The citation for Korsgaard is "Korsgaard, Christine, ed. 1996. #e Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press."
As I understand Peterson and Samuel's answer in the essay, they take it that we have reason for morality (in terms of compassion) because linguistic competence consists in being able to imagine another person's state of mind. So if we imagine another person's pain we do so in a way such that we experience that pain including aversion to that pain that is the desire to alleviate that pain becomes present when we understand (linguistically) that another person is in pain.
One can disagree that linguistic competence works like that. Another thing you can deny is that it would lead to a sufficiently general convergence of different agents on how to behave.
To use your example, if I travel through the cold I come upon the cave. The occupant of the cave as in your example tries to drive me off. However let's say there is not just one person but a bunch of people, the man's family in the cave. In my interaction I realize that the reason the guy doesn't want me in there is there is not enough room, he needs to make sure his children have a place by the fire. I empathize with the children and so gain the desire that they not be denied heat also and this if it does not remove my desire to enter the cave at least mitigates it and makes me less angry about the refusal. Likewise my remonstrating with the cave occupant might elicit sympathy from them that changes there desire to converge with mine to be in the cave and we might work out an accommodation without violence etc.
Obviously we do experience compassion for others as a motive. Whether it arises from our linguistic ability (or broader ability to communicate with and understand each other) seems like an open question. Another open question is would everyone be so moved and so moved so as to converge to the same judgement, if they were free of practical constraints on debate (freezing to death forecloses debate early in this case) and so on. If not then this is perfectly in line with subjectivism, some individuals (having one set of particular subjective views) will after communication converge on a set of moral practices, others (other subjective perspectives) will just disagree and not converge upon honest discussion. If however all rational beings capable of the use of language would converge on the same collective attitude (who should be let in the cave, for how long etc.) or even if all human beings, that to me sounds like a moral fact that is if not universal at least sufficiently general as to constitute the kind of thing posited by moral realism.
Note I take it realism is about a) something being the case (something being real) and b) this being somehow accessible to us human beings (something about our reasoning or perception allowing us to reliably converge on beliefs conforming to that situation). For example scientific realists don't think there are just mind independent (stance independent) facts about scientific posts like electrons and then independently of this we have beliefs about electrons, it's precisely that we have reason to think our beliefs about electrons have been formed, altered etc. so as to converge on these independent facts. Whereas scientific antirealists don't need to think there are no facts about electrons (that would be sufficient but not necessary to be a scientific antirealist), they just need to deny that actual human beings have reason to think their actual scientific beliefs have somehow converged on these facts.
I'm not really convinced by Peterson and Samuel's kind of argument, but it is to me at least a little suggestive and tries to address the worry about moral realism not itself being motivating.
My friend retired philosopher Danny Goldstick in his book Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press, 2009. Makes arguments that remind me of Samuel and Peterson's but I apparently have not grasped them. If I understand correctly his startegy is the opposite, show that not having the sort of moral attitudes of compassion etc. at all is impossible that no actual human beings operate in this way (in spends a chapter on trying to show that no one is consciouslessness) and so close off the possibility of what he takes to be alternatives (being a rational egotist who only goes along with pro-social rules out of fear of punishment, not any genuine compassion etc.).
Another friend of mine Philosopher Luke Roelofs is writing a book "Morality and Empathy" where he hopes to tackle the following:
"What grounds our obligation to treat each other well? What, if anything, can provide an objective justification for basic moral principles like 'treat others as you would like them to treat you?' My second book, currently under contract, is an attempt to address this very old question in a novel way by drawing on recent debates in cognitive science about what is sometimes called empathy: the process of understanding other minds by imaginatively recreating their perspectives. I think the right understanding of empathy can effect a productive synthesis of sentimentalism (the idea that morality comes from our capacity for feeling with others) and rationalism (the idea that morality comes from our capacity to reason about things), because empathy is a way of reasoning with feelings to understand conscious beings from the inside."
