Even J.L. Mackie, one of the first who defended moral error theory ("moral statements are systematically false"), concluded that if moral facts don't represent some true, suprasensory moral domain, we might as well just invent moralities which "work" for us. If utilitarianism is too demanding, forget it. Etc.
That was a very enjoyable read. When I initially saw the tweet at the beginning, I got rather irrationally angry at the implication that a moral anti-realist position rendered all discussion of morality superfluous. I was happy to see you addressed basically all of my objections in good form.
From some reading of philosophy-adjacent people discussing All That Stuff it seems to me that they constantly refer to those things they call "intuitions" and I'm failing to see how those "intuitions" substantively differ from, to use a colloquial term, "feelings", which I think are best operationalised as "emotionally informed beliefs".
Also, yes, very much on the "what to do" vs "what is true" distinction.
Even J.L. Mackie, one of the first who defended moral error theory ("moral statements are systematically false"), concluded that if moral facts don't represent some true, suprasensory moral domain, we might as well just invent moralities which "work" for us. If utilitarianism is too demanding, forget it. Etc.
That was a very enjoyable read. When I initially saw the tweet at the beginning, I got rather irrationally angry at the implication that a moral anti-realist position rendered all discussion of morality superfluous. I was happy to see you addressed basically all of my objections in good form.
[Not a philosopher]
From some reading of philosophy-adjacent people discussing All That Stuff it seems to me that they constantly refer to those things they call "intuitions" and I'm failing to see how those "intuitions" substantively differ from, to use a colloquial term, "feelings", which I think are best operationalised as "emotionally informed beliefs".
Also, yes, very much on the "what to do" vs "what is true" distinction.
Why would we have to have unfounded assumptions? I don't accept the Münchhausen trilemma as a legitimate problem.