type-A physicalism seems to me like a confused reasoning scheme. It is obvious that no amount of having exhaustive knowledge or reasoning about the underlying physical state of a particular sensation could tell you what it's like to have that sensation unless you've experienced it. And so the type-A physicalist seems to do away with this by saying that if we have sufficient knowledge about the causal antecedents then we would know what it is like to have that sensation and the putative epistemic gap would no longer obtain, but how would this amount to saying anything else besides that it is *possible* that type-A physicalism is true? It seems like it doesn't, given that type-A physicalism is *just the view that such a gap does not exist*. So it seems like it is saying that explanatory gap problem is *possibly false*, that given other possible information about causal antecedents that we can come to acquire, we would reach a full understanding of mental cognition that in no way illustrates the putative epistemic gap. However, this goes against the general normative attitude that we should reason *in light of the available evidence*. And it seems like in light of the available evidence, antecedent physical-causal explanations of mental states don't give us an account as to what those mental states are, what it would be like to experience them. So saying that its just possible that there are things out there we may not know about such that if we did know about the gap would fail to be the case just seems confused, and is no strong evidence against opposing views.
“It’s obvious” isn’t a good reason to think anything. I consider views in the vicinity of Type-A physicalism to be obvious and the only legitimate positions worth considering. There is no such thing as some sort of special, private “what it’s like” to have an experience inaccessible to science. I deny there is any such thing. Just about the only thing people who disagree have is their personal insistence that it’s obvious that it does exist. I’m not impressed by that.
My position doesn’t turn on saying it’s possible we can account for any explanatory gaps. I deny there is an explanatory gap in the first place.
So would you think that if you've never tasted chocolate, nor any chocolate-adjacent foods of the kind that would allow you to speculate on what it would be like, and I gave you an exhaustive, in-depth description of every neuron, neurotransmitter, and firing pattern involved in the causal makeup of chocolate-tasting, you would come to know what the taste of chocolate is in fact like?
Also, I think it being "obvious" is in fact a good reason to think some things. Its obvious to me that the sky looks blue in broad daylight, and I needn't have any other reasons besides that as to why I should hold this belief. This is just how most ordinary and mundane beliefs about the world function, unless you're also saying that those are also forfeit?
type-A physicalism seems to me like a confused reasoning scheme. It is obvious that no amount of having exhaustive knowledge or reasoning about the underlying physical state of a particular sensation could tell you what it's like to have that sensation unless you've experienced it. And so the type-A physicalist seems to do away with this by saying that if we have sufficient knowledge about the causal antecedents then we would know what it is like to have that sensation and the putative epistemic gap would no longer obtain, but how would this amount to saying anything else besides that it is *possible* that type-A physicalism is true? It seems like it doesn't, given that type-A physicalism is *just the view that such a gap does not exist*. So it seems like it is saying that explanatory gap problem is *possibly false*, that given other possible information about causal antecedents that we can come to acquire, we would reach a full understanding of mental cognition that in no way illustrates the putative epistemic gap. However, this goes against the general normative attitude that we should reason *in light of the available evidence*. And it seems like in light of the available evidence, antecedent physical-causal explanations of mental states don't give us an account as to what those mental states are, what it would be like to experience them. So saying that its just possible that there are things out there we may not know about such that if we did know about the gap would fail to be the case just seems confused, and is no strong evidence against opposing views.
“It’s obvious” isn’t a good reason to think anything. I consider views in the vicinity of Type-A physicalism to be obvious and the only legitimate positions worth considering. There is no such thing as some sort of special, private “what it’s like” to have an experience inaccessible to science. I deny there is any such thing. Just about the only thing people who disagree have is their personal insistence that it’s obvious that it does exist. I’m not impressed by that.
My position doesn’t turn on saying it’s possible we can account for any explanatory gaps. I deny there is an explanatory gap in the first place.
So would you think that if you've never tasted chocolate, nor any chocolate-adjacent foods of the kind that would allow you to speculate on what it would be like, and I gave you an exhaustive, in-depth description of every neuron, neurotransmitter, and firing pattern involved in the causal makeup of chocolate-tasting, you would come to know what the taste of chocolate is in fact like?
Also, I think it being "obvious" is in fact a good reason to think some things. Its obvious to me that the sky looks blue in broad daylight, and I needn't have any other reasons besides that as to why I should hold this belief. This is just how most ordinary and mundane beliefs about the world function, unless you're also saying that those are also forfeit?