In a completely different vein Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics argued that happiness is the practice of virtue. My sense of the rationale is we wany not merely to live (survive), but live well. Our desires include inherently social and other directed desires (not just compassion but the desire to be admired and so on) and so the excellence of human life consists in caring about others in a certain way. Aristotle assumes with his usual optimism that human excellence will converge to basically one set of practices and activities, which are a lot like conventional morality. So again sounds like if not universal sufficiently general set of facts about morality, to be called realism.
On JPA's question "why be mad?" Perhaps something useful to think about is a joke I remember and an attitude about anger. As I recall it was someone (Richard Dawkins?) commenting on the irrationality of supernatural belief (in this case something like animism) and an example he brought up is Basil Faulty (fictional character played by John Cleese noted for comically expressive fits of anger), whipping a car that was not working. On this analysis Basil is irrational for getting mad at the car. JPA seems to be imaging something parallel.
If we are being clear though the problem with Basil being angry is not that he is angry (or even angry in an exaggerated and expressive way) that his car is not working. It's that he is treating the car as if it is a person at whom he is mad, whipping it etc. The car has no ability to sense or experience pain from this and no ability to change its behaviour in response to pain or the expectation of pain like a human can. Basil is using the wrong sorts of actions to manipulate the situation.
Whereas in terms of dealing with the caveman personal anger of this kind (that prompts you to want to whip them) is not so misbegotten. Moral anti-realism is consistent first with some sort of negotiation and appeal to compassion say working in some cases, but not in every case as perhaps the positions of the disputants are too different. Further threats of violence etc. work on prudential and not moral considerations, thinking that we will all rationally converge on a judgement about whether to submit to a threat of violence is some sort of realism or universalism about prudence not morality and is very different from thinking we will all converge on judgements about what compassion requires of us universally and so on. So being mad a the caveman who won't let you in is very different from being mad at the car.
If universal convegence to a set of judgements (what I take to be a part of moral realism) is a thing then if I've converged to the best final judgement and its that the caveman shhould let me in the cave, then I will be frustrated with him for ignoring some moral consideration that he has but because he's too hungry or tired or whatever he's missed and I will have that sort of personal anger from that frustration (a good thrashing will teach him his lesson to properly calculate utilities!). Or if I just know I will easily win the fight and this is pointless because he will just gain injuries from his intransginece again I have reason for a certain kind of anger at caveman I would not have towards a broken car.
However, I think at some point, if I consider the other person's point of view and realize look they just don't have good reason for compassion or fear of my violence, they are not miscalculating their own motives then I would cease to have that frustration. I may still have anger and sadness at my situation having to fight the guy, but it would be like the frustration someone trying to get a stuck nut off has that inspires them to great effort and loosening the nut with this anger fueled twist of the wrench, not Basil Faulty's anger fueled and useless whipping the car. So, I don't think it is totally misbegotten the idea that I wouldn't care. However it is very heavily attenuated from the sort of broad simple statement one does often see made in polemics for moral realism
Also in real life situations I probably don't have time to converge my psychology to such nice judgements whatever they should be. So I may still be frustrated and left with feeling as though I need to punish and "teach a lesson" to people and things that it makes no sense to have this attitude about. Basil Faulty is an exaggeration of a common human experience of anger.
The word "should" can be demarcated into three distinct versions based on the common usage of the word.
Methodological should, Goal-based should, and Self-reflective should.
Goal-based should, is essentially an expressive way of talking about the goal one partakes in that is compatible with one's psychological predispositions/character. If a goal isn't compatible, change one's character/psychological predispositions if one is able, or don't do the goal. To give an example of this, here's a sentence: "If I want to finish this marathon and I know I thrive in groups, then I should join a running club this month to stay motivated."
Methodological should, is talking about the method one needs to use to complete a goal or in relation to "what I should've done if I had the chance." To give a common example, "if you want to be an artist, you should go to this well-respected art school or read this particular set of books" The methods to become an artist in this case, is to get an education or to be self-taught by using well-designed books that reduce art into a series of steps to be learned.
Self-reflective should, be in relation to thinking about the past, "what I should've done, or could've done better." To give an example, "I went to the bar last night and over drank, I shouldn't have done that since I puked so much vomit, and now regret my actions."
