I suspect something like this fallacy may be lurking behind a lot of casual accusations of incoherence or self-defeat—e.g., illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is incoherent because (according to opponents of illusionism) an illusion is a phenomenally conscious experience. Or determinism is self-defeating because (according to opponents of determinism) a belief with a sufficient cause can’t be justified.
As far as I can tell, "whether moral realism is true" is not an empirical matter. It is hard to imagine how we’re about to discover whether moral realism is true. I would not take this bet.
I suspect something like this fallacy may be lurking behind a lot of casual accusations of incoherence or self-defeat—e.g., illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is incoherent because (according to opponents of illusionism) an illusion is a phenomenally conscious experience. Or determinism is self-defeating because (according to opponents of determinism) a belief with a sufficient cause can’t be justified.
Absolutely! I have an upcoming blog post addressing this specifically in the case of illusionism. Stay tuned.
As far as I can tell, "whether moral realism is true" is not an empirical matter. It is hard to imagine how we’re about to discover whether moral realism is true. I would not take this bet.