another fascinating article, thanks so much for writing these! i've been learning a lot from your content.
do you think that the literature showing that intuitive dualism and essentialism are highly popular psychological/cognitive attitudes/tendencies/stances among non-experts, or, the "folk", can be taken to lend some support to the assumption that non-philosophers think about consciousness in ways that may be the same or very similar ways that, at least in part, might have motivated the phenomenological and analytic discourse on 'phenomenal consciousness'?
also, what do you think about eric schwitzgebel's 'innocent' conceptualisation of phenomenal consciousness? (latest, most streamlined version is chapter 8 in his latest book, but earlier version is available separately online.) he claims that none of the magical properties famously 'quined' by dennett are necessary, and still, a folk-psychologically obvious notion of experience remains (which, being charitable, (i don't think it too far-fetched to conjecture) may be what led to all the qualia memeplex.)
in addition, there's an essay titled 'mary on acid: experiences of unity and the epistemic gap' by jussi jylkkä in 'philosophy and psychedelics' edited by sjöstedt & hauskeller. i think that it clearly, simply and theoretically neutrally points out the explananda that can seem so baffling and private and 'mysterious' and 'spooky' despite being bedrock 'duh' obvious—just the fact of experience. the basic claim is that the epistemic gap is not the difference between two kinds of concepts, but rather the difference between experiences themselves and any kind of concepts. the brute fact of experience—'this' being separate from what science can say about it. unitary knowledge (brute fact of experiencing. 'this'.) vs relational (scientific) knowledge.
I'd have to go back and look at that research. I haven't looked at it in many years and I'd now have new eyes for methodological concerns.
So, with that caveat in mind, my initial reaction is to say that yes, evidence of intuitive dualism should be taken as more consistent with nonphilosophers have a concept of phenomenal consciousness than otherwise. I take it to be some evidence that they really do have such a concept, but it is not definitive. We simply need more data. It's very plausible that this motivated discourse on phenomenal consciousness among philosophers.
I'll have to have a look at what Schwitzgebel says, specifically and address your remarks later! I've gotta run!
another fascinating article, thanks so much for writing these! i've been learning a lot from your content.
do you think that the literature showing that intuitive dualism and essentialism are highly popular psychological/cognitive attitudes/tendencies/stances among non-experts, or, the "folk", can be taken to lend some support to the assumption that non-philosophers think about consciousness in ways that may be the same or very similar ways that, at least in part, might have motivated the phenomenological and analytic discourse on 'phenomenal consciousness'?
also, what do you think about eric schwitzgebel's 'innocent' conceptualisation of phenomenal consciousness? (latest, most streamlined version is chapter 8 in his latest book, but earlier version is available separately online.) he claims that none of the magical properties famously 'quined' by dennett are necessary, and still, a folk-psychologically obvious notion of experience remains (which, being charitable, (i don't think it too far-fetched to conjecture) may be what led to all the qualia memeplex.)
in addition, there's an essay titled 'mary on acid: experiences of unity and the epistemic gap' by jussi jylkkä in 'philosophy and psychedelics' edited by sjöstedt & hauskeller. i think that it clearly, simply and theoretically neutrally points out the explananda that can seem so baffling and private and 'mysterious' and 'spooky' despite being bedrock 'duh' obvious—just the fact of experience. the basic claim is that the epistemic gap is not the difference between two kinds of concepts, but rather the difference between experiences themselves and any kind of concepts. the brute fact of experience—'this' being separate from what science can say about it. unitary knowledge (brute fact of experiencing. 'this'.) vs relational (scientific) knowledge.
I'd have to go back and look at that research. I haven't looked at it in many years and I'd now have new eyes for methodological concerns.
So, with that caveat in mind, my initial reaction is to say that yes, evidence of intuitive dualism should be taken as more consistent with nonphilosophers have a concept of phenomenal consciousness than otherwise. I take it to be some evidence that they really do have such a concept, but it is not definitive. We simply need more data. It's very plausible that this motivated discourse on phenomenal consciousness among philosophers.
I'll have to have a look at what Schwitzgebel says, specifically and address your remarks later! I've gotta run!