All Methodological shoulds imply indirectly either a goal-based should or a self-reflective should, depending on the context.
Since "how to" is impartial, while "the why" depends on the psychology, this implies morality is semi-subjective. If one's psychological makeup necessitates going against the goal of following morality (in a manner whereby they wouldn't have the desire to help others even hypothetically), they ought to be against morality.
The evidence for "oughts/shoulds" that I have found is solely in the context of goals that are compatible with one's own psychology, methods that are compatible with the goals, and thinking about "doing better compared to what I did."
I have seen no evidence of this "intrinsic value" regarding the common use of the word "ought" or "should," outside of philosophers playing semantics to suggest an "intrinsic purpose." There are situational purposes based on psychological predispositions and the environment, but really nothing else.
However, within this framework, this isn't a mere "whim/preference" since what can be an ought, can only come about, based on the psychological nature of the individual/the environmental context. The whims don't matter as much if the whims are against one's own character. (Unless they're for changing one's character, but psychologically speaking, there are limits to being able to do that).
Even then, this implies plenty of "shoulds" aren't in relation to morals, since the word is frequently used in non-moral contexts. This implies that while morality's origin is subjective, it's a specific demarcated subjectivity from other goals.
If we look at Deontological ethics, Ethical egoism, Virtue ethics, and various other ethical systems.
We can see a family resemblance model that fulfills at least two of the three conditions (being about cooperation, coexistence, and self-development) either as an end or a means for some other end.
Thus, even if one were to criticize my framework, I have full justification in asserting that genocide is immoral, because genocide as a method, goes against the 2/3rd's of the moral goal (coexistence, and cooperation). The last one is iffy, since it may or may not hamper one's own internal self-development.
Regarding your specific request of someone dealing with your question of why we should care in the literature here is a quote:
"We want something more, and something more human. #is is
Korsgaard’s central issue with realism. Traditional realism, she argues, leaves
an explanatory gap: the existence of robust, mind- independent normative
facts doesn’t explain why these things count as reasons for us. It’s just as
though ‘we have normative concepts because we’ve spotted some normative
entities, as it were wafting by’ (1996, 44)."
This is from
Christa Peterson and Jack Samuel, The Right and the Wren In: Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 7. Edited by: David Shoemaker, Oxford University Press. © Christa Peterson and Jack Samuel 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192844644.003.0001
The citation for Korsgaard is "Korsgaard, Christine, ed. 1996. #e Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press."
As I understand Peterson and Samuel's answer in the essay, they take it that we have reason for morality (in terms of compassion) because linguistic competence consists in being able to imagine another person's state of mind. So if we imagine another person's pain we do so in a way such that we experience that pain including aversion to that pain that is the desire to alleviate that pain becomes present when we understand (linguistically) that another person is in pain.
One can disagree that linguistic competence works like that. Another thing you can deny is that it would lead to a sufficiently general convergence of different agents on how to behave.
To use your example, if I travel through the cold I come upon the cave. The occupant of the cave as in your example tries to drive me off. However let's say there is not just one person but a bunch of people, the man's family in the cave. In my interaction I realize that the reason the guy doesn't want me in there is there is not enough room, he needs to make sure his children have a place by the fire. I empathize with the children and so gain the desire that they not be denied heat also and this if it does not remove my desire to enter the cave at least mitigates it and makes me less angry about the refusal. Likewise my remonstrating with the cave occupant might elicit sympathy from them that changes there desire to converge with mine to be in the cave and we might work out an accommodation without violence etc.
Obviously we do experience compassion for others as a motive. Whether it arises from our linguistic ability (or broader ability to communicate with and understand each other) seems like an open question. Another open question is would everyone be so moved and so moved so as to converge to the same judgement, if they were free of practical constraints on debate (freezing to death forecloses debate early in this case) and so on. If not then this is perfectly in line with subjectivism, some individuals (having one set of particular subjective views) will after communication converge on a set of moral practices, others (other subjective perspectives) will just disagree and not converge upon honest discussion. If however all rational beings capable of the use of language would converge on the same collective attitude (who should be let in the cave, for how long etc.) or even if all human beings, that to me sounds like a moral fact that is if not universal at least sufficiently general as to constitute the kind of thing posited by moral realism.
