocked I haven’t seen these problems more prominently discussed in analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, I think intuitions can justify belief in philosophical theories. (I’d construe intuitions as intellectual seemings, though I know you don’t believe in such things.)
Michael Huemer has defended phenomenal conservatism by claiming that alternative epistemologies are self-defeating. He argues that all beliefs are based on seemings (such as intuitions), and if seemings do not justify belief, then no beliefs are justified. I think you’d deny that beliefs are based on seemings because there are no such things as seemings. Elsewhere, you’ve argued that we shouldn’t believe in seemings because they may be ruled out by a completed cognitive science. I think this assumes a realist view of cognitive science, namely, that a completed theory of cognitive science would be true. Since I don’t accept realism about science, I’m not convinced by this argument.
> “It just renders our primary philosophical toolbox: our own minds, an unopened black box that we only access via its outputs and not by examining its internal workings. That’s not a way I think we can or should do philosophy, and it is highly vulnerable to producing mountains of baloney.”
You’re right. Intuitions probably make us believe mountains of baloney because they don’t have the right connections to the world to reliably produce true beliefs. Nevertheless, I offer two justifications for intuition-based philosophy. First, intuitions may provide epistemic justification for belief because there is no alternative. (This is true only if basically all beliefs are based on seemings.) If there is nothing better than intuition to get at metaphysical truth, then it may be reasonable to use our intuitions to try to discover metaphysical truths. I think this holds even if my beliefs based on intuition are true, say, 0.1% of the time. Of course, no one is required to use intuitions, and if you want to be a skeptic about intuition, I have no problem with that. Second, there’s pragmatic justifications for intuition-based philosophy. I find using intuitions satisfying because I like holding metaphysical beliefs. It’s not the case that the only purpose of inquiry is avoiding error. Personally, I am willing to take the epistemic risk to form beliefs based on intuitions. I want to believe.
Thanks for the response! I'm not a scientific realist, and am not sure what a realist view of cognitive science would be but I probably wouldn't endorse such a thing. So...it's not very likely I'm assuming any such thing.
A more general issue isn't simply speculation about what a completed cognitive science would include. Rather, it's a question of what kind of information we have available now. What even is a "seeming"? Why should I think people have them? I don't think there are good answers to these questions.
For comparison: I think if we fully scour the earth, we won't find Bigfoot. But I'm very skeptical Bigfoot exists right now because there's no good evidence that it exists. Seemings are in an even worse position. I at least have a clear idea of what it would mean for Bigfoot to exist. But I don't even think the notion of a "seeming" is sufficiently robust to be testable yet.
>>First, intuitions may provide epistemic justification for belief because there is no alternative.
This claim is fine and all but are there arguments for it?
>>Of course, no one is required to use intuitions, and if you want to be a skeptic about intuition, I have no problem with that
Some people may insist that we do use intuitions, whether we want to or not, and those of us denying it are engaged in performative contradictions since we hold views based on our intuitions. So maybe on some views I am required to use them.
>>Second, there’s pragmatic justifications for intuition-based philosophy. I find using intuitions satisfying because I like holding metaphysical beliefs. It’s not the case that the only purpose of inquiry is avoiding error. Personally, I am willing to take the epistemic risk to form beliefs based on intuitions. I want to believe.
There can be local pragmatic justifications for just about anything, given the right circumstances, but there's a deeper question about what, all things considered, given a person's goals and interests, would be best for them to endorse given their values. I doubt an intuition-centric approach to philosophy is really what people would favor under better conditions.
Thanks for the response! Just as I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my beliefs, I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my seemings. I think I have beliefs, and one reason I think this is based on introspection. When I consider the proposition “I have hands” I tend to feel it to be the case that I have hands. This is what I mean by belief. I take seemings to be a propositional attitude where the mind presents a proposition to me as true. When I introspect, the naïve comprehension schema of set theory seems true to me even though I know it’s not correct. So, I think I have a seeming that the schema is true. This kind of argument won’t convince people who don’t have these introspective experiences, and anyone's introspection may be misguided.
