I might be missing conceptual distinctions here, but the P/NP seems to be pretty much equivalent to "feelz"/other internal processes. Is there more to this, I wonder.
These measures are just so hopeless lol. Imagine conducting this study on Disney movies or kids' books where the "minded" objects are far more likely to exhibit primitive emotional states like feeling hunger, loneliness, joy, etc rather than planning or thinking. What would weighing the evidence in favor of one or the other even amount to?
Or imagine a primitive civilization built next to a volcano: "The volcano god is feeling calm today," on a clear day with no wind; "The volcano god is angry," when there's an earthquake and lava is spewing from the volcano; "The volcano god is thinking about when to explode," when there's a series of extreme weather events that aren't extreme enough to result in an eruption (and imagine a civilization where this description is never formed because the volcano is always quick to erupt and it makes more sense to model the volcano god as an erratic and impulsive individual that doesn't sustain long-formed thinking). The attribution of phenomenal vs cognitive states is context driven and subject to all sorts of weird and unusual considerations that people clearly don't mean to be correspondence-truth-tracking on whether the subjects involved "actually" or "really" have phenomenal or cognitive states.
[Non Philosopher Here]
I might be missing conceptual distinctions here, but the P/NP seems to be pretty much equivalent to "feelz"/other internal processes. Is there more to this, I wonder.
These measures are just so hopeless lol. Imagine conducting this study on Disney movies or kids' books where the "minded" objects are far more likely to exhibit primitive emotional states like feeling hunger, loneliness, joy, etc rather than planning or thinking. What would weighing the evidence in favor of one or the other even amount to?
Or imagine a primitive civilization built next to a volcano: "The volcano god is feeling calm today," on a clear day with no wind; "The volcano god is angry," when there's an earthquake and lava is spewing from the volcano; "The volcano god is thinking about when to explode," when there's a series of extreme weather events that aren't extreme enough to result in an eruption (and imagine a civilization where this description is never formed because the volcano is always quick to erupt and it makes more sense to model the volcano god as an erratic and impulsive individual that doesn't sustain long-formed thinking). The attribution of phenomenal vs cognitive states is context driven and subject to all sorts of weird and unusual considerations that people clearly don't mean to be correspondence-truth-tracking on whether the subjects involved "actually" or "really" have phenomenal or cognitive states.