Note I take it realism is about a) something being the case (something being real) and b) this being somehow accessible to us human beings (something about our reasoning or perception allowing us to reliably converge on beliefs conforming to that situation). For example scientific realists don't think there are just mind independent (stance independent) facts about scientific posts like electrons and then independently of this we have beliefs about electrons, it's precisely that we have reason to think our beliefs about electrons have been formed, altered etc. so as to converge on these independent facts. Whereas scientific antirealists don't need to think there are no facts about electrons (that would be sufficient but not necessary to be a scientific antirealist), they just need to deny that actual human beings have reason to think their actual scientific beliefs have somehow converged on these facts.
I'm not really convinced by Peterson and Samuel's kind of argument, but it is to me at least a little suggestive and tries to address the worry about moral realism not itself being motivating.
It is not I think the only strategy.
My friend retired philosopher Danny Goldstick in his book Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press, 2009. Makes arguments that remind me of Samuel and Peterson's but I apparently have not grasped them. If I understand correctly his startegy is the opposite, show that not having the sort of moral attitudes of compassion etc. at all is impossible that no actual human beings operate in this way (in spends a chapter on trying to show that no one is consciouslessness) and so close off the possibility of what he takes to be alternatives (being a rational egotist who only goes along with pro-social rules out of fear of punishment, not any genuine compassion etc.).
Another friend of mine Philosopher Luke Roelofs is writing a book "Morality and Empathy" where he hopes to tackle the following:
"What grounds our obligation to treat each other well? What, if anything, can provide an objective justification for basic moral principles like 'treat others as you would like them to treat you?' My second book, currently under contract, is an attempt to address this very old question in a novel way by drawing on recent debates in cognitive science about what is sometimes called empathy: the process of understanding other minds by imaginatively recreating their perspectives. I think the right understanding of empathy can effect a productive synthesis of sentimentalism (the idea that morality comes from our capacity for feeling with others) and rationalism (the idea that morality comes from our capacity to reason about things), because empathy is a way of reasoning with feelings to understand conscious beings from the inside."
https://www.lukeroelofs.com/moralityandempathy
In a completely different vein Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics argued that happiness is the practice of virtue. My sense of the rationale is we wany not merely to live (survive), but live well. Our desires include inherently social and other directed desires (not just compassion but the desire to be admired and so on) and so the excellence of human life consists in caring about others in a certain way. Aristotle assumes with his usual optimism that human excellence will converge to basically one set of practices and activities, which are a lot like conventional morality. So again sounds like if not universal sufficiently general set of facts about morality, to be called realism.
On JPA's question "why be mad?" Perhaps something useful to think about is a joke I remember and an attitude about anger. As I recall it was someone (Richard Dawkins?) commenting on the irrationality of supernatural belief (in this case something like animism) and an example he brought up is Basil Faulty (fictional character played by John Cleese noted for comically expressive fits of anger), whipping a car that was not working. On this analysis Basil is irrational for getting mad at the car. JPA seems to be imaging something parallel.
If we are being clear though the problem with Basil being angry is not that he is angry (or even angry in an exaggerated and expressive way) that his car is not working. It's that he is treating the car as if it is a person at whom he is mad, whipping it etc. The car has no ability to sense or experience pain from this and no ability to change its behaviour in response to pain or the expectation of pain like a human can. Basil is using the wrong sorts of actions to manipulate the situation.
Whereas in terms of dealing with the caveman personal anger of this kind (that prompts you to want to whip them) is not so misbegotten. Moral anti-realism is consistent first with some sort of negotiation and appeal to compassion say working in some cases, but not in every case as perhaps the positions of the disputants are too different. Further threats of violence etc. work on prudential and not moral considerations, thinking that we will all rationally converge on a judgement about whether to submit to a threat of violence is some sort of realism or universalism about prudence not morality and is very different from thinking we will all converge on judgements about what compassion requires of us universally and so on. So being mad a the caveman who won't let you in is very different from being mad at the car.