I’ll give an explanatory argument for the reality of seemings. I’d argue that seemings are an explanatory theoretical posit. Seemings are real because beliefs and dispositions to believe can come apart from seemings. Seemings aren’t identical to beliefs because it can seem to me that P but I can fail to believe that P. I could have a perceptual hallucination but fail to believe whatever is represented to me by the hallucination because I know I am hallucinating. Here, something seems to me to be the case, but I don’t have a corresponding belief. Neither are seemings identical to dispositions to believe because I can be disposed to believe that P while not having the seeming that P. Someone could be disposed to believe that she’ll go to heaven when she dies because she wants that to be true, but that may not seem true to her.
You might respond that I'm begging the question against you because my use of “seeming” here is loaded with certain implications. But then just consider how people could behave. People sometimes report that things “appear” or “look” certain ways (even construed in a non-perceptual way), and this suggests that they are having a certain kind of mental experience. It’s not crazy to think that a person having a hallucination could realize that she’s having a hallucination, disbelieve her hallucinatory experiences, but still report and feel the pull of her hallucinatory appearances. This is what I mean by a seeming.
>>I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my seemings.
What is it that you think you have introspective evidence of?
>>When I consider the proposition “I have hands” I tend to feel it to be the case that I have hands
What do you mean when you say you *feel* it to be the case? I can look at my hands, interact with them, and so on. I have lots of reasons to believe I have hands. And there are various respects in which it feels like I have hands: I can literally feel them! But I don't know what that has to do with "seemings," if anything.
>>I take seemings to be a propositional attitude where the mind presents a proposition to me as true.
Your mind...presents a proposition to you? What does that mean?
>>When I introspect, the naïve comprehension schema of set theory seems true to me even though I know it’s not correct. So, I think I have a seeming that the schema is true.
This just seems like a report of a seeming. It doesn't really help me to know what it is you're describing.
>>This kind of argument won’t convince people who don’t have these introspective experiences, and anyone's introspection may be misguided.
It doesn't seem like an argument so much as various claims.
>> I’d argue that seemings are an explanatory theoretical posit. Seemings are real because beliefs and dispositions to believe can come apart from seemings. Seemings aren’t identical to beliefs because it can seem to me that P but I can fail to believe that P.
The issue here is that this is still underdescribed. Is there specific phenomenology? Are you referring to dispositions? Are all seemings a natural kind? This just isn't specific or clear enough. People can find themselves disposed to believe things are true and then not believe them. But you're not referring to that.
>>I could have a perceptual hallucination but fail to believe whatever is represented to me by the hallucination because I know I am hallucinating.
Yes, but we have a clear account of this in terms of visual experience and believing that one's visual experience is inaccurate. What I'm questioning is whether there is an intellectual analogue to this. I don't think there is, or at least, to the extent that there is, I think it's a learned behavior.
>> Neither are seemings identical to dispositions to believe because I can be disposed to believe that P while not having the seeming that P.
Visual hallucinations can be understood as the product of distinct cognitive processes and have been localized to specific regions of the brain. Is there any similar cognitive and neuroscientific analog for "seemings"?
>>You might respond that I'm begging the question against you because my use of “seeming” here is loaded with certain implications.
My concern is mostly that I'm seeing lots of assertions but little by way of clarification or support. What I mostly get is people just super duper double dog swearing they have seemings. But that's not how we establish the existence of psychological phenomena. I mean, it's a start. But I want to see external corroborating data, and that requires sufficient clarity to operationalize "seemings" so they can be studied empirically.
>>People sometimes report that things “appear” or “look” certain ways (even construed in a non-perceptual way), and this suggests that they are having a certain kind of mental experience.
