What I'm writing is purely speculative (and a bit inflammatory), but I strongly believe it is case 2.
The realist is unable to convey the concepts because they are inhibited by a strong psychological self-protective response. It is self-protection against extreme (stance-dependent) harms. Ironically, I believe it is the realist who has some "impoverishment" of mental faculties.
The concept is actually very simple to convey: a stance-independent moral reason is the strong stance-dependent feeling that an action is unjustified or justified. The feeling is so strong that it is akin to the feeling of the existence of other "real" things. Thus, the realist categorizes the moral claims as "real". The strength of this feeling is motivated by the impulse for self-protection against extreme harms. Of course, to convey this, they have to accept that the so-called "stance-independence" is reducible to "stance-dependence" and in doing so, undermine their psychological self-protection.
This account also explains why realists frequently accuse anti-realists of not being able to object to extreme harms (e.g. baby torture), even though first-order normative claims are irrelevant. To them, stance-independence psychologically serves to protect against these harms.
What I'm writing is purely speculative (and a bit inflammatory), but I strongly believe it is case 2.
The realist is unable to convey the concepts because they are inhibited by a strong psychological self-protective response. It is self-protection against extreme (stance-dependent) harms. Ironically, I believe it is the realist who has some "impoverishment" of mental faculties.
The concept is actually very simple to convey: a stance-independent moral reason is the strong stance-dependent feeling that an action is unjustified or justified. The feeling is so strong that it is akin to the feeling of the existence of other "real" things. Thus, the realist categorizes the moral claims as "real". The strength of this feeling is motivated by the impulse for self-protection against extreme harms. Of course, to convey this, they have to accept that the so-called "stance-independence" is reducible to "stance-dependence" and in doing so, undermine their psychological self-protection.
This account also explains why realists frequently accuse anti-realists of not being able to object to extreme harms (e.g. baby torture), even though first-order normative claims are irrelevant. To them, stance-independence psychologically serves to protect against these harms.
My quote here is true but I do wanna say that I made it largely in jest and I actually think anti-realism is more than reasonable
Also I really like the article, well done