If universal convegence to a set of judgements (what I take to be a part of moral realism) is a thing then if I've converged to the best final judgement and its that the caveman shhould let me in the cave, then I will be frustrated with him for ignoring some moral consideration that he has but because he's too hungry or tired or whatever he's missed and I will have that sort of personal anger from that frustration (a good thrashing will teach him his lesson to properly calculate utilities!). Or if I just know I will easily win the fight and this is pointless because he will just gain injuries from his intransginece again I have reason for a certain kind of anger at caveman I would not have towards a broken car.
However, I think at some point, if I consider the other person's point of view and realize look they just don't have good reason for compassion or fear of my violence, they are not miscalculating their own motives then I would cease to have that frustration. I may still have anger and sadness at my situation having to fight the guy, but it would be like the frustration someone trying to get a stuck nut off has that inspires them to great effort and loosening the nut with this anger fueled twist of the wrench, not Basil Faulty's anger fueled and useless whipping the car. So, I don't think it is totally misbegotten the idea that I wouldn't care. However it is very heavily attenuated from the sort of broad simple statement one does often see made in polemics for moral realism
Also in real life situations I probably don't have time to converge my psychology to such nice judgements whatever they should be. So I may still be frustrated and left with feeling as though I need to punish and "teach a lesson" to people and things that it makes no sense to have this attitude about. Basil Faulty is an exaggeration of a common human experience of anger.
The word "should" can be demarcated into three distinct versions based on the common usage of the word.
Methodological should, Goal-based should, and Self-reflective should.
Goal-based should, is essentially an expressive way of talking about the goal one partakes in that is compatible with one's psychological predispositions/character. If a goal isn't compatible, change one's character/psychological predispositions if one is able, or don't do the goal. To give an example of this, here's a sentence: "If I want to finish this marathon and I know I thrive in groups, then I should join a running club this month to stay motivated."
Methodological should, is talking about the method one needs to use to complete a goal or in relation to "what I should've done if I had the chance." To give a common example, "if you want to be an artist, you should go to this well-respected art school or read this particular set of books" The methods to become an artist in this case, is to get an education or to be self-taught by using well-designed books that reduce art into a series of steps to be learned.
Self-reflective should, be in relation to thinking about the past, "what I should've done, or could've done better." To give an example, "I went to the bar last night and over drank, I shouldn't have done that since I puked so much vomit, and now regret my actions."
All Methodological shoulds imply indirectly either a goal-based should or a self-reflective should, depending on the context.
Since "how to" is impartial, while "the why" depends on the psychology, this implies morality is semi-subjective. If one's psychological makeup necessitates going against the goal of following morality (in a manner whereby they wouldn't have the desire to help others even hypothetically), they ought to be against morality.
The evidence for "oughts/shoulds" that I have found is solely in the context of goals that are compatible with one's own psychology, methods that are compatible with the goals, and thinking about "doing better compared to what I did."
I have seen no evidence of this "intrinsic value" regarding the common use of the word "ought" or "should," outside of philosophers playing semantics to suggest an "intrinsic purpose." There are situational purposes based on psychological predispositions and the environment, but really nothing else.
However, within this framework, this isn't a mere "whim/preference" since what can be an ought, can only come about, based on the psychological nature of the individual/the environmental context. The whims don't matter as much if the whims are against one's own character. (Unless they're for changing one's character, but psychologically speaking, there are limits to being able to do that).
Even then, this implies plenty of "shoulds" aren't in relation to morals, since the word is frequently used in non-moral contexts. This implies that while morality's origin is subjective, it's a specific demarcated subjectivity from other goals.
If we look at Deontological ethics, Ethical egoism, Virtue ethics, and various other ethical systems.
We can see a family resemblance model that fulfills at least two of the three conditions (being about cooperation, coexistence, and self-development) either as an end or a means for some other end.
Thus, even if one were to criticize my framework, I have full justification in asserting that genocide is immoral, because genocide as a method, goes against the 2/3rd's of the moral goal (coexistence, and cooperation). The last one is iffy, since it may or may not hamper one's own internal self-development.
I never knew until I started reading your blog that metaethics was a blood sport ;-).