Well mental experience may be misleading. I think such language is metaphorical and that there's no particular reason to think that philosophical thinking is quasi-perceptual or literally perceptual.
>> It’s not crazy to think that a person having a hallucination could realize that she’s having a hallucination, disbelieve her hallucinatory experiences, but still report and feel the pull of her hallucinatory appearances. This is what I mean by a seeming.
Hallucinations involve perception. What I want to know is what the analog to this is.
You take issue with my metaphorical descriptions of belief and seeming. I think the concept of belief can be operationalized so that it can be measured empirically. For example, if someone believes that P, then she will tend to respond affirmatively when asked whether P. Maybe the idea of seeming can be operationalized as well, but I don’t know whether anyone has tried to do that. Apparently, your view is that in the absence of a clear operationalization of seeming and its empirical implications, we shouldn’t believe they are real.
I object to your demand for operationalization to determine whether seemings are real. It’s legitimate to conduct psychological and empirical tests to determine whether people have beliefs or seemings. But even if we couldn’t possibly gather empirical evidence for the reality of seemings, I wouldn’t take that as decisive reason to deny their reality. I view beliefs and seemings as private mental states that cannot, in principle, be accessed by others in the same way that oneself accesses them. There are reliable empirical indicators of whether I have certain a mental state or attitude, but I don’t think empirical tests are decisive in determining whether I have such states. I doubt that mental states are subject to empirical testing in the same way as ordinary physical phenomena like ordinary objects are. This would likely be unacceptable to you as an empiricist.
You might further object that seeming, unlike belief, isn’t even even a coherent concept—so we’re just talking about nonsense. I don’t think there’s a problem using metaphorical language to understand seemings or any concept. I don't think primitive concepts can always be eliminated, and I don’t think it’s desirable to do so. Maybe this methodological disagreement is irresolvable. If that’s the case, I’m okay with that.
I accept intuition-based philosophy, but I agree with most of what you say. I am embarrassed that I did not realize the serious flaws you point out in thought experiment methdology, and I am shocked I haven’t seen these problems more prominently discussed in analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, I think intuitions can justify belief in philosophical theories. (I’d construe intuitions as intellectual seemings, though I know you don’t believe in such things.)
Michael Huemer has defended phenomenal conservatism by claiming that alternative epistemologies are self-defeating. He argues that all beliefs are based on seemings (such as intuitions), and if seemings do not justify belief, then no beliefs are justified. I think you’d deny that beliefs are based on seemings because there are no such things as seemings. Elsewhere, you’ve argued that we shouldn’t believe in seemings because they may be ruled out by a completed cognitive science. I think this assumes a realist view of cognitive science, namely, that a completed theory of cognitive science would be true. Since I don’t accept realism about science, I’m not convinced by this argument.
> “It just renders our primary philosophical toolbox: our own minds, an unopened black box that we only access via its outputs and not by examining its internal workings. That’s not a way I think we can or should do philosophy, and it is highly vulnerable to producing mountains of baloney.”
You’re right. Intuitions probably make us believe mountains of baloney because they don’t have the right connections to the world to reliably produce true beliefs. Nevertheless, I offer two justifications for intuition-based philosophy. First, intuitions may provide epistemic justification for belief because there is no alternative. (This is true only if basically all beliefs are based on seemings.) If there is nothing better than intuition to get at metaphysical truth, then it may be reasonable to use our intuitions to try to discover metaphysical truths. I think this holds even if my beliefs based on intuition are true, say, 0.1% of the time. Of course, no one is required to use intuitions, and if you want to be a skeptic about intuition, I have no problem with that. Second, there’s pragmatic justifications for intuition-based philosophy. I find using intuitions satisfying because I like holding metaphysical beliefs. It’s not the case that the only purpose of inquiry is avoiding error. Personally, I am willing to take the epistemic risk to form beliefs based on intuitions. I want to believe.
Thanks for the response! I'm not a scientific realist, and am not sure what a realist view of cognitive science would be but I probably wouldn't endorse such a thing. So...it's not very likely I'm assuming any such thing.
A more general issue isn't simply speculation about what a completed cognitive science would include. Rather, it's a question of what kind of information we have available now. What even is a "seeming"? Why should I think people have them? I don't think there are good answers to these questions.
For comparison: I think if we fully scour the earth, we won't find Bigfoot. But I'm very skeptical Bigfoot exists right now because there's no good evidence that it exists. Seemings are in an even worse position. I at least have a clear idea of what it would mean for Bigfoot to exist. But I don't even think the notion of a "seeming" is sufficiently robust to be testable yet.
>>First, intuitions may provide epistemic justification for belief because there is no alternative.
This claim is fine and all but are there arguments for it?
>>Of course, no one is required to use intuitions, and if you want to be a skeptic about intuition, I have no problem with that
Some people may insist that we do use intuitions, whether we want to or not, and those of us denying it are engaged in performative contradictions since we hold views based on our intuitions. So maybe on some views I am required to use them.
>>Second, there’s pragmatic justifications for intuition-based philosophy. I find using intuitions satisfying because I like holding metaphysical beliefs. It’s not the case that the only purpose of inquiry is avoiding error. Personally, I am willing to take the epistemic risk to form beliefs based on intuitions. I want to believe.
There can be local pragmatic justifications for just about anything, given the right circumstances, but there's a deeper question about what, all things considered, given a person's goals and interests, would be best for them to endorse given their values. I doubt an intuition-centric approach to philosophy is really what people would favor under better conditions.
Thanks for the response! Just as I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my beliefs, I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my seemings. I think I have beliefs, and one reason I think this is based on introspection. When I consider the proposition “I have hands” I tend to feel it to be the case that I have hands. This is what I mean by belief. I take seemings to be a propositional attitude where the mind presents a proposition to me as true. When I introspect, the naïve comprehension schema of set theory seems true to me even though I know it’s not correct. So, I think I have a seeming that the schema is true. This kind of argument won’t convince people who don’t have these introspective experiences, and anyone's introspection may be misguided.
I’ll give an explanatory argument for the reality of seemings. I’d argue that seemings are an explanatory theoretical posit. Seemings are real because beliefs and dispositions to believe can come apart from seemings. Seemings aren’t identical to beliefs because it can seem to me that P but I can fail to believe that P. I could have a perceptual hallucination but fail to believe whatever is represented to me by the hallucination because I know I am hallucinating. Here, something seems to me to be the case, but I don’t have a corresponding belief. Neither are seemings identical to dispositions to believe because I can be disposed to believe that P while not having the seeming that P. Someone could be disposed to believe that she’ll go to heaven when she dies because she wants that to be true, but that may not seem true to her.
You might respond that I'm begging the question against you because my use of “seeming” here is loaded with certain implications. But then just consider how people could behave. People sometimes report that things “appear” or “look” certain ways (even construed in a non-perceptual way), and this suggests that they are having a certain kind of mental experience. It’s not crazy to think that a person having a hallucination could realize that she’s having a hallucination, disbelieve her hallucinatory experiences, but still report and feel the pull of her hallucinatory appearances. This is what I mean by a seeming.
>>I’d point to introspective evidence for the reality of my seemings.
What is it that you think you have introspective evidence of?
>>When I consider the proposition “I have hands” I tend to feel it to be the case that I have hands
What do you mean when you say you *feel* it to be the case? I can look at my hands, interact with them, and so on. I have lots of reasons to believe I have hands. And there are various respects in which it feels like I have hands: I can literally feel them! But I don't know what that has to do with "seemings," if anything.
>>I take seemings to be a propositional attitude where the mind presents a proposition to me as true.
Your mind...presents a proposition to you? What does that mean?
>>When I introspect, the naïve comprehension schema of set theory seems true to me even though I know it’s not correct. So, I think I have a seeming that the schema is true.
This just seems like a report of a seeming. It doesn't really help me to know what it is you're describing.
>>This kind of argument won’t convince people who don’t have these introspective experiences, and anyone's introspection may be misguided.
It doesn't seem like an argument so much as various claims.
>> I’d argue that seemings are an explanatory theoretical posit. Seemings are real because beliefs and dispositions to believe can come apart from seemings. Seemings aren’t identical to beliefs because it can seem to me that P but I can fail to believe that P.
The issue here is that this is still underdescribed. Is there specific phenomenology? Are you referring to dispositions? Are all seemings a natural kind? This just isn't specific or clear enough. People can find themselves disposed to believe things are true and then not believe them. But you're not referring to that.
>>I could have a perceptual hallucination but fail to believe whatever is represented to me by the hallucination because I know I am hallucinating.
Yes, but we have a clear account of this in terms of visual experience and believing that one's visual experience is inaccurate. What I'm questioning is whether there is an intellectual analogue to this. I don't think there is, or at least, to the extent that there is, I think it's a learned behavior.
>> Neither are seemings identical to dispositions to believe because I can be disposed to believe that P while not having the seeming that P.
Visual hallucinations can be understood as the product of distinct cognitive processes and have been localized to specific regions of the brain. Is there any similar cognitive and neuroscientific analog for "seemings"?
>>You might respond that I'm begging the question against you because my use of “seeming” here is loaded with certain implications.
My concern is mostly that I'm seeing lots of assertions but little by way of clarification or support. What I mostly get is people just super duper double dog swearing they have seemings. But that's not how we establish the existence of psychological phenomena. I mean, it's a start. But I want to see external corroborating data, and that requires sufficient clarity to operationalize "seemings" so they can be studied empirically.
>>People sometimes report that things “appear” or “look” certain ways (even construed in a non-perceptual way), and this suggests that they are having a certain kind of mental experience.
Well mental experience may be misleading. I think such language is metaphorical and that there's no particular reason to think that philosophical thinking is quasi-perceptual or literally perceptual.
>> It’s not crazy to think that a person having a hallucination could realize that she’s having a hallucination, disbelieve her hallucinatory experiences, but still report and feel the pull of her hallucinatory appearances. This is what I mean by a seeming.
Hallucinations involve perception. What I want to know is what the analog to this is.
You take issue with my metaphorical descriptions of belief and seeming. I think the concept of belief can be operationalized so that it can be measured empirically. For example, if someone believes that P, then she will tend to respond affirmatively when asked whether P. Maybe the idea of seeming can be operationalized as well, but I don’t know whether anyone has tried to do that. Apparently, your view is that in the absence of a clear operationalization of seeming and its empirical implications, we shouldn’t believe they are real.
I object to your demand for operationalization to determine whether seemings are real. It’s legitimate to conduct psychological and empirical tests to determine whether people have beliefs or seemings. But even if we couldn’t possibly gather empirical evidence for the reality of seemings, I wouldn’t take that as decisive reason to deny their reality. I view beliefs and seemings as private mental states that cannot, in principle, be accessed by others in the same way that oneself accesses them. There are reliable empirical indicators of whether I have certain a mental state or attitude, but I don’t think empirical tests are decisive in determining whether I have such states. I doubt that mental states are subject to empirical testing in the same way as ordinary physical phenomena like ordinary objects are. This would likely be unacceptable to you as an empiricist.
You might further object that seeming, unlike belief, isn’t even even a coherent concept—so we’re just talking about nonsense. I don’t think there’s a problem using metaphorical language to understand seemings or any concept. I don't think primitive concepts can always be eliminated, and I don’t think it’s desirable to do so. Maybe this methodological disagreement is irresolvable. If that’s the case, I’m okay with that.
Great post as always! Sad to hear about your personal problems, but congratulations